The scramble for rice

Alex and I have recently posted on the WFP’s appeal for more funds as the price of food continues to rise. Last week the price of rice began to shoot upwards sparking fears of a major rice shortage in Asia. According to experts global rice stocks are at their lowest since 1976. However some commentators aren’t convinced  and argue that despite the sharp increase the fundamental balance between supply and demand remains largely intact. But are their voices loud and frequent enough for prices to drop and calm to return.

Not at the moment… last week’s turbulence (trigged by Egypt and Cambodia which banned rice exports) saw rice stocks jump 30 per cent in international markets causing the Vietnamese Government to announced it would reduce rice exports this year to 3.5m tons, from a projection of between 4m and 4.5m tons. India meanwhile has raised its minimum export price to $1,000 (€635, £500) per ton, up from $650 per ton, in a bid to keep domestic prices low.

One possible consequence of this run on rice is an increase in social unrest (food riots have broken out in Egypt, Cameroon, and Burkina Faso in the past week) which has led donor organisations to ask for more funding to maintain food distribution programmes.

According to the WFP $50m would buy 189,000 tons of food last year in Afghanistan, which would feed 3.5m people. This year, the same amount would buy only 112,000 tons to feed 1.9m.

Iran’s “Grand Bargain”: how the story disappeared

The current edition of the Columbia Journalism Review should be required reading for foreign policy wonks as well as aspiring hacks.  It has a great piece on how marines  in Iraq turned to a blogger in New Jersey to track the patterns of insurgent attacks – as well as a thoughtful dismissal of  indie documentaries on the war.  Best of all is the cover story, which explains how the U.S. print media have followed the administration’s line on Iran, including this account of how the Iranian offer of a “grand bargain”in May 2003 has been kept out of the news. 

Whatever its inspiration, Iran’s offer put nearly everything on the table, from support for Hezbollah to Iran’s nuclear energy program. It has since been dubbed the “Grand Bargain.” The exact provenance of the offer wasn’t initially clear. It came sans letterhead via a fax from the Swiss ambassador to Iran—Washington’s designated middleman for communications. But the offer does appear to have been serious.

The offer wasn’t an easy story for journalists to nail down. The Iranians who had crafted a peace offering to the “Great Satan” had every incentive to stay mum, as did an administration in Washington that had little interest in negotiating. But the Financial Times published a short piece by diplomatic correspondent Guy Dinmore in July 2003 sketching out the overture and the U.S.’s lack of interest. “We are not reaching out at this point,” a State Department official told Dinmore.

And there the story sat. The first follow-up didn’t come for nearly a year, until Dinmore himself wrote another, more detailed piece in which he clarified that the fax was actually the culmination of a series of feelers. The added details still did not set off a rush for follow-up. The next story on Iran’s interest in a deal didn’t appear until the fall of 2004, roughly eighteen months after Dinmore’s first report, in The Washington Post. That story, the first to refer to a “Grand Bargain,” included more intriguing revelations:

• Through Swiss Ambassador Tim Guldimann, Tehran indicated a desire to discuss its nuclear program.
• The offer held the outlines of a “Grand Bargain,” but Washington balked. “We’re not interested in a grand bargain,” then U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton said.
• Over eighteen months, the countries periodically discussed their mutual interests in Afghanistan and Iraq. But a Bush administration policymaker said “instructions were clear” to the U.S. negotiators: “Don’t bring up the nukes.”

All of which were mentioned roughly sixty paragraphs into the Post piece. The story itself, written in the run-up to the 2004 presidential elections, was a lengthy (and stinging) assessment of the administration’s nonproliferation strategy. There’s very little to criticize in the Post’s effort. The story’s reporters—Dafna Linzer and Barton Gellman—simply happened across some fine nuggets as part of a larger investigation.

What is surprising was (again) the lack of follow-up. Few other reporters seemed interested in the evidence of Iran’s apparent peace overtures and the U.S.’s recalcitrance. The first headline about any of this in a U.S. paper wouldn’t come for another year and a half, nearly three years after the Financial Times first revealed those overtures. (That story was published in February 2006 by a freelancer, Greg Beals, in Long Island’s Newsday.)

Reporters seemed interested in the story and later—when a source began providing documentary proof—some tried to write it. But “editors slashed it down to something like the last paragraph of a larger story,” says Trita Parsi, the Iran expert and former congressional staffer who provided the documents. “It was something that went against people’s assumptions.”

Through the rest of 2006, there appears to have been one piece devoted to the offer, in The Washington Post—it ran on page A16. Even though the offer had never really made news, it was considered old news.

New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof decided to write about the proposals in early 2007. Kristof says he, too, was “concerned about the possibility of a military encounter. So I started doing some reporting.” Kristof eventually added more detail showing that the Iranians had not simply sent the offer through the Swiss, but had also approached the State Department, and had sent an offer to the White House itself. Writing about the various versions of the offer, Kristof concluded “neo-cons killed [an] incipient peace process.”

No story about the “Grand Bargain” ever appeared in the news pages of the Times.

West Africa’s new resource curse

A few weeks back the Guardian noted the transformation of Guinea-Bissau, a tiny, jungly and desperately poor country on the tip of West Africa, into the world’s first “narco-state.” Presumably this phrase means that its economy relies on drugs, though it has never been clearly defined and Guatemala and Afghanistan have also laid claim to the title in the recent past. No matter, what is not in doubt is that Guinea-Bissau, which had hitherto relied for survival on a meagre harvest of cashew nuts and fish (at least those fish that are not plundered by European Union trawlers), has found its diamonds/oil/gold/coltan substitute: cocaine.

The traditional route for exporting the drug from Colombia to Europe – Britons and Spaniards are the world’s biggest cokeheads – is via the Caribbean, but the American crackdown (no pun intended) has made that option both risky and expensive. Guinea-Bissau, which is the nearest point of Africa to South America, has no prisons and a police force that owns no handcuffs or vehicles, presents an alluring alternative. A few years ago, therefore, Colombian drug cartels began flying consignments of the drug to airstrips (left over from a recent civil war) in the remote jungles of the Bijagos islands. From there, having paid off local police, they move it north across the Sahara to Europe. (more…)

Meanwhile, in southern Iraq…

…you may have noticed that all is not well.  The British troops in Basra (both of them) are needless to say staying out of the way.  But as the Yorskhire Ranter reports,

…inevitably, the US authorities seem to have swallowed the “southern surge” thing, and are now pressing for more British troops to be sent – not just that, but for an advance back into Basra.

This is genuinely bugfuck insane and the Prime Minister has no choice but to reject it; there is literally no-one left. Army planners are already looking at calling out at least 2 Territorial Army [= reservist – ed.] battalions in their entirety to cover routine tasks; a mass of resources is going into Afghanistan; there is some question as to whether there is another brigade in the tubes for the next but one rotation in Iraq. The inter-allied shit just hit the fan.

Meanwhile, John Robb reckons that Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi army

has the ability to shut down, indefinitely, all oil production (a million barrels a day) in southern Iraq. This effort will cost the government tens of millions in revenues for each day of the conflict. It may prove be the most effective means of prematurely terminating Maliki’s offensive.

Bill Lind, for his part, thinks that “For about half a year, we have been enjoying something of a lull in the war in Iraq … Events begin to suggest that the lull is ending and Mars is in the ascendant.”  His analysis of what caused the lull, and why it seems set to fracture, is well worth the time.

Update: Kevin Drum has thoughtfully provided a cheat sheet on who’s fighting who in Basra –

  • ISCI = SIIC = new name for SCIRI = Badr Corps = “aristocratic” Hakim family = exiles during Saddam Hussein’s reign = pro-Iran = generally in control of army and security forces = pro-U.S. = ally of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his Dawa Party.
  • Mahdi Army = JAM = “firebrand cleric” Muqtada al-Sadr = Iraqi nationalists = originally part of Maliki’s governing coalition but no longer = anti-U.S. = populist/working class orientation = controls much of the oil sector in Basra.
  • “Special groups” = rogue elements of the Mahdi Army = maybe Sadr is just as happy to have Maliki take these guys out for him, but who knows for sure?
  • Fadhila = ex-allies of Sadr = won some elections in Basra in 2005 = smallest of the three Shiite factions in the south.

Consultants and corruption in Afghanistan

A new report by the Agency Co-ordinating Body for Afghan Relief (Acbar) says the international aid effort in Afghanistan is in large part “wasteful and ineffective”, with as much as 40 per cent of funds spent going back to donor countries in corporate profits and consultant salaries. This is worrying but not really news…

As far back as 2002 a classified private contractor’s  report (the irony) on the security situation in Afghanistan described how pointless it was to have major consultancies working in Kabul ‘when what the Afghan officials need are desks, chairs and computers.’

The FT article also reports that the administration of Hamid Karzai has failed to tackle high-level corruption in a government that relies on international handouts for 90 per cent of public spending. Let’s not beat around the bush – corruption is endemic in Afghanistan and while there has been very limited success in building a more transparent and accountable government the story is depressing. Senior drug traffickers for example are routinely captured and sent to the police cells only for a call to come in from a senior government official letting the handcuffed prisoner free. As I said in a previous post  follow the drugs, all you find are drug users and drug dealers, but if you follow the money, you don’t know what you’ll find’. According to one anti-narcotics official ‘the sharks are swimming free while the minnows are captured’.

And while it is interesting to know that the cost of engaging a foreign contractor can be as much as $500,000 (€324,000, £252,000) a year, and many donors insist that contractors use material and labour from their own countries rather than sourcing locally; and that countries such as Spain and France are contributing too little, while big donors are failing to fulfil their commitments; I do wonder how NGOs are fairing in Afghanistan?

Surely a more more interesting perspective on aid to Afghanistan would be an holistic account of the donor system? How we in the broadest possible sense are doing.

Finally and as mentioned in the Demos report on national security Acbar also published figures showing how the most insecure provinces benefit the most from international funding – the report suggests that if Helmand were a country, it would rank as the fifth biggest recipient of US development aid. In perhaps the best example of an understatement I can think of Matt Waldman, a policy adviser for Oxfam said rewarding the most volatile provinces was “short-sighted”.