A few weeks ago, Charlie suggested that Afghanistan’s opium economy might benefit from skyrocketing food prices.
But the trajectory is unlikely to change, as farmers choose to grow opium for a variety of reasons. Sometimes they grow because they have to repay opium-denominated debt. Sometimes the transaction costs of growing non-opium crops are too high. These include bribes to be paid to Afghan policemen on the way to market. Finally – and while I am no expert on this – high energy prices (one of the causes of rising food prices) also increases the cost of growing non-opium crops i.e gasolin to take products to market and to make fertilizer etc.
In this piece, I try to lay out a way forward for the Afghan government. In short:
First, the international community must forego the idea that it can sequence coercive and development activities; it is simply not possible given the conditions now and in the foreseeable future.
Second, the international community needs to take aerial eradication off the table and make clear that traffickers, not farmers, are the problem.
Instead, the government should focus on rolling out the Afghan state, prioritizing the provision of security to local farmers. The international community, in turn, should focus on building local capacity to maintain security and deliver basic services and tackle the corrupt Afghan National Police. Such an approach will allow the gradual introduction of basic services and access to licit sources of income.
A “stability-first” policy needs to be coupled with arrests and the prosecution of drug lords and their backers in government. Unless these “narcotics entrepreneurs” are targeted, arrested and prosecuted, little will change. A special UN-backed narcotics court should be set up to do this.
Narcotics threatens to negate all of Afghanistan’s (dwindling) post-2001 achievements and a new policy is clearly needed. But will the international community act?
Speech by David Steven to the UK Defence Academy’s Advanced Research and Assessment Group seminar on Strategic Communications, Public Diplomacy and Afghanistan (4 June 2008).
There’s a great article in this week’s New Yorker about a new form of therapy designed to treat the estimated 20% of Iraq and Afghanistan veterans who are returning to the US with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
The therapy is based on virtual reality – using a specially-modified version of the game Full Spectrum Warrior, which was partly designed by the Pentagon as a training programme, though civilians can also buy it and play it on their PCs or consoles.
The special therapeutic version, called Virtual Iraq, uses a head-set that fully immerses the player in the environment. Psychologists then use it to re-expose the patient to the incident that caused their trauma, the incident which is lodging in their memory like shrapnel, and not letting them get on with their life.
The programme can be modified to quite detailed specifications – the psychologist can take the patient to a number of different environments, such as walking through a market, or driving along a road in a Humvee, and can introduce elements such as helicopters flying over head, people shouting in Arabic, even ‘the smell of burnt hair’.
In The Next Attack, Benjamin and Simon argued that:
It is unlikely that even in his feverish reveries, Usama bin Laden could have imagined that America would stumble so badly and wound itself so grievously. By occupying Iraq, the United States has played into the hands of its opponents, affirming the story they have been telling to the Muslim world and adding to their aura as true warriors in defence of Islam…
There is, as has so often been said, a war of ideas going on, a battle for hearts and minds. Unfortunately, America has wound up on the wrong side.
Of course, this was pretty predictable. Every effective terror movement in history has been fuelled by the adverse reaction of its host society. The Bush administration has simply proved particularly obtuse and self-destructive- a fact for which Al Qaeda is appropriately grateful. In 2004, bin Laden mischievously quoted an unnamed British diplomat speaking at Chatham House (!) to support his assertion that ‘it seems as if we and the White House are on the same team shooting at the United States’ own goal’.
Benjamin and Simon’s policy prescription for the US can be summed simply as: stop scoring own goals. They call for a ‘deep and dramatic’ engagement with the Islamic world and point to Turkey’s relationship with the EU as a model. It has moved from military repression to relative liberalism, they suggest, albeit a liberalism that has an Islamic hue.
‘These changes, as well as the speed with which they have taken hold, are nothing short of remarkable,’ they write. ‘That they have happened at all is due to one thing: the prospect of membership in the European Union. The transformative potential this prospect has held has been clear to American policy makers for years, and, wisely, they have supported Turkey’s bid consistently and vocally.’
Of course, US support for Turkish accession to the EU is somewhat problematic. George Bush pushed this line in 2004 despite attempts from the French and others to warn him off. ‘Including Turkey in the E.U. would prove that Europe is not the exclusive club of a single religion, and it would expose the clash of civilizations as a passing myth in history,’ he said.
It’s hard for Europeans to be lectured on this issue by a man who believes that the US is in the midst of a Christian revival prompted by the ‘confrontation between good and evil’ (his words) that America finds itself in. Or from a guy who said this in 2001:
Oh, I know there’s some voices who want to wall us off from Mexico. They want to build a wall. I say to them, they want to condemn our neighbours to the south in poverty, and I refuse to accept that type of isolationist and protectionist attitude.
And then signed a bill to build a 700 mile fence along the Mexican border in 2006 – part of a desperate attempt to shore up his approval rating with the shrinking portion of Americans who represent his base.
Apropos of Alex’s post on the FCO’s new website, I’ve been checking out the MoD’s aptly named media blog ‘Defence News’ which like a tin of Ronseal doesn’t mix sophisticated narrative with insightful analysis but servers a single purpose: to defend the MoD against negative publicity and refute any allegation the press team can find. A taster:
A number of media cover the publication by the MOD of its Spring Performance report with some claiming that the armed forces are “seriously under strength”. The Armed Forces are stretched but Senior Military Officers advise that the situation is manageable.
Or
It is simply ludicrous to suggest that there is any truth to these offensive allegations. There is no shortage of personal kit or body armour in either Iraq or Afghanistan. All personnel are issued with sufficient supplies before being deployed on operations and there is no requirement for soldiers to buy or obtain their own boots, guns or shirts. Soldiers on the ground and their commanding officers regularly praise their equipment. I beg to differ.
These comments are interspersed with daily diaries of what Ministers are doing, images and an assortment of press releases. Think media communication 1.0 – for beginners. In short the MoD website needs an overhaul. All of which reminds me I am giving a talk at the Defence Image Projection and Reputation Management conference in June on the image of the armed forces in civilian environments.
