by Daniel Korski | Jul 17, 2008 | Conflict and security, Cooperation and coherence, North America
After several years, the U.S government finally unveiled a new personnel cadre – the Civilian Response Corps of the United States of America – who will deploy, alongside the U.S military, into post-conflict theatres. Readers will recall that Prime Minister Brown promised a British version when he launched the UK’s National Security Strategy (although nothing seems to have happened since).
Once the hoopla dies down, the Civilian Response Corps is actually a quite modest version of what was originally in President Bush’ 2007 State of the Union Address. Then he said he wanted to “establish a volunteer Civilian Reserve Corps”, which would
function much like our military reserve. It would ease the burden on the Armed Forces by allowing us to hire civilians with critical skills to serve on missions abroad when America needs them.
The Address came after several years of trying to establish the State Department’s post-conflict office, but was probably motivated by the-then arrival of General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker in Baghdad, both of whom wanted not only a surge of troops, but of civilians too.
However, the Civilian Response Corps consists of federal employees, not volunteers from the private sector, state and local governments. It is, in effect, bureaucratic fat built into the system so that the U.S government has the necessary in-house capacity to draw-on. This, of course, is good. But it is hardly an amazing breakthrough. The 250 posts it funds cannot even fill 300 Iraq jobs that are due to come up next year.
Verdict: A good move. One that should encourage others – like the Europeans – to set-up a civilian reserve, as I wrote here. But far from what is needed and what should be expected after several years of work.
by Daniel Korski | Jul 16, 2008 | Africa
The Russian and Chinese veto of UNSC sanctions against Zimbabwe may in hindsight have been predicable, even inevitable, but on day of the vote they came as a clear surprise to many, not least British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, who only days earlier told the House the tougher sanctions were in the bag.
Leaving aside whether you believe sanctions are a good idea – I certainly do – what happened? Had Russian President Dmitri Medvedev not signed up to sanctions only days before at the G8 Summit in Japan? Did the Prime Minister simply not take “Njet” for an answer? Bit by bit, the run-up to the vote is emerging.
It now seems the issue was driven not by No. 10, but from the 7th floor of the U.S State Department, where Jendayi Frazer, U.S Assistant Secretary of State, sits. Even though no U.S interests are at stake, Ms Frazer, an academic colleague of Condi Rice’s from her Stanford days, has focused intently on Zimbabwe, apparently raising the issue whenever she meets African leaders.
Ms. Frazer – who is known to abhor her British opposite number Lord Malloch Brown from his UN days – apparently was in the driving seat on Zimbabwe policy, after having waited in vain for a UK lead. With the US Ambassador to the UN, Zal Khalizaid, she apparently pushed hard for a tough resolution. Better to make a stand, the argument went.
But after the G8 meeting, British diplomats apparently thought that the Russians would balk and became nervous. In fairness, Brown – who had been micro-managing the issue – thought he’d gotten Medvedev on board. But either little thought was given to whether the Russian president could in fact deliver – especially after the British Prime Minister harangued him at his first summit – or the issue was not deemed important enough to merit a Russian rejection.
To be on the safe side, however, the Foreign Office apparently asked Bush to call Medvedev and Rice to raise the issue with her Russian counterpart. None of this happened and things began to fall apart. The Chinese, who diplomats believe would probably have abstained if the Russians had not decided to veto, moved to veto as well.
By then the Prime Minister had already sounded confident in his post-G8 address to the House during PMQs. As a last-ditch effort, diplomats considered tabling a weaker resolution, giving South Africa more time to find a solution and thus putting the onus back on Tabo Mbeki and, ultimately, Robert Mugabe. But the U.S – who chaired the UN Security Council – decided to go for broke, tabled the old text and the rest, as they say, is history.
In the aftermath of the no-vote, the U.S government has been quick to point out that the Russian veto shows Russian cannot be seen as a reliable partner. Russian officials have reacted angrily at this, saying Medvedev never promised support for U.N. sanctions.
But what does the episode say about U.S and UK foreign policy? That even on an issue of such totemic importance to Britain – and where the Prime Minster has taken a personal interest – the U.S remains in the lead, yet unable or unwilling to do the necessary due diligence to ensure more than declaratory success.
by Daniel Korski | Jul 16, 2008 | Conflict and security
Bush, Obama and McCain have in the last few days all talked about Pakistan and Afghanistan.
In my view all three shirk the need for 1) a new political settlement in Afghanistan, including through negotiations with “pragmatic” Taliban elements, 2) a new trans-Atlantic push on Pakistan and the region (and not only a CT-focused approach), and 3) the need to invest in the Afghan National Police.
Here is what they have said:
(more…)
by David Steven | Jul 12, 2008 | Global system, North America
George Bush prepares for his post-presidential stand up career:
The American leader, who has been condemned throughout his presidency for failing to tackle climate change, ended a private meeting with the words: “Goodbye from the world’s biggest polluter.”
He then punched the air while grinning widely, as the rest of those present including Gordon Brown and Nicolas Sarkozy looked on in shock.
Mr Bush, whose second and final term as President ends at the end of the year, then left the meeting at the Windsor Hotel in Hokkaido where the leaders of the world’s richest nations had been discussing new targets to cut carbon emissions.
by Daniel Korski | Jul 1, 2008 | Europe and Central Asia, Middle East and North Africa
Crisis is nothing new to the European Union. In fact, crises have made the EU’s foreign policy what it is, filling most of Javier Solana’s office hours. But the bloc is about to face a particularly serious crisis over the likely ouster of Turkey’s democratic government by the Turkish military.
Turkey’s military views itself as the guardian of the secular principles of the Turkish state, and has carried out three coups since 1960. In 1997 it led a campaign to force from power Turkey’s first Islamist-led government. It is now gearing up to conduct another one, this time using judicial processes rather than tanks and troops.
In July, Turkey’s top court is likely to outlaw the country’s ruling party and bar its president and prime minister from politics. The AK Party is accused of trying to undermine Turkey’s secular constitution and establish an Iran-style Islamic state. The leaked diary of Turkey’s navy chief has detailed how the military have pressurized the country’s court so as to get the results they want.
This would be disastrous for Turkey. Since capturing an outright majority in the Turkish Grand National Assembly in late 2002, and after wining again in 2004, AK has undertaken an impressive array of reforms. After ramming reform packages through the legislature, the European Commission determined in October 2004 that Turkey had met all the legal requirements to begin accession talks.
Sure there have been bumps on the road. On a number of occasions the European Commission has had to warn the government. But a military coup would not only halt reforms; it would encourage a radical response from the AK Party’s supporters, who, for the second time, will be denied their democratic right. What comes after the AK may be the very thing that military says it fears: a radicalized Islamic movement that shuns compromise and democratic politics in favor of the violent destruction of Turkey’s secular state.
This can be in nobody’s interest. Turkey is not only an important strategic partner, able to assist Iraq’s reconstruction and key for stability in the Black Sea and Caspian littoral. Under Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the government has shown a willingness help solve the long-standing dispute over Cyprus, support reconstruction in the Balkans and assist peace-making in the Arab-Israeli conflict. By being on the (admittedly slow) path towards European integration, Turkey also puts paid to the idea of clash of civilizations.
The EU needs to join forces with the outgoing Bush administration and communicate in clear terms that a military coup, however dressed-up, would be unacceptable and damage Turkey’s European integration. More, the White House needs to work with Congress to send a signal that a new administration – whether run by John McCain or Barack Obama – would be equally unhappy with a military take-over.
If a coup does happen, the EU should suspend – although not entirely stop – Turkey’s European integration and present a new government with a clear set of conditions for the resumption of EU-Turkey relations. NATO also needs to consider how to deal with a military-run Turkey. Having forced new members to adhere to democratic standards it cannot just accept the overthrow of Turkey’s democratic government.
Longer-term, civilian oversight over the military must be front and centre of the EU’s demands. Of the democratic reforms that Turkey has undertaken, none is more important and controversial than those related to the Turkish military’s power. For example, in December 2003, the legislature terminated the military’s exclusive control over a discretionary pool of funds that was generally used for weapons procurement. But this has clearly not been enough. A specially-created audit board should investigate all the military’s expenditures and report to parliament.
In exchange for such demands, the EU needs to re-examine what it can offer Turkey. President Nicolas Sarkozy’s call for a special relationship between the EU and Turkey will have played no small part in the military’s calculations. Though Prime Minister Erdogan has pursued pro-EU policies, he has become increasingly disillusioned with the entry negotiations. The military – while weary of EU integration, which can curtail their power in ways NATO membership cannot – will seek to play on Turkish disillusionment with the EU. Countering such propaganda will require tangible promises to a new civilian government.
