Pakistan’s beleaguered police

by | May 27, 2009 | Conflict and security, South Asia

As Charlie noted here last week, counter-insurgency expert David Kilcullen was pretty damning on US drone attacks during his recent visit to London.  But another interesting point he made was on the need for western governments to provide more support to Pakistan’s beleaguered police.  Here’s Kilcullen giving evidence to the House Armed Services Committee on April 23:

The police are a critically important element in any counterinsurgency, and I am not aware of any successful campaign in which police reform, police capability-building, police intelligence and the use of police to protect the population and uphold law and order, were not key components.

Pakistan needs a much larger, much better equipped, better trained, better supported and better paid police force. The fact that it doesn’t have one is partly because the police are a major institutional rival to the army, and we have funneled the vast majority of our aid to, and through, the military.

From a policy standpoint, increasing police reform and assistance efforts would thus serve four purposes at the same time – it would protect the Pakistani people, improve counterinsurgency performance, enhance the rule of law and weaken the stranglehold of the army over the civilian leadership of Pakistan.

As Kilcullen argued when he was in London, Pakistan’s army sees its raison d’etre in terms of Pakistan’s rivalry with India.  The police, on the other hand, see their raison d’etre in terms of the rule of law: a much more useful strategic concept, given the extent to which counter-insurgency is a fight for legitimacy, or the fact that successful counter-insurgency often requires de-escalation rather upping the ante – something that often comes more naturally to police forces than armies.  (Bill Lind’s seminal paper on 4GW makes the same point:

…the key to keeping the peace is to de-escalate situations rather than escalate them. Soldiers are taught to escalate.  If something isn’t working, bring in more firepower. Cops don’t do that, because it enrages the local community.)

As has been widely noted, Pakistan’s army has minimal expertise in counter-insurgency, and is attempting to counter the Taliban’ offensive in the Swat valley with conventional tactics.  The Taliban, for their part, appear to be clear on who they should be worrying about most: look at this morning’s attack on police HQ in Lahore, or the attack in March on the police academy in the same city.

The security burden

by | Mar 8, 2009 | Conflict and security

In Small Wars Journal, Sergeant Michael Hanson laments the weight of the equipment that a US marine carries to keep himself safe. 40 pounds of body armour, plus a pack that can weight twice as much again (at a total of 120 pounds or 54 kilos, that’s like lugging Jennifer Lopez around wherever you go).

The consequences are predictable:

This weight limits their speed, mobility, range, stamina, agility and all around fighting capability. They can’t go out far and they can’t stay out long with all of this gear. It is simply too much. Combat patrols are typically four hours, and even that short amount of time is exhausting. Our Marines are being consistently outrun and outmaneuvered by an enemy with an AK, an extra magazine and a pair of running shoes.

Sergent Hansen believe that the flight to security  (“all the best equipment for our soldiers”) – ends up making soldiers less secure. You’ll find a similar sentiment in General Petraeus’s admirably concise counterinsurgency guidelines. Walk, is one of his directives. You can’t commute to this fight, is another.

But where does this leave civilian agencies? I doubt there is a single British or American embassy in the world that hasn’t seen dramatically increased security since 9/11. Many now resemble prisons.

Aid agencies, meanwhile, operate from fortified compounds in a growing number of countries, while the Iraq operations of some international NGOs are said to have hidden their use of armed guards from their own head offices. Both struggle against the prospect of an ‘armed humanitarianism.’

Petraeus calls on soldiers to live among the people, deepening their cultural understanding and ability to navigate informal networks, through prolonged and regular face-to-face contact. Diplomats, of course, need to do the same.

He advises them to “understand how local systems are supposed to work – including governance, basic services, maintenance of infrastructure, and the economy-and how they really work.” That’s the mission of development workers.

I am not trying to make a glib point here. Soldiers have the means to defend themselves (and to prevent the kidnaps that, once amplified by the media, can be strategic game changers). Diplomats and aid workers do not.

But how can civilian agencies deepen engagement with populations, while responding to growing insecurity? And what will they do if they find that – like the overloaded marine – security measures are eroding their ability to do their job?

Are we helping Pakistan?

by | Mar 4, 2009 | Conflict and security, South Asia

I’ve been visiting Pakistan on and off for a couple of years now – and each time things have got much, much worse (see this bleak assessment from 12 months ago).

Now the country has been plunged into further crisis. The Mumbai attacks put new pressure on its fractious relationship with India. The shootings in Lahore have severed its sporting links with the rest of the world.

These are calculated attempts to isolate and destabilize the country – attacks that have been planned by people who understand how to probe a culture’s weak points, and are skilled in the art of systems disruption.

They have consistently achieving outcomes disproportionate to the resources invested. But have we – the West I mean – done the same?

Here’s six questions I’d like to have the answer to. They all relate to the the country’s army, which is a dominant force in Pakistan’s politics and economics – and is an institution that has iconic status, even though it is losing legitimacy and respect.

Today, the Pakistan army finds itself in a strikingly similar position to that of the US military in Iraq before the surge. It is fighting a series of interlinked insurgencies. And it is losing badly – mostly because it’s fighting the wrong war.

So:

  1. How much money are the UK and US channeling to the Pakistan military?
  2. What proportion strengthens Pakistan’s ability to fight 20th century wars?
  3. And what proportion is directed at counter-insurgency and 4th generation warfare?
  4. Has a systematic and concerted attempt been made to pass the lessons learned in Iraq onto Pakistani senior and mid-level officers?
  5. If so, is there evidence that strategy is switching from targeting militants to protecting Pakistan’s people (perhaps the fundamental COIN tenet).
  6. And given that all modern armies boast about their commitment to outcomes (or effects based operations), what outcome has the UK and US’s vast post-911 investment in the Pakistan military delivered?