by Charlie Edwards | Sep 10, 2008 | Conflict and security, North America
In the run up to tomorrow’s anniversary (the wikipedia article on 9/11 is locked because of a high risk of vandalism) here are some interesting reports and articles worth reading (fee free to add).
A brilliant analysis by NYT’s Dexter Filkin on the regrouping and strengthening of al-Qaeda and Taliban forces in remote areas of Pakistan.
What’s going on? I asked the warlord. Why aren’t they coming for you?
“I cannot lie to you,” Namdar said, smiling at last. “The army comes in, and they fire at empty buildings. It is a drama — it is just to entertain.”
Entertain whom? I asked.
“America,” he said.
The Centre for American Progress has published its annual Terrorism Index.
The House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the House Committee on Homeland Security published a new report yesterday evening on the Administration’s Implementation of Recommendations by the 9/11 Commission. The title: The Wasted Lessons of 9/11: How the Bush Administration has ignored the law and squandered its opportunities to make our country safer.
by Daniel Korski | Aug 21, 2008 | Conflict and security, Influence and networks, North America
In 2006 the U.S national security establishment “re-discovered” counter-insurgency, as General David Petraeus fresh from having published the Army/Marine COIN doctrine – set about implementing a COIN strategy in Iraq and his fellow-travellers in the State Department like David Kilcullen pushed for a COIN handbook to change the strategic way the US government does COIN.
Now it’s time for another re-discovery – namely of the proxy war. Proxy wars were common in the Cold War, and proxies were used in conflicts in Greece, Angola, Korea, and Vietnam.
But these wars have now come back. In the Caucasus NATO’s fighting Russia through Georgia, in Iraq the U.S is really taking on Iran, while Israel aims at Tehran but shoots at Hezbollah in Lebanon. In Asia Pakistan uses the Taliban inside Afghanistan to hit at India.
Meanwhile, conflict in the Horn of Africa is escalating rapidly as power struggles within Somalia are exacerbated by the military support that both Ethiopia and Eritrea give to the opposing parties there.
The West used to be good at these proxy wars. First, because of the “soft” power of democratic capitalism, which drew people to a cause not just a country. But in the new world where the enemies are often Salafist Islamists does the U.S and its allies have the necessary universal language and universal appeal?
Second, successful proxy wars depended on the proxies being authentic representatives of at least parts of their societies. Where they were not, they failed. Today, does an alliance with the U.S automatically exclude one as a legitimate representative?
As proxy wars look likely to be one of the predominant modes of warfare in the 21st century, the U.S will need to find answers to these questions and, as with the development of its COIN capabilities, gear its diplomatic, military and economic instruments to deal with the new challenge.
by Daniel Korski | Aug 18, 2008 | Cooperation and coherence, Europe and Central Asia, Influence and networks, South Asia
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf is resigning, thus opening a new chapter in this country’s history as the governing parties, PPP and PML-N, are bound to go at each other’s jugulars once the celebrations end.
But there is little time for festivities. The government has not been able to assume control over the military and intelligence apparatus or engage an increasingly capable alliance of Pakistani militant groups and al Qaeda, which looks set to control much of western Pakistan. Pakistan’s turmoil has pinched the country’s economy, and stoked inflation. In addition, relations with India have taken a turn for the worse.
The governing parties should be helped to re-draft the constitution to give way to a new, ceremonial President (like in India). But what is really needed is a new coalition agreement, which commits the government to deal with the economic meltdown, intelligence reforms, the emergence of a Pakistani Taliban and Pakistan-India links.
To bring the military on board to such an agenda, a revision is needed of US military assistance with the implicit promise of more and better-targeted assistance as a reward for a deal. A new U.S administration should use the threat of a suspension of military assistance if the Pakistani military balks at the necessary changes. Before the “nuclear option” of a legislative ban on assistance – which Barack Obama has supported in the past – a new administration could direct an audit of U.S military assistance.
While Europe can only play a limited role in moving the Pakistani military, it can play much bigger part in dealing with the Pakistani government. Over on the Spectator’s website, I offer suggestions for what shape this can take and the leverage the West has:
As a carrot for a new deal – which should include a balanced counter-insurgency strategy, regional peace initiatives and intelligence reforms – the Prime Minister could offer to host high-profile donor’s conference, which could lay the foundation for a UN-led assistance programme to be overseen by an assistance envoy. Perhaps this could be a job for Paddy Ashdown, who was lined up for the UN job in Afghanistan until Afghan President Hamid Karzai changed his mind.
No peace in Pakistan is possible without a regional peace process and Gordon Brown should persuade George W. Bush to appoint a Presidential Envoy – a regional version of Zalmay Khalilzad’s previous Afghan role – and for the EU to do the same. These two “tandem envoys” could then begin the long trek towards regional stability, helping to prepare the ground for a new strategy from a new U.S administration.
However much it spends, the U.S will get little for its aid dollars given its reputation in the region. Therefore, any international, UN-led assistance programme needs to be kicked-off by the Europeans.
by Daniel Korski | Aug 5, 2008 | Conflict and security, Cooperation and coherence, Economics and development
Partly to deflect criticism of his call for a withdrawal from Iraq, Senator Barack Obama has said the U.S “should seize the moment” to build up its presence in Afghanistan. His rival John McCain agrees; when Obama called for two additional U.S brigades to be sent to Afghanistan, McCain demanded that three brigades be deployed i.e. 15.000 more troops. They also agree on taking a harder line vis-à-vis Pakistan.
But rather than lead to a chorus of support, something else has stirred. Voicing a concern I’m told is felt by several top Democrats, including Senator John Kerry, Jim Webb, the Democratic senator for Virginia, told the Financial Times that the US should avoid suggesting that the withdrawal of troops from Iraq will be followed by a surge of troops in Afghanistan.
In a break not only with the Bush administration’s Freedom Agenda, but also a post-2002 cross-party consensus that U.S should help rebuild failing and failed states, Senator Webb said the U.S
can’t create stable societies in places like Afghanistan . . . that can’t be our objective.
For now, the kink in the bi-partisan consensus on helping build failing and fragile states is small. But it also has a British variant in the Conservative Party and, I predict, will grow over time.
Thomas Kuhn argued that science does not progress via a linear accumulation of new knowledge, but undergoes periodic “paradigm shifts”. The comparison to foreign policy ideas is, I admit, not straight (and our view of scientific development has moved on), but it is straight enough. And we may be about to witness a paradigmatic shift away from state-building. But what replaces it?
by David Steven | Aug 4, 2008 | Conflict and security, North America, South Asia
So…The US is hassling Pakistan to crack down on its border regions. But it wants the Pakistanis to use the same tactics that it failed with in Afghanistan (and Iraq, of course). Yes, it’s another episode of the dysfunctional US-Pakistan relationship.
All this comes, according to the LA Times, after the new, and beleaguered, Prime Minister of Pakistan, Yusaf Raza Gillani, “got an earful from both the White House and Congress about the need to act far more aggressively in the tribal areas.” Their response? Send in the Special Forces. A US-trained and equipped commando division is being sent to the tribal region, we are told. Its mission – to put the insurgency to the sword.
I am sure this is a heady stimulant for the armchair warriors in the White House, but it flies in the face of the US counterinsurgency doctrine, which states flatly that “the military forces that successfully defeat insurgencies are usually those able to overcome their institutional inclination to wage conventional war against insurgents.”
But conventional war has long been the strategy of choice for Pakistan to deal with its internal problems (problems that could eventually lead to total state failure). Look at what happened back in 2004, when the US bullied General Musharraf into a disastrous attack on the tribal areas:
The tribesmen considered the military action as an attack on their autonomy and an attempt to subjugate them. Attempts to persuade them into handling over foreign militants failed and, with apparent mishandling, the military offensive against suspected al-Qaeda militants turned into an undeclared war between the Pakistani military and rebel tribesmen. Anger grew as government forces demolished the houses of members of the defiant tribes as collective punishment and seized their properties, even in other parts of the province.
The result was humiliation. One Colonel took shelter in a mosque and emerged with the Koran on his head, begging for mercy. Tribesmen stripped him of his uniform, and sent him on his way. In the end, the army signed a truce with the militants – a move that was widely (and rightly) interpreted as surrender.
In 2004, there was some excuse for this. The US, after all, was still learning some very hard lessons in Iraq, lessons that led David Petraeus to come back to the US believing that:
Success in a counterinsurgency requires more than just military operations. Counterinsurgency strategies must also include, above all, efforts to establish a political environment that helps reduce support for the insurgents and undermines the attraction of whatever ideology they may espouse.
Five years on, however, and the US’s Pakistan policy remains stuck in the dark ages. One of the most fragile countries on earth continues to be used as a political football in Washington (with Obama a willing participant, sadly).
The US’s field manual on counter-insurgency is selling well on Amazon (who would have predicted that a few years ago?). It described counterinsurgencies as ‘learning competitions’. At the moment, that’s one game we’re clearly losing.
Can I suggest that someone in Washington RTFM and reads it soon?
(Via Juan Cole.)
