by Alex Evans | Jan 3, 2009 | Conflict and security, Global Dashboard, South Asia, UK
With just over a couple of weeks to the inauguration, it’s finally sinking in: Barack Obama’s Presidency is going to imply some pretty fundamental changes to the global war on terror. Serious thinking on how to dismantle Guantanamo is well underway – as is discussion about which of America’s allies will be willing to welcome its detainees (Australia and Britain both profess reluctance; Portugal, on the other hand, looks well on course for a special relationship with the new Administration). A sea change on torture and rendition also appears to be a racing certainty.
In Iraq, too, massive changes are underway. As well as the rich symbolism of the sock and awe incident, there’s now also yesterday’s more tangible proof of how far things have moved on: the Iraqi government has assumed control of the Green Zone.
Now, pause to wonder: are these changes likely to have a significant impact on the capacity of radical Islamist groups to recruit and retain committed volunteers – whether in Europe, the Middle East, South Asia or wherever? After all, Guantanamo, torture, rendition and Iraq surely represented four of the principal sources of the sense of grievance so essential to effective radicalisation. Does that mean the outlook on counter-terrorism is finally brightening?
One possible reason why not, of course, has to do with Gaza. Olmert’s rationale for Israel’s attacks is not hard to discern – Hamas ended its ceasefire, there’s an election in February, he wanted to rebuild Israel’s credibility after the 2006 debacle in Lebanon, there was only a brief window of opportunity before Obama’s inauguration. But even so, the fact that Israel’s attacks have so far killed 436 Palestinians (compared to 172 dead in Mumbai) will clearly fuel a sense of outrage among many – including this blogger – and will provide a powerful recruiting sergeant for Islamist groups everywhere.
But another answer to the question of sources of grievance after Bush can be found by taking a stroll down my local high street, in a part of East London that has one of the highest proportions of Muslims in the capital.
Today, the activist posters you see on lamposts and on the walls of the shops selling mobile phone skins and international calling cards have one key message: end the undeclared war on Pakistan. If you visit Hizb ut-Tahrir’s website, meanwhile, you find that just beneath the coverage of Gaza from the last fortnight, it’s Pakistan that’s the focus of attention and grievance – a point made even clearer by this youtube video of theirs from the start of December.
[youtube:http://uk.youtube.com/watch?v=uI47aQVLoq0]
You might think it odd that Islamist opinion in the UK should be focusing on a relatively small number of drone attacks in Pakistan when a major troop surge is about to take place over the border in Afghanistan. But think again, and you realise that of course it makes eminent sense for Hizb ut-Tahrir to focus on the grievance of most direct relevance to Britain’s large diaspora community – and to weave political Islamism into long-standing fears about Pakistan’s territorial integrity.
Barack Obama’s arrival in the White House represents a welcome turning point on many components of the ‘war on terror’. But the evolving situation in Pakistan (on which Obama is hawkish, remember) may well represent another – especially here in the UK. If Obama steps up US attacks on Pakistan’s border areas, then many British Muslims will doubtless listen to what Gordon Brown has to say about it with keen interest…
by Daniel Korski | Dec 11, 2008 | Conflict and security, Cooperation and coherence, UK
A couple of posts ago, Charlie drew our attention to the fact that a new report would be recommending the appointment of a Minister for Security Diplomacy. “What the f*** is security diplomacy?”, our resident security expert asked.
I haven’t read the report, but the question got me thinking. What, indeed, is security diplomacy? I don’t mean in a traditional way — working with NATO; on security policy issues; and managing defence relationships. I mean in a 21st century kind of way. So here is my stab at what it could be.
One of the 21st century’s biggest national security challenges – and therefore diplomatic tasks — will be to affect people who we cannot affect. By that, I mean that European governments have to affect security outcomes in countries with whom they have only weak links or little leverage over. They have to do so because what happens in these countries affect our security, well-being, safety. . . you know the arguments.
Take the case of Pakistan and the country’s military-security establishment. Everyone acknowledges that working with the Pakistani military will be key in lessening Indo-Pakistani tensions, containing the Taliban insurgency, clamping down on WMD proliferation, and defeating Al Qaida. Everyone acknowledges that achieving these goals is vital to Britain’s and Europe’s security.
But there are only four countries that have any real leverage on Pakistan and her security establishment: the U.S, China, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. Despite being Pakistan’s largest trading partner and a major donor, Europe has only limited leverage over Islamabad (and the military HQ in Rawalpindi), even if Britain is a (small) exception to the rule.
So the question becomes – how can Europe get the countries that do have leverage over Pakistan to act, or act in ways that may be beneficial to Europe’s interests? What incentives can be offered? Could the EU, for example, ask Turkey to lead diplomatic talks with Pakistan on the EU’s behalf, with the Turkish Prime Minister briefing the EU Heads of State? And if that is indeed what is needed, what can Turkey be offered in return?
If this is “security diplomacy” does it go beyond what it traditionally the focus of bilateral relationships and diplomacy in a non-polar world i.e. where we cannot rely on the hegemon to sway third-countries to its will? Many diplomats will argue that this is already what they doing. They are already lobbying diplomats in Beijing for China to help in Afghanistan etc.
But perhaps using the rubric “security diplomacy” makes this a concrete line of activity, ensures resources and prioritization? Much like the way Britain’s European network of embassies now focus primarily on how to leverage votes in the European Council rather than on, say, managing the UK-Romanian relationship, so implementing this kind of diplomacy may mean suborning the normal bilateral links in a number of cases (of which Pakistan is clearly one), to the so-called “diplomatic security interest”.
I am not arguing for a Minister for Security Diplomacy. Rather, I have long argued for a top-to-bottom assesment of the government’s capabilities, a National Security Review, rather than piecemeal solutions. But I’d be interested to hear what people think of the notion of security diplomacy.
by Daniel Korski | Dec 9, 2008 | Conflict and security, Cooperation and coherence, Europe and Central Asia, Global Dashboard, Influence and networks, North America
Following Barack Obama’s election, the intellectual market has filled up with policy papers about how the U.S and Europe can cooperate on substantive issues like China, Russia, CT, climate change etc. But little time has been devoted to the way in which the EU and the U.S cooperate, that is, the institutions of the trans-Atlantic relationship.
NATO will continue to have an important role in the Euro-Atlantic community, but the North Atlantic Alliance is no longer the place where Americans or Europeans go to talk about big strategic questions. This is true not only for non-military topics such as the global financial crisis or climate change, but also for classic foreign policy problems.
In this paper I — and two other colleagues — have tried to lay out what kind of new institutions could boost U.S-EU cooperation. Recommendations include:
- That the President of the United States be invited once a year to the European Council
- Back-to-back EU and NATO summits
- That the US Secretary of State join the GAERC twice a year
- That American Cabinet officials be invited to European Commission meetings from time to time
- That US/PSC discussions be held alternately in Brussels and Washington.
- “Double-hatting” the EU Head of Delegation in Washington as an EU Special Representative
- Establishing a small European Legislatures Liaison Office in Congress, comprising representatives from the EP and national legislatures, as well as setting up Congress/EP task forces on key issues like Afghanistan/Pakistan and climate change.
- Setting-up a US-EU Conflict Prevention Task Force, with a permanent secretariat housed in Brussels.
- Establishing a NATO/EU School for Conflict, Post-Conflict and Stabilisation to provide training for deploying personnel
New transatlantic institutions cannot in themselves help the EU develop policies or come up with a better way of thinking strategically about foreign policy issues; but at a time of considerable transatlantic policy convergence, the absence of a solid framework for US-EU discussion will see both sides miss out on a valuable opportunity for cooperation on shared challenges.
by David Steven | Dec 8, 2008 | Off topic
It was a very busy weekend on Global Dashboard. So in case you missed it:
by Alex Evans | Dec 7, 2008 | Conflict and security, South Asia
News is emerging this morning of a militant attack on NATO supply containers in Pakistan, where they were awaiting onward shipment to Afghanistan. CNN has details:
A security guard was killed and two employees were wounded in the attack on the Faisalal terminal just outside of the city of Peshawar, according to officials. Companies hired by NATO to drive fuel, food and other supplies to troops fighting the Taliban use the terminal to park containers waiting for convoys across the border into Afghanistan. The fire started by the attackers destroyed 62 containers, according to Peshawar Senior Police Superintendent Kashif Alam.
This latest attack follows another a week ago, and plenty more in the preceding months. It’s still only a few weeks since Pakistan’s army chief did a big presentation in Brussels vowing to keep NATO’s supply lines to Afghanistan open:
“We will do whatever is possible, whatever is within our power to ensure that this line of supply is open,” Kayani told top officers in Brussels, according to Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola, head of NATO’s military committee. “We understand how critical it is to Afghanistan … and because we want Afghanistan to succeed we would harm ourselves if we did not do our best to ensure that,” Di Paola quoted Kayani as saying.
But can he deliver? AP flags up the key statistic: “up to 75 percent of the supplies for Western forces in [Afghanistan] pass through Pakistan after being unloaded from ships at the Arabian sea port of Karachi”.
