by Jules Evans | Aug 9, 2008 | Europe and Central Asia
One of the interesting questions in the Georgia – Ossetia – Russia conflict is who is calling the shots.
On the Ossetian and Russian side, is Dmitry Medvedev, the young president who many think is the puppet of Putin, calling the shots? It’s interesting to contrast the rhetoric of Putin and Medvedev in the last few days. Medvedev has been quoted as saying: ‘”Under the Constitution and the Federal law … I must protect the life and dignity of Russian citizens wherever they are”.
That’s a Westernized lawyer speaking, almost as if apologizing to the West. ‘Look, I don’t really want to send in the tanks, but you understand, I must, it’s in the constitution.’
I wonder if Medvedev had any say on the movement of Russian armed forces at all. I think Putin would have called the shots on this one. He’s seemed much more up for a confrontation in his comments, saying ‘Of course there will be consequences’ when Georgia invaded Ossetia.
But Putin was quoted yesterday as saying: “There are lots of volunteers being gathered in the region, and it’s very hard to withhold them from taking part. A real war is going on.” This sounds a bit like Lebanon talking about Hezbollah, or the PLO talking about Hamas. ‘We’d like to call a ceasefire, but you know, these volunteers, it’s out of our hands.’
Meanwhile, who’s in charge in Georgia? Mikhail Saakashvili’s chief press spokesman in Tblisi is an American government official. The city is crawling with CIA spooks. You can’t get into a lift in the Radisson without seeing some yank with a crew-cut and shiny black shoes. Did the Georgians tell the Americans what they planned to do? Did the Americans agree? Or are they being pulled into a stand-off with Russia against their will?
This is the weird thing with proxy wars, it’s hard to define who is in control of what. But be assured that Russia will see America’s hand behind Georgia’s actions, even if Saakashvili has been operating more autonomously. This is not just a stand-off between Georgia and Ossetia. It’s a stand-off between Russia and the US, over the borders of NATO.
by Richard Gowan | Aug 8, 2008 | Conflict and security, Europe and Central Asia
The international response to events in Georgia is still at the declaratory stage, and some analysts predict a long struggle. It’s not a good sign when the Finns are talking about “fully-fledged war” (the Finns don’t have a lot of luck: the had the EU presidency during the Lebanon war in 2006, and now they’re chairing the OSCE).
But a couple of things seem clear already. Firstly, this war is not going to end the way the Georgians presumably wanted: a lightning move by their forces creating a fait accompli in South Ossetia that Russia would have to accept. Russia has already nixed that, so Georgia is in a position where it cannot achieve its initial war aim. (I am at a loss to imagine how the Georgians ever thought they could achieve it, as doing so would have required an element of surprise that they couldn’t pull off, but whatever). Logically, it should pull back and look for a deal to consolidate some gains, but that’s not what tends to happen in the cases…
The second thing that’s pretty clear is that South Ossetia is in an unholy mess. As Jules points out, it’s tiny, and there are increasingly credible reports of a death toll in the hundreds – the Ossetes are claiming 1000+. Out of a population of 60,000. Media images imply that physical destruction has been significant. And if the Georgians decide to try to slug it out with the Russians, not only in Ossetia but in Abkhazia and Georgia proper, this damage is going to spread and intensify.
(NB: the really scary scenario is that the Georgians will now decide that their best hope of winning global sympathy, or even direct military aid, is to fall back into their own territory and get lots of CNN coverage of their heroic resistance. Logically, the Russians should refuse to play along, but again, I don’t trust in that).
What seems probable is that, after an indeterminate period of violence, we will end up with a situation in which South Ossetia is under full or partial Russian control, and a wreck. If there was a ceasefire, two basic options would be on the table. Russia could declare South Ossetia a separate state, or even part of Russia – the West would not recognize this, and the Russians would have to handle clearing up the wreckage, as they did in Chechnya. If the outcome is less clear-cut, however, it may be necessary for the international community to (i) patrol a ceasefire line and (ii) pick up a least part of the reconstruction burden.
As far as the peacekeeping part goes, I rather doubt we’ll return to the status quo ante: a dysfunctional mixed force of Russians, Georgians and Ossetes doing joint patrols, monitored by OSCE military observers. The likely alternatives are (i) a light Ceasefire Observation Mission, which could well be created out of the OSCE presence, or by enlarging the UN Observer Mission in Georgia, which currently only watches the Abkhazia situation and (ii) a heavier interpositional military mission, along the lines of the UN forces in Cyprus and the Golan Heights, though probably not on the scale of that in Lebanon. I think we can rule out any larger civilian-military peacebuilding mission – the reconstruction will stay separate.
If you were going for the interpositional military option, who’d do it? NATO is out of the question, and the OSCE doesn’t do military forces beyond the unarmed observer level. That leaves (i) the EU (suggested by the Estonians, but might look too like NATO in Disguise to the Russians), (ii) the UN (not impossible, although if we’re talking about European troops, they’ll want a special command structure that reduces their reliance on UNHQ, as they have in Lebanon) or (iii) an ad hoc multinational force. In all cases, I’d expect the bulk of the force to be European. The obvious lead country is Germany: it has a history of trying to sort out the Caucasus, and it’s got some troops to spare, unlike France and the UK…
In theory, I’d prefer a force made up of higher-end Latin Americans (Argentina, Brazil, Chile) as they’re intelligent peacekeepers and relatively impartial – the problem for any European force, whatever its flag, is that it’ll be pulled in all directions by the EU’s splits over Russia policy. But the LAs are in Haiti, and I don’t think that EU governments would accept such a slight to their collective ego.
I expect to be proved wrong by events. It will all look different in the morning.
by Daniel Korski | Aug 5, 2008 | Conflict and security, Cooperation and coherence, Economics and development
Partly to deflect criticism of his call for a withdrawal from Iraq, Senator Barack Obama has said the U.S “should seize the moment” to build up its presence in Afghanistan. His rival John McCain agrees; when Obama called for two additional U.S brigades to be sent to Afghanistan, McCain demanded that three brigades be deployed i.e. 15.000 more troops. They also agree on taking a harder line vis-à-vis Pakistan.
But rather than lead to a chorus of support, something else has stirred. Voicing a concern I’m told is felt by several top Democrats, including Senator John Kerry, Jim Webb, the Democratic senator for Virginia, told the Financial Times that the US should avoid suggesting that the withdrawal of troops from Iraq will be followed by a surge of troops in Afghanistan.
In a break not only with the Bush administration’s Freedom Agenda, but also a post-2002 cross-party consensus that U.S should help rebuild failing and failed states, Senator Webb said the U.S
can’t create stable societies in places like Afghanistan . . . that can’t be our objective.
For now, the kink in the bi-partisan consensus on helping build failing and fragile states is small. But it also has a British variant in the Conservative Party and, I predict, will grow over time.
Thomas Kuhn argued that science does not progress via a linear accumulation of new knowledge, but undergoes periodic “paradigm shifts”. The comparison to foreign policy ideas is, I admit, not straight (and our view of scientific development has moved on), but it is straight enough. And we may be about to witness a paradigmatic shift away from state-building. But what replaces it?
by Richard Gowan | Aug 3, 2008 | East Asia and Pacific, Economics and development, Global system, Off topic
A story from Australia.
A charity program sending bras to women in developing nations has provoked debate about what’s appropriate assistance. The Uplift Fiji project has sent out more than 40,000 second-hand bras from Australia to countries such as Fiji, Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea. But a women’s development organisation in East Timor says Operation Uplift is a classic example of a donor driven project that shows little understanding of the needs of developing communities. Nance Haxton reports from Adelaide.
HAXTON: Uplift Fiji organisers say the program gives women in developing countries dignity, and prevents fungal infections and abscesses on the chest wall that can result from living in tropical climates without wearing a bra. Rotary International ships the second-hand bras overseas to a number of countries, with a thousand bras going to Papua New Guinea this week. However not all organisations are supportive of the project. The Alola Foundation in East Timor was established by Kirsty Sword Gusmão to increase the status of women in that country through community development grants, humanitarian relief and advocacy. The community programs adviser for the foundation based in Dili is Meredith Budge. She says projects such as Uplift Fiji can do more harm than good.
BUDGE: These kinds of projects really are, only, I think designed to focus on the donor, the person who feels good because they can give something that they would otherwise throw in the rubbish. But what happens is that you then create this dependency relationship.
HAXTON: She says her main concern is that programs such as Uplift Fiji are essentially misdirected, and can undermine local economies.
BUDGE: Dumping a whole lot of second-hand and possibly new bras in a charity fashion actually would undermine the ability of anybody to actually start up a decent and cheap supply business in that country.
HAXTON: She says the Alola Foundation is now discouraging donations of second hand goods, because often they are in poor working order, can be bought more cheaply locally, and then only add to rubbish collection problems.
BUDGE: We can buy things far more cheaply here because we’re part of the Asian environment, and can get cheap things from Indonesia, than can possibly be bought in Australia and then shipped over here.
HAXTON: Uplift Fiji national coordinator Liz Baker says they sort the bras in Australia and only send them in biodegradable packaging. She says the project was created to address a critical need.
BAKER: The women we are shipping to have asked for bras. The project started because women were asking a particular aid worker for bras and she was giving hers away on a regular basis in isolated communities. In Fiji in particular, while there’s second-hand clothing available, there’s not second-hand bras in sizes to suit the Fijian women who are substantial women; and they tend to be D to E cups. So while other things they can get their hands on; they really can’t obtain bras unless they’ve got the price of a week’s wages, which is what a new bra costs at the moment.
HAXTON: Liz Baker says ultimately there is room for many different approaches to community development and international aid.
by Richard Gowan | Aug 1, 2008 | Africa, Conflict and security, Cooperation and coherence, Europe and Central Asia
In January, I enjoyed 15 seconds of fame commenting on the shortage of helicopters for peace operations in The Economist (I’d already raised the issue on this blog and for ECFR). I found myself in touch with Thomas Withington, an aviation journalist researching the problem. He was kind enought to quote me back in May, but it was evident that he knew a lot more about the technicalities than I did. Now he’s published a first-class study of which countries have what helicopters, and who might send them to Darfur. The IHT takes up the story:
The report said military powers like the U.S., Britain and France are tied down in wars and other peacekeeping operations. But it singled out the Czech Republic, Italy, Romania, Spain, Ukraine and India, saying they have suitable aircraft needed for the mission.
A UN official in Darfur told AP the mission has only 27 transport helicopters, all commercially leased. UN documents say the mission needs 18 medium-lift military helicopters and the force has sought to get six attack helicopters. But the UN official said it has none and an offer from Ethiopia of five combat helicopters was still being discussed.
Many military helicopters that could be used by the UNAMID mission in Darfur are sitting in hangars or being used in air shows, the report said. NATO nations “could provide as many as 104 suitable helicopters for the UNAMID force,” saying the alliance members best placed to provide the aircraft are the Czech Republic, Italy, Romania and Spain. In addition, it said, “Ukraine and India could together contribute 34 helicopters.”
There was no immediate comment from the governments of those nations. The report was endorsed by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, who has repeatedly expressed frustration over the lack of attack and transport helicopters and other critical gear that he says is crucial for the Darfur peacekeeping mission. “Given the terrain and security situation in Darfur, it is critical that member states provide missing aviation assets,” Ban said in a statement released by his office.
The governments involved would doubtless argue that they are doing their best elsewhere: India is the UN’s #1 helicopter supplier, Ukraine has attack choppers in Liberia to deter any new trouble there, Spain has committed two planes to Chad, etc. I am increasingly inclined to think that, while I usually view the idea of “UN standing forces” as a miasma, there is a case for some sort of international helicopter pool for peace ops. That was where Thomas and I ended up in May:
The pool of aircraft “could be available to the UN, AU and others. They wouldn’t be UN owned but it might be possible to fund a standing pool of aircraft,” says Gowan. “The most convincing political basis we’ve seen for it is that it should be something largely focused on the region where the bulk of UN peacekeeping is concentrated, which is Africa, and that it should be something shared between the UN and the AU who would fund this pool for missions that were mandated by the UN or AU.”
A nice idea on paper. But not much comfort to the people of Darfur, I admit.
PS: Mark reminds me that, last November, Indian combat camels were mooted as an alternative to helicopters. I find no evidence of progress on this front.
