As Gideon Rachman notes, the fact that the G20 has now staged a summit at the level of leaders rather than finance ministers – which by my reckoning made it a de facto L20 – means that “the venerable old G8 has a real challenger on its hands”.
In addition to the advantages that Gideon counts off – the G20’s novelty, its inclusion of emerging economies, the fact that the G20 has the earlier summit (G20 in April vs. G8 in July), the Berlusconi factor – there’s also the fact that Gordon Brown (who’s chairing the April G20) is already gearing up for a big push to make a success of the G20 and get the ball rolling in earnest on a Bretton Woods II agenda (c.f. David and my paper on this if you missed it).
Even before you consider the G20, there are some big question marks over the G8. What has it really delivered over the past decade since it enlarged from G7 to G8? My count would go something like this: debt relief; the Proliferation Security Initiative; the Global Fund on AIDS, TB and Malaria; and the Financial Stability Forum. Four credible initiatives, yes – but not much of a tally for ten years’ worth of summits, and also notable that none of these areas really involved any serious domestic implementation commitments.
Part of the problem here is the limited bandwidth of the ‘sherpa’ system that prepares the summit agenda before heads meet in the summer. As I noted in a Guardian piece back in July, sherpas have pretty busy day jobs (like Permanent Secretary at the Foreign Office, or Private Secretary to the PM), which rather curtails their capacity to tee up major global deals as well. It’s a case in point of the problem with moving issues to the leaders’ level: yes, you get the big picture, but at the cost of moving issues to the most over-stretched parts of governments. Hardly surprising that you’re more likely to end up with a media-friendly ‘initiative’ rather than a comprehensive long-term framework.
And perhaps it’s here that we come to what may be the real ace up the G20’s sleeve: its roots in the world of finance ministers. Like leaders, finance ministers have the big picture. But unlike leaders, they also have big departments that already cover most of the global waterfront (apart from a few hard security areas like arms control) – and hence a great deal more analytical capacity for getting to grips with complex issues like climate change, trade and reform of the global financial system.
True, foreign ministries have big departments with lots of capacity too – but they have no way of forcing coherence on the rest of their governments when it comes to implementation. Finance ministries, on the other hand, have a decisive advantage: while herding cats may never be easy, it’s a whole lot more manageable if you control the catfood.
Admittedly, the G8 has a Finance Ministers’ variant too – which has arguably achieved more in recent years than the leaders’ G8. But co-ordination between the two G8 bodies hasn’t stood out as a strong point. With the G20, Gordon Brown has a chance to forge a different, more effective relationship between the finance ministers’ and leaders’ levels; indeed, it would be hard to imagine someone better qualified to do so, given that as well as spending a decade as Finance Minister, Brown was chair of the IMFC for so long.
In our paper on Bretton Woods II (pdf), Alex and I provide rather a gloomy assessment of financial crisis – which we suggest is going to last longer than many think…
Given that we now face what Gordon Brown has described as “the first truly global financial crisis of the modern world”, our bet would be that it takes as long as a decade to bring it fully under control.
Let’s unpack the assumptions behind our pessimism. We start from the premise that, six months back, experts were overly optimistic about how far-reaching the meltdown would be. This is based, in part, on April’s Progressive Governance summit, where heads of state were (a) clearly freaked out; (b) fairly sure they grasped the problem, if not the solutions; (c) not acting as if they expected any further big surprises.
Consider, too, what the IMF’s Dominique Strauss Kahn was saying at the time. He was as worried by inflation, as he was by economic slowdown. Although he was forecasting a “rather important, serious slowdown in economic growth” – the expected pain wasn’t really that bad:
Something around 0.5 percent as a rate of growth for the United States in 2008 and a slight recovery during 2009-an average of 0.6 percent for 2009, which is both linked to the financial turmoil, of course, but also the business cycle.
Next, we look at the lessons of earlier banking crises that, in developed countries, have tended to take four or five years to unravel, cost around 12% of GDP to resolve, and lead to a cumulative loss in output equal to almost a quarter of GDP. The figures are drawn from this useful chart prepared by PIMCO’s Michael Gomez:
Then add in what we know about the banking crisis that gripped Japan in the 1990s, which the IMF ascribes to “accelerated deregulation and deepening of capital markets without an appropriate adjustment in the regulatory framework”. Hiroshi Nakaso’s account is worth reading in full – seven years of crisis management and fire fighting as a senior manager at the Bank of Japan.
“When the bubble burst in the early 1990s, no one expected it was going to usher in such a prolonged period of weak growth in Japan,” he writes. Policy makers underestimated the seriousness of the problem, while banks lacked the ‘foresight and courage’ to confront their predicament head on.
At the time there was considerable schadenfreude in the West about Japan’s failure to get to grips with its crisis. It was eight years or so before its policy makers even found the levers that would begin to inch the crisis towards a solution. Are we right to assume that we’ll now do better? (more…)
– The summit is unlikely to be able to live up to its billing. Leaders do not yet understand the nature of the problem well enough to be able to implement viable solutions. However, the problem is more fundamental than a simple lack of shared awareness.
– History suggests that leaders will only think the unthinkable on institutional reform once the challenge they face has really hit rock bottom. But history also suggests that we are wrong to think that the worst of the crisis is now past, given that many past banking crises have taken five years or more to unravel.
– Bretton Woods 1 looked across the whole international economic waterfront in 1944, while this weekend’s summit will be much more narrowly focused. Leaders will make a big mistake if they try and tackle finance in isolation, given the growing impact of resource scarcity, and that 2009 is supposed to see another ambitious global deal – on climate.
– We need to recalibrate what we expect from globalization through a serious debate about subsidiarity. Where has globalization gone too far, too fast? Where do we need more integration at a global level? These were exactly the questions that preoccupied Keynes in 1933, when he weighed the relative benefits of global versus local across a range of variables. We need a similar debate today as a precursor to serious international economic reform.
– Leaders need to extend their horizons in (at least) five directions: onto longer time scales; beyond financial regulation into wider resource scarcity challenges; into other international processes, especially climate; towards grand bargains with emerging powers; and beyond government, to non-governmental networks.
Full version after the jump, or better yet here’s the pdf.
We are now officially beginning some sort of post-credit crunch global governance feeding frenzy. We now have the following to look forward to:
– The report of a new High Level Commission on modernisation of the World Bank, chaired by former President of Mexico Ernesto Zedillo;
– A UN General Assembly task force on the global financial system, chaired by Joseph Stiglitz (composition and terms of reference to be announced on 30 October);
– An EU summit on the financial crisis and reform of global financial institutions on 7 November, to prepare for…
– A G20 summit on international financial institution reform in Washington DC on 15 November (though no-one seems to have told the G20 secretariat);
– A UN Financing for Development summit from 29 November to 2 December – it’s been in preparation since last year, but Ban Ki-moon has now suggested turning it into a UN summit on the financial crisis, in NYC rather than Doha as planned (Ban says:
“I strongly believe that holding the summit at the United Nations, the symbol of multilateralism, will lend universal legitimacy to this endeavour and demonstrate a collective will to face this serious global challenge…”)
I make no claim to this being a comprehensive list (and will add to it as I find more baubles to hang on the tree). But it all invites the question: how much is really going to be achieved through all this pannelling and summitry? As Eurodad, the civil society network on debt relief, notes on its website:
Several meetings that Eurodad staff have had in recent days reveal that senior European policy makers have few precise reform proposals for this summit meeting and have not started negotiating a common EU position. Indeed smaller European countries are unhappy that they will be excluded from the 15 November meeting. The summit – with its extravagant “Bretton Woods II” billing – may reveal a very dangerous gap between expectations and delivery,
Too right. Over the summer, there were no fewer than three summits (FAO; G8: WTO) that claimed in advance that they were riding to the rescue on food prices, and which then failed to deliver anything interesting. Now it looks like we’re about to do the same on the credit crunch…
Update: Eurodad have produced a helpful FAQ on the ‘Bretton Woods II’ summit – download it here. Thanks to Alex Wilks.
Update 2: David and I have published a briefing paper on the Summit.
