by Daniel Korski | Dec 8, 2008 | Conflict and security, Cooperation and coherence, Economics and development, South Asia
A year ago when I was helping prepare Lord Ashdown for his (ultimately aborted) Afghan appointment, I wrote to a senior U.S official with my concerns about the security situation in Kabul. “Security”, I wrote “has deteriorated in once-safe areas like the capital Kabul”. This, I argued, would damage the already weak Karzai government, particularly as the Afghan authorities were scheduled to take control of the city’s security. To deal with this problem, I proposed a cross-departmental Kabul Security Plan akin to the Bagdad Security Plan, which the U.S introduced as part of the “surge”.
The two countries face different kinds of insurgencies. In Iraq, unless the U.S secured Baghdad the insurgency could not be defeated. In Afghanistan, even if Kabul is safe and prosperous the insurgency may still win. The Red Army held most of Afghanistan’s major cities but were still defeated by a largely rural insurgency. However, if the U.S coalition cannot hold Kabul and keep it safe from violent crime whilst building it up, there is going to be little hope for others parts of the country. I also lobbied for the EU to take a special role in the city, arguing in a memo for Javier Solana’s staff and later an article:
Renewed support for the city’s reconstruction is needed; the EU has experience in city reconstruction from the EU Administration in Mostar. It should offer the Afghan government a cross-disciplinary team, led by an experienced European city administrator, to help adjust existing political, military and reconstruction plans for, and international support to, Kabul’s stabilization and reconstruction
The reply I got from the U.S official to my original suggestion was curt: “Don’t you think you need to leave that sort of issue to someone with the word “general” in front of their name”. Annoyed, I wrote back quoting French World War I premier Georges Clemenceau that war is too important to leave to generals.
Now, after a year of waiting and a continuous worsening of the security situation both in the capital city and surrounding areas, the U.S has woken up to the problem. The New York Times reports that “most of the additional American troops arriving in Afghanistan early next year will be deployed near the capital, Kabul, American military commanders here say, in a measure of how precarious the war effort has become.”
Better late than never, I guess. But the failure to nip problems in the bud, face uncomfortable problems head-on coupled with a continued unwillingness to stray off talking points is what has undone the U.S-led effort and what the Obama administration must change if it hopes to change dynamics in Afghanistan.
by Jules Evans | Dec 6, 2008 | Conflict and security, Europe and Central Asia
This may have escaped people’s attention (it did mine), but Ukraine and Georgia were told they couldn’t join the NATO club this week, and Georgia was given a bit of a ticking off for its abrupt and dumb escalation of the North Ossetia conflict in August.
The NATO communique said: “we remind all parties that peaceful conflict resolution is a key principle of the Partnership for Peace Framework Document.”
As Liz Fuller writes for Radio Free Europe:
“Translated from diplomat-speak into plain English, that reads “The use of heavy artillery against civilians asleep in their homes in Tskhinvali just hours after Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili announced a unilateral cease-fire was a crude violation of our basic ground rules, and one we cannot overlook.”
Fuller adds:
“Equally, if not more damaging to Georgia’s NATO aspirations was the spectacular ineptitude of its armed forces, which proved anything but battle-ready. The country’s two crack U.S.-trained brigades were serving as part of the international peacekeeping force in Iraq during the August war. According to a new International Crisis Group report, “the [Georgian] armed forces and military infrastructure sustained heavy damage during the Russian invasion, revealing flaws in planning, supply, coordination, air defense, and combat communications systems which contributed to quick demoralization of the troops,” who abandoned the strategic military base in Senaki without firing a single shot.
by David Steven | Dec 3, 2008 | Africa, Conflict and security, North America
Christmas 2006 and Santa brings the American right an unexpected Christmas present – the invasion of (nasty, Islamic) Somalia by (nice, Christian) Ethiopia. Times were tough in Iraq, so the cheerleaders of military force were glad of the opportunity to get out their pom poms and strut their stuff for an army that really knew how to put the boot in.
Why, they asked over at National Review (bastion of US conservatism), is Ethiopia so successful at vanquishing Jihadi foes, when the US has so much trouble? Was it a more sophisticated approach to counter-insurgency? Greater understanding of cultural drivers? No – it was because they were prepared to fight like real men untramelled by the Geneva conventions.
Ethiopians are “not worried about whether they will be seen as “occupiers” or whether their “occupation” will be viewed as benevolent,” Cliff May reckoned. Neither are they:
Overly concerned about whether their tactics will win approval from the proverbial Arab Street – or the European Street or Turtle Bay. They are fighting a war; their intention is to defeat their enemies; everything else is secondary or tertiary.
James Robbins, meanwhile, was also in thrall to the Ethiopian’s use of of ‘maximum force’, dismissing those who warned this was a war that the Ethiopians would never win. John Miller, meanwhile, wanted Ethiopian troops airlifted in to kick some Iraqi ass, while Cliff May headlined a piece: “WHY EUROPEANS AND ARABS ARE ROOTING FOR THE ISLAMISTS IN SOMALIA.”
(Oh and don’t forget daffy old Kathryn Lopez who was all weak at the knees as she warned the world not to ‘mess with Ethiopia’.)
So how did it go then? Here’s today’s editorial from the FT:
Before Ethiopia invaded with Washington’s blessing, Somalia barely registered on the global jihadi radar. Two years later, the conflict is a significant mobilising force. Videos seeking recruits and financing for Islamist militias fighting the Ethiopian-backed transitional government have proliferated on jihadi web sites. Fighters from Zanzibar, the Comoros islands and as far away as Pakistan have been drawn to the insurgency. Ethiopia’s intervention has bolstered extremist elements that the US and other western powers hoped – against the advice of most experts at the time – that it would contain.
In recent months, hardline al-Shabaab militias have gained control over much of southern Somalia. By contrast, the transitional government that Ethiopia stepped in to install can claim influence over the town of Baidoa and only parts of the capital, where roadside bombs explode daily. Ethiopian troops are bogged down fighting an insurgency that gains strength from their presence, while the government they support shows no signs of becoming more effective. It is a familiar scenario for the US and its allies in Iraq and Afghanistan. Ethiopia however, has announced its decision to cut its losses and withdraw by the end of the year.
Nowadays of course, the Somalia is largely forgotten by the American right – all the posters of Ethiopian troops have been torn down from right-wing bedrooms. But they still think their foreign policy prescription was the right one – and that Bush has left the world a safer place….
by Daniel Korski | Dec 2, 2008 | Europe and Central Asia
“Never let Germany walk alone”, Francois Mitterand apparently used to tell his military commanders. But two decades after the end of the Cold War, Germany has slipped away not only from France’s embrace, but also from its traditional role within the EU. On a range of issues, Germany is going-alone, even if doing so is detrimental to Berlin’s own interests and corrosive of alliance relations.
On Russia, for example, Germany has been almost hysterically concerned that the Baltic states would push the EU towards an anti-Moscow stance. In NATO and EU discussions, it has often been German diplomats who have debased the debate, accusing those, like Britain and Sweden, who want a tougher post-Georgia policy towards Russia as wanting to start a new Cold War.
To The Economist, these mishaps are a function of Germany’s political situation. Facing a general election next year, Chancellor Angela Merkel is locked in a battle with the SDP’s likely front-runner and current Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, making every foreign policy issue a battle for domestic advantage. Things have not been helped by the notoriously poor relationship between Mrs Merkel and France’s president, Nicolas Sarkozy, who’s frenetic diplomatic style cuts against the German chancellor’s measured ways.
But the problem runs deeper and may not be solved by the future German elections or the recently held U.S ones. For while the polls show the CDU in the lead, they are sufficiently tight to be able to force another so-called “grand coalition” between CDU and CDU, which would see a re-run of all the foreign policy battles.
The election of Barrack Obama in the U.S is also unlikely to make a big difference. On Iran, Afghanistan and Iraq — trouble-spots that will to occupy the Obama administration’s time —Germany’s position is at best awkward. Germany’s industry still has strong links with Iran; last month Germany’s ambassador to Iran, Herbert Honsowitz, told his Iranian hosts not to worry about Berlin’s announcement that it would reduce trade links as German companies would use the United Arab Emirates as a middleman for more than $4 billion in commerce.
And everyone expects President Obama to ask Germany to send more troops to NATO’s Afghan mission and deploy some of those 4500 soldiers already there to the war-torn south. German diplomats are furiously compiling arguments that would counter such a request –- and may offer police officers instead — but these are unlikely to make too much of an impact when President Obama makes the public case and Secretary Clinton does the follow-up.
Then there is climate change? Mrs Merkel was once seen as of the key reformers, even at one point dubbed “the climate chancellor”. But she is now pushing for parts of Germany’s industry to be exempted from emissions trading. This may put her at odds not only with the Obama administration, but also Congress, now that Democratic congressman Henry Waxman has taken the reigns of the House Energy and Commerce Committee.
Running through all these issues is one big question: what role does Germany want to play in the world? Does it want to be a large Switzerland – unarmed, mediating between all sides, but unwilling to take bold positions, devote resources and make sacrifices? Or does it want to be a key ally for the U.S, Britain and France, a motor of the EU and a pillar of the Euro-Atlantic community?
On my recent visits to Berlin I have become convinced that many of Germany’s politicians know current policy is not working. They also know that many of the world’s problems –- from Russia to Iran –- can only be solved by Germany’s active involvement. However, a large proportion of the public does not want to accept the price that has to be paid for Germany’s freedom, security and prosperity. And German politicians of all hues have been unwilling to make the case as forcefully as required, in part –- but not exclusively — because of the political situation. However, neither Germany nor its allies can afford for Europe’s largest country to walk alone.
by David Steven | Nov 29, 2008 | North America
George Bush – he liberated the downtrodden, helped the sick and gave succour to the old. Yes, those are the fond thoughts the 43rd President hopes we’ll have for him:
I would like to be a person remembered as a person who, first and foremost, did not sell his soul in order to accommodate the political process. I came to Washington with a set of values, and I’m leaving with the same set of values. And I darn sure wasn’t going to sacrifice those values; that I was a President that had to make tough choices and was willing to make them. I surrounded myself with good people. I carefully considered the advice of smart, capable people and made tough decisions.
I’d like to be a President (known) as somebody who liberated 50 million people and helped achieve peace; that focused on individuals rather than process; that rallied people to serve their neighbor; that led an effort to help relieve HIV/AIDS and malaria on places like the continent of Africa; that helped elderly people get prescription drugs and Medicare as a part of the basic package; that came to Washington, D.C., with a set of political statements and worked as hard as I possibly could to do what I told the American people I would do.
(Photo under a cc license from icbulk.)
Update: The National Review’s Victor Davis Hanson is lapping this up. Yes sir, Bush has done mighty fine:
We will come, through the Obama prism, to see that Bush’s sins were largely the absence of rhetorical skills, unfortunate shoot ’em braggadocio in 2003-4, the federal response to Katrina, and a certain administration haughtiness about the problems in Iraq between 2002-6, but not most of his policies that included prescription drugs, No Child Left Behind, AIDs relief in Africa, the removal of two odious regimes, and consensual governments in their places, a framework at home to stop 9/11-type terrorism, and good working partnerships with key allies abroad such as Britain, Germany, France, Italy, India, et al, and a pragmatism in handling rivals like Russia and China.
In short, given all that, Obama’s victory (predicated on painting Bush as a Hoover/Nixon redux), more so even than perhaps a John McCain’s, may do more for Bush’s reputation that anyone ever imagined. And the Mumbai mess (over there, not here) will only empasize all this, as an array of old 9/11-era experts who used to warn us about radical Islam, then, in the subsequent respite at home, screamed that Bush fabricated a war against terror against bogeymen, and now in their third manifestation are paraded once more out to warn us about?—why, yes, radical Islam!
