by Alex Evans | Nov 1, 2007 | Climate and resource scarcity, Global system, Middle East and North Africa
At last, enough time to blog about Jim Holt’s terrific article on Iraq’s oil in the 18 October edition of the London Review of Books. Here’s how he begins:
Iraq is ‘unwinnable’, a ‘quagmire’, a ‘fiasco’: so goes the received opinion. But there is good reason to think that, from the Bush-Cheney perspective, it is none of these things. Indeed, the US may be ‘stuck’ precisely where Bush et al want it to be, which is why there is no ‘exit strategy’.
Holt goes on to observe that as much as a quarter of the world’s remaining oil reserves may be in Iraq – and that Iraq’s new oil law (drafted by the US) would work strongly to American advantage. Under the draft law, the Iraq National Oil Company would retain control of just 17 out of 80 oilfields, while the rest – including all yet-to-be-discovered oil – would remain under the control of foreign companies for the next thirty years.
US hegemony in country, Holt goes on, would be maintained by five ‘super-bases’, which are all already currently under construction. That these “enduring” bases are being built is not news – the Independent on Sunday broke the story in the UK back in April last year, when Andrew Buncombe wrote that:
Major Joseph Breasseale, a senior spokesman for the coalition forces’ headquarters in Iraq, told The Independent on Sunday: “The current plan is to reduce the coalition footprint into six consolidation bases – four of which are US. As we move in that direction, some other bases will have to grow to facilitate the closure [or] transfer of smaller bases.”
As Buncombe’s article observed back then, some of the largest bases under construction were in the middle of the desert, away from large urban centres. I remember thinking at the time that pulling out of urban centres only made sense as part of a statebuilding strategy if the US was extremely confident of an improving security situation and of being able to hand control over to Iraqi security forces sooner rather than later – which clearly wasn’t the case. But as garrisons for defending criticial oil infrastructure, on the other hand… on that count, the superbases would make much more sense.
Holt’s LRB article came only a month after Alan Greenspan’s comment in his newly published memoirs that the Iraq war was “largely about oil”. (Greenspan subsequently clarified his comments in an interview with Bob Woodward for the Washington Post, when he said that “I was not saying that that’s the administration’s motive. I’m just saying that if somebody asked me, ‘Are we fortunate in taking out Saddam?’ I would say it was essential.”)
It’s remarkable that the debate over why the US went to war in Iraq is only now getting underway, four years after the conflict began. As Holt quotes in his article,
Many people are still perplexed by exactly what moved Bush-Cheney to invade and occupy Iraq. In the 27 September issue of the New York Review of Books, Thomas Powers, one of the most astute watchers of the intelligence world, admitted to a degree of bafflement. ‘What’s particularly odd,’ he wrote, ‘is that there seems to be no sophisticated, professional, insiders’ version of the thinking that drove events.’
That’s exactly right. For all that books like Woodward’s State of Denial give us a valuable insight into the extent of Administration incompetence and turf warfare in planning the war and its aftermath, what they don’t give us is a really surgical dissection of the path to war and the various possible motives. What began with the charge that Saddam Hussein already had WMD then became the weaker charge that he could not be allowed to flout previous Security Council Resolutions on the issue; when it became apparent that there weren’t even live WMD programmes, the basis for intervention shifted again ex post to a humanitarian intervention.
The role of oil, on the other hand, never really got discussed seriously in the media. When, back in January 2003, Colin Powell said: “The oil of Iraq belongs to the Iraqi people. Whatever form of custodianship there is … it will be held for and used for the people of Iraq”, I was surprised by how little debate ensued. I remember arguing at an IPPR seminar in early 2003 that his words seemed evasive. The question of who owns the oil was of secondary importance; the real question – as the race between China and the US for access to energy supplies in Africa showed very clearly – was who gets to buy it, and on what terms.
There’s much more to discuss here, and here’s hoping that the apparent initial stirrings of a proper discussion of the role of oil in the path ro war in Iraq proves to be just that. But for now, here’s Holt’s conclusion:
The occupation may seem horribly botched on the face of it, but the Bush administration’s cavalier attitude towards ‘nation-building’ has all but ensured that Iraq will end up as an American protectorate for the next few decades – a necessary condition for the extraction of its oil wealth.
If the US had managed to create a strong, democratic government in an Iraq effectively secured by its own army and police force, and had then departed, what would have stopped that government from taking control of its own oil, like every other regime in the Middle East? On the assumption that the Bush-Cheney strategy is oil-centred, the tactics – dissolving the army, de-Baathification, a final ‘surge’ that has hastened internal migration – could scarcely have been more effective.
The costs – a few billion dollars a month plus a few dozen American fatalities (a figure which will probably diminish, and which is in any case comparable to the number of US motorcyclists killed because of repealed helmet laws) – are negligible compared to $30 trillion in oil wealth, assured American geopolitical supremacy and cheap gas for voters. In terms of realpolitik, the invasion of Iraq is not a fiasco; it is a resounding success.
Still, there is reason to be sceptical of the picture I have drawn: it implies that a secret and highly ambitious plan turned out just the way its devisers foresaw, and that almost never happens.
by Mark Weston | Oct 26, 2007 | Europe and Central Asia, Middle East and North Africa
Most commentators on the Congressional resolution commemorating the Armenian genocide have adopted a US-centric view. Andrew Sullivan describes the move as “foolish in the extreme” because it will antagonize a key US ally. The University of San Francisco’s Stephen Zunes supports the decision because it is vital for the US to uphold its “longstanding principles.” But it’s not all about America – Turkey has some questions of its own to answer.
The row over the Armenian genocide and the threatened incursion into Iraqi Kurdistan are two sides of the same kuru? for Turkey. Ninety years after the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, Turks still inhabit a foreign policy realist world, where all your neighbours want a chunk of your territory and the criticisms of far-off superpowers mask their real goals of gaining influence within your borders and weakening your global standing. (more…)
by Alex Evans | Oct 22, 2007 | Conflict and security, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia
Amid the blizzard of coverage following the bombing on Benazir Bhutto’s convoy in Karachi last week, two pieces that are worth a look:
First, for a big picture view of worries in the Beltway about Pakistan, see this excellent news analysis article from yesterday’s New York Times. While David Sanger and David Rohde found the usual expressions of confidence in Musharraf from White House officials, other “current and former officials” warned that US leverage over Pakistan is now limited – and Musharraf himself weakened, following failed attempts at conciliation in tribal areas, ineffectual military action against the Taliban and Al Qaeda
Almost every major terror attack since 9/11 has been traced back to Pakistani territory, leading many who work in intelligence to believe that Pakistan, not Iraq, is the place Mr. Bush should consider the “central front” in the battle against terrorism. It was also the source of the greatest leakage of nuclear arms technology in modern times.
After years of compromises and trade-offs, there are questions inside and outside the administration about whether Mr. Bush has invested too heavily in a single Pakistani leader, an over-reliance that may have prevented the United States from examining other long-term strategies. “It never stitched together,” said Daniel Markey, a State Department official who dealt with Pakistan until he left government earlier this year. “At every step, there was more risk aversion — because of the risk of rocking the boat seemed so high — than there was a real strategic vision.”
[snip]
“We have to remember that the U.S. doesn’t have very much capability to affect internal developments” in Pakistan, said Robert D. Blackwill, the former American ambassador to India and a senior official in the National Security Council during Mr. Bush’s first term.
“What I am struck by are the trends we see today: the North-West Province is ungovernable and a sanctuary for terrorists,” he said. “The politics are fractured and deeply unstable, Musharraf is weaker, and the army is uncertain which way it will go.”
Second, see this Sunday Times article by Christina Lamb, who was on Bhutto’s bus when the bomb went off (she knows Bhutto and various of her aides from way back when, and they invited her on board for the procession after spotting her in the crowd of journos at the airport). Her account of the bomb blast is predictably harrowing, but what’s especially noteworth here is her access to Bhutto’s team, and Bhutto herself, both before and immediately after the blast. For instance:
…this was a US-brokered deal that had involved frequent meetings with Richard Boucher, the US assistant secretary of state for south and central Asia, as well as 2am phone calls from Condoleezza Rice, the secretary of state, to break deadlocks.
Britain had also played its part, and Jack Straw was credited with bringing Bhutto in from the cold when he was foreign secretary.
“As long as Washington and Whitehall are wedded to keeping Musharraf in power for their war on terror, she had no choice but to come back like this,” said [Bhutto’s security adviser] Malik, who led the negotiations on her side.
by Alex Evans | Oct 20, 2007 | Influence and networks, North America
Much sniggering on the US right as shock jock Rush Limbaugh executes an expert piece of political aikido on his political opponents. The story goes like this:
After Limbaugh referred to Iraq war veterans criticial of the war as “phony soldiers”, 41 infuriated Democrat Senators sent him a stiff letter of complaint. “Although Americans of good will debate the merits of this war, we can all agree that those who serve with such great courage deserve our deepest respect and gratitude. That is why Rush Limbaugh’s recent characterization of troops who oppose the war as ‘phony soldiers’ is such an outrage,” they thundered.
1-0 to the Dems? Not so fast! Undeterred, Limbaugh announced on his show that he was going to auction the letter for charity on eBay. And, he’d match the price dollar for dollar. So – what did it fetch? A thousand? Ten thousand? A hundred thousand? Not even close. Here it is: two point one million dollars – the largest amount ever paid on eBay for an item being sold for charity. Ouch – 2-1 to Limbaugh!
And where will be money be going? To the Marine Corps – Law Enforcement Foundation Inc. (of which he’s a director), to give scholarships and aid to families of marines and cops killed in the line of duty. 3-1! (Limbaugh: “this is more fun than I’ve ever had in my life”.)
But it gets worse for the Democrats. In a statement of the floor of the Senate on Friday, Democrat majority leader Harry Reid actually praised the auction (choking all the way, presumably): “I strongly believe that when we can put our differences aside, even Harry Reid and Rush Limbaugh, we should do that and try to accomplish good things for the American people”. 10-1!
What can one say to a drubbing like that? “The horror, the horror…”
by Alex Evans | Oct 20, 2007 | Cooperation and coherence, Influence and networks, North America
Who’d have thought it? UNCLOS – the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, hardly the sexiest multilateral environmental agreement around – has become a cause celebre for both the the progressive end of the US blogosphere and the Pentagon. What gives?
Here’s the story so far. UNCLOS, which covers issues like defining maritime zones, protecting the marine environment and preserving freedom of navigation, came into force in 1994. The US has signed it, but the Senate – where a band of diehards led by Sen. James Inhofe wants to block the treaty- has not yet ratified it. So far, so predictable.
But now the fun starts. First, why is the Administration – including the Pentagon, and indeed the President himself – telling the Senate to get a move on and ratify? Since when does the Pentagon care about this sort of thing? And second, why is the progressive blogosphere right alongside them in this endeavour?
Let’s take the bloggers first. They’re interested in the treaty not because of its environmental benefits (though those are fine by them too), but primarily because they think they can use it tactically to marginalise their enemies. Here’s Scott Paul at the Washington Note:
…the opposition to the Bolton nomination was a battle well chosen. It was very important on its merits: it successfully weakened and then partially removed an extremely negative element from the administration. But just as important was its execution. Thanks to some smart group decisions on strategy and message, the Bolton campaign is making current battles against pugnacious nationalism more winnable than before.
The effort to ratify the Law of the Sea convention is a campaign that matters for similar reasons. Yes, the Law of the Sea is compelling on its face. The armed forces rightly wants its navigational and overflight rights protected. Environmentalists rightly want the U.S. to join and add to global ocean stewardship efforts. And U.S. companies should have a chance to compete with foreign firms for offshore resources…
All of these are good reasons for the U.S. to accede to the Law of the Sea, but none of them alone or even in combination would necessarily make it important for the progressive agenda. So why is the Law of the Sea significant? Simple: our absence from the Law of the Sea is the outer wall of Fortress America. Winning the ratification battle would seriously de-fang the same pugnacious nationalists who are on the opposite side of almost every important foreign policy issue facing the U.S.
Matt Stoller expands on the point:
Without being able to pass the very basic Law of the Sea treaty, there is no way we will ever get a treaty through on global warming, create the space to internationalize the Iraq mess, or work with allies abroad in any coherent manner. Fortunately, this is extremely winnable. All it will take is some floor time from Reid, and we’ll win, embarrass, and marginalize the hyper-nationalists.
Note also the messaging strategies that progressive bloggers are using. Take this post by Taylor Marsh, for instance, which employs the derisive term “black helicopter crowd” no less than seven times to describe Sen. Inhofe’s band. It’s a pretty smart marginalising strategy, especially given that the national security tribe want the treaty.
Which leads us on to our other question. What does the Pentagon care? And what makes UNCLOS such a big deal that President Bush himself should endorse it? Essentially, the answer has to with securing access to international waters for the US Navy. The military worries that without being a party to the treaty, states might arbitrarily restrict access to US ships.
Well, fine, but that doesn’t altogether explain the urgency. This is hardly a new concern, is it? Well, actually, it is: step forward the emerging spat over the Northwest Passage, which in a warmer world becomes navigable by normal ships rather than just icebreakers. Canadian PM Stephen Harper is trying to make the case that the Passage lies within Canada’s waters – and hence that Canada gets to choose who sails through it. And if the US ratifies UNCLOS, it gains an important new tool in its kit for contesting Canada’s claim. QED!
So that, my friends, is the story of how the Pentagon, the netroots, President Bush and the Natural Resources Defense Council all got into bed with each other. Say what you like about climate change, it sure can trigger some curious political realignments…
