General merry-go-round

Today American Defence Secretary Robert Gates recommended that General David Petraeus be appointed head of US Central Command. Until Admiral William Fallon was sacked earlier in the year, the idea had been for  General Petraeus to replace General John Craddock as Supreme Allied Commander and help fix the failing mission in Afghanistan, especially after Paddy Ashdown was nixed as UN chief by the Afghan government.

But with Fallon gone and things not altogether stable in Iraq, Afghanistan will have to wait. In Petraeus’ place will be Lt. General Ray Odierno, a mountain-like soldier who served as Petraeus’ no. 2 in Iraq until he was made Deputy Chief of the Army. The top military slot in Iraq had been rumoured to be reserved for Pete Chiarelli, Robert Gates’ Military Adviser, who was described to me as “possessing Petraeus’ intellect but none of his ego.”

In many ways, Petraeus’ move is an obvious one. Nobody knows the Iraq campaign better than Petraeus and the relationship with Odierno has worked before. Paradoxically, it may help restore the formal chain of command, which sees the Iraq commander reporting to the Centcom commander and then to the President (through the SecDef). This chain was famously disrupted because of the close link between President Bush and General Petraeus, which probably caused much of Fallon’s frustration. But will Odierno be given the freedom Petraeus himself had?  

What of the persistent rumours that Petraeus will one day enter the political arena? Well, in Flordia he is closer to Washington (and the TV networks). If John McCain wins in November, he’d be a shoe-in for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. But perhaps the sheen will come off him when he is no longer the sand-covered field commander and everyone will be pilgrimaging to Baghdad to see Odierno.  The real loser would seem to be NATO’s Afghan campaign, which would have benefitted from Petraeus’ skills. As Centcom commander he will still oversee the U.S-led, CT-focused Operation Enduring Freedom mission. But the military centre of gravity in Afghanistan is the NATO mission as it’s hard to see how Petraeus can now work his magic from Tampa, Florida. 

Building Resilience – RUSI

Today, I gave the closing address at the RUSI conference, Protecting the Critical Infrastructure, in a session introduced by RUSI’s head of risk and resilience, Anthony McGee. From the introduction to the conference by RUSI’s head, Professor Michael Clarke:

Protecting the Critical National Infrastructure and ensuring the continuation of political, social and economic activity is vital to the UK. As a modern ‘just-in-time’ society is becoming increasingly dependent on goods and services distributed through critical infrastructure, so the potential consequences of disruption to that infrastructure become more serious.

However, the increasing importance of well protected, resilient infrastructure is matched by the growing complexities and interdependencies of a CNI which is spread across sectors and nation states. Relationships between stakeholders are somewhat disjointed, the ownership of risk is unclear and yet the consequences of failure are potentially catastrophic.

Most of the speakers got stuck into the nitty gritty of how infrastructure fails and why – with last summer’s catastrophic floods as exhibit A. My job, however, was to take a somewhat broader view of resilience at a time when the old ‘command and control’ paradigm is failing…

The talk draws heavily (of course) on my collaboration with Alex Evans, but also on work with the economist, David Bloom. Also there’s quite a overlap with these GD posts. Full text after the jump (or here as a pdf).

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The CIA’s assessment of the British Government’s role in Basra

Back in the middle of February I posted on the plight of the Iraqi people in Basra suggesting that while the the city was not in the media spotlight things were turning from bad to worse. I ended saying I think we are going to see a lot more about Basra in the headlines in the next few weeks. Hmmm. Even though the report I read was shocking there was some positive stuff about British involvement – it was, however, not overly complimentary. And certainly not as bad as General Hayden’s view of how we, the Brits, have done in Southern Iraq.

Propaganda 2.0

The US military wonders whether it makes sense to co-opt bloggers:

Since the start of the Iraq war, there’s been a raucous debate in military circles over how to handle blogs — and the servicemembers who want to keep them. One faction sees blogs as security risks, and a collective waste of troops’ time. The other (which includes top officers, like Gen. David Petraeus and Lt. Gen. William Caldwell) considers blogs to be a valuable source of information, and a way for ordinary troops to shape opinions, both at home and abroad.

This 2006 report for the Joint Special Operations University, “Blogs and Military Information Strategy,” offers a third approach — co-opting bloggers, or even putting them on the payroll. “Hiring a block of bloggers to verbally attack a specific person or promote a specific message may be worth considering,” write the report’s co-authors, James Kinniburgh and Dororthy Denning.

Iran’s “Grand Bargain”: how the story disappeared

The current edition of the Columbia Journalism Review should be required reading for foreign policy wonks as well as aspiring hacks.  It has a great piece on how marines  in Iraq turned to a blogger in New Jersey to track the patterns of insurgent attacks – as well as a thoughtful dismissal of  indie documentaries on the war.  Best of all is the cover story, which explains how the U.S. print media have followed the administration’s line on Iran, including this account of how the Iranian offer of a “grand bargain”in May 2003 has been kept out of the news. 

Whatever its inspiration, Iran’s offer put nearly everything on the table, from support for Hezbollah to Iran’s nuclear energy program. It has since been dubbed the “Grand Bargain.” The exact provenance of the offer wasn’t initially clear. It came sans letterhead via a fax from the Swiss ambassador to Iran—Washington’s designated middleman for communications. But the offer does appear to have been serious.

The offer wasn’t an easy story for journalists to nail down. The Iranians who had crafted a peace offering to the “Great Satan” had every incentive to stay mum, as did an administration in Washington that had little interest in negotiating. But the Financial Times published a short piece by diplomatic correspondent Guy Dinmore in July 2003 sketching out the overture and the U.S.’s lack of interest. “We are not reaching out at this point,” a State Department official told Dinmore.

And there the story sat. The first follow-up didn’t come for nearly a year, until Dinmore himself wrote another, more detailed piece in which he clarified that the fax was actually the culmination of a series of feelers. The added details still did not set off a rush for follow-up. The next story on Iran’s interest in a deal didn’t appear until the fall of 2004, roughly eighteen months after Dinmore’s first report, in The Washington Post. That story, the first to refer to a “Grand Bargain,” included more intriguing revelations:

• Through Swiss Ambassador Tim Guldimann, Tehran indicated a desire to discuss its nuclear program.
• The offer held the outlines of a “Grand Bargain,” but Washington balked. “We’re not interested in a grand bargain,” then U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton said.
• Over eighteen months, the countries periodically discussed their mutual interests in Afghanistan and Iraq. But a Bush administration policymaker said “instructions were clear” to the U.S. negotiators: “Don’t bring up the nukes.”

All of which were mentioned roughly sixty paragraphs into the Post piece. The story itself, written in the run-up to the 2004 presidential elections, was a lengthy (and stinging) assessment of the administration’s nonproliferation strategy. There’s very little to criticize in the Post’s effort. The story’s reporters—Dafna Linzer and Barton Gellman—simply happened across some fine nuggets as part of a larger investigation.

What is surprising was (again) the lack of follow-up. Few other reporters seemed interested in the evidence of Iran’s apparent peace overtures and the U.S.’s recalcitrance. The first headline about any of this in a U.S. paper wouldn’t come for another year and a half, nearly three years after the Financial Times first revealed those overtures. (That story was published in February 2006 by a freelancer, Greg Beals, in Long Island’s Newsday.)

Reporters seemed interested in the story and later—when a source began providing documentary proof—some tried to write it. But “editors slashed it down to something like the last paragraph of a larger story,” says Trita Parsi, the Iran expert and former congressional staffer who provided the documents. “It was something that went against people’s assumptions.”

Through the rest of 2006, there appears to have been one piece devoted to the offer, in The Washington Post—it ran on page A16. Even though the offer had never really made news, it was considered old news.

New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof decided to write about the proposals in early 2007. Kristof says he, too, was “concerned about the possibility of a military encounter. So I started doing some reporting.” Kristof eventually added more detail showing that the Iranians had not simply sent the offer through the Swiss, but had also approached the State Department, and had sent an offer to the White House itself. Writing about the various versions of the offer, Kristof concluded “neo-cons killed [an] incipient peace process.”

No story about the “Grand Bargain” ever appeared in the news pages of the Times.