by David Steven | May 12, 2008 | Climate and resource scarcity, North America
John McCain’s out on the campaign trail today promoting his green credentials, but its clear that his climate change proposals would put a McCain administration on collision course with many, maybe most, of its international partners.
Here’s McCain’s headline promise on climate:
By the year 2012, we will seek a return to 2005 levels of emission, by 2020, a return to 1990 levels, and so on until we have achieved at least a reduction of sixty percent below 1990 levels by the year 2050.
At first glance, this sounds pretty compatible with the ranges that the Kyoto countries (almost all countries bar the US) agreed to be ‘guided by’ in their side negotiation at Bali. Following the lead of the IPCC, these countries said that:
Global emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) need to peak in the next 10-15 years and be reduced to very low levels, well below half of levels in 2000 by the middle of the twenty-first century.
McCain’s 60% by 2050 is ‘well below half’ of course (especially when you note the different baseline). But that fails to take into account how Americans emit at the moment. The US will have to cut much further and faster than McCain realises, if we are going to hit the global target.
Breaking out emissions on a per capita basis shows why:
- According to Nick Stern (pdf), per capita emissions will need to be around 2-2.5 tonnes gigatons CO2e by 2050, based on a population of 9 billion people.
- The US government’s own stats, however, show that its per capita emissions were around 24 tonnes gigatons in 2006 (based on a population of 300 million).
- McCain’s 60% reduction would take them down to just under 6 tonnes gigatons, based on a population that had grown to 420 million people (and obviously higher if population growth is less rapid.
In other words, the US would still be two to three times above the global average in 2050. By mid-century, under McCain’s plan, its per capita emissions would be higher than China’s – at around 5 tonnes gigatons – are today! (more…)
by David Steven | May 10, 2008 | Climate and resource scarcity, Europe and Central Asia
Yesterday I was at a roundtable on Europe and climate change, hosted by Jim Murphy, the UK’s minister for Europe, with his French counterpart, Jean-Pierre Jouyet, as the main speaker.
France is about to take over the EU presidency and will play a critical role on the road to Copenhagen. Two questions stand out:
- Can the EU show that it is making credible moves towards its unilateral commitment to a 20% emissions cut by 2020?
- How hard will the French push the idea that laggards on climate change should be punished through the global trade regime?
The first question is the most important. In Bali, the Europeans had some success in leading the negotiations from in front. I summed up their strategy as follows in my Bali wrap up:
(i) Take a unilateral commitment first. (ii) Next bring on board others prepared to move ahead of the pack. (iii) Only then bring the US – the problem player – into the thick of the action, and do so at a time [after the presidential elections] when the country will be desperate to re-engage with the wider world; (iv) And finally, persuade developed countries to do their bit, using a blend of three arguments. First, that rich countries have committed to action first. Second, that incentives are on the table, to help the switch from dirty to clean tech. And finally that not to act is unfair on countries that are poorer and more vulnerable (expect India to hear a lot from low-lying Bangladesh, for example).
But that strategy only works if Europe’s partners believe that the EU intends to keep the commitments it has freely made. At the moment, that is far from clear. The roundtable was opened by the FT’s George Parker, who argued that the UK missed half of its own green targets, public interest in the environment was on the wane, and that the EU was failing to align its budget to its green aspirations. (more…)
by Charlie Edwards | May 6, 2008 | Africa, Climate and resource scarcity, Conflict and security, East Asia and Pacific, Middle East and North Africa
Is the lack of fresh water a catalyst for conflict? The scenario has become fashionable of late, with Ban Ki-moon pondering such a future earlier this year, while John Reid made a great song and dance of it when he was Defence Secretary (perhaps he even did a rain dance). But it seems, according to researchers at Oregon State University that the evidence points to an altogether different scenario, where the world’s 263 trans-boundary rivers (whose basins cover nearly half the land surface of the world) generate more co-operation than conflict.
The Economist picks up the story:
Over the past half-century, 400 treaties had been concluded over the use of rivers. Of the 37 incidents that involved violence, 30 occurred in the dry and bitterly contested region formed by Israel and its neighbours, where the upper end of the Jordan river was hotly disputed, and skirmished over, before Israel took control in the 1967 war. And some inter-state water treaties are very robust. The Indus river pact between India and Pakistan survived two wars and the deep crisis of 2002.
Where the doom-mongers do have a point is this: drought, desertification and food shortage are among the factors that foment conflict within states by tipping some areas, at least, into social collapse. The drying up of old grazing lands, once shared by Arab herders and African farmers, is one of the things that pushed Sudan’s west into chaos and misery. But what about war between nations that more-or-less function? For anyone who takes a cynical view of the causes of war, water seems a less likely agent than say, oil or diamonds. For dictators or warlords (the sort who sponsored or prolonged ghastly wars in Congo and Angola), water is less enticing than minerals or gems. It is harder to steal and sell.
Water, it seems, is a source for cooperation. Mark Zeitoun, a Canadian scholar at the London School of Economics, says rivers provide a perfect case of “asymmetrical co-operation” between countries that are forced to work together on terms dictated by the strongest. Take the Nile, where the main riparian states, Egypt, Sudan, Uganda and Ethiopia, or their colonial masters have been watching each other’s water use closely for a century at least—and Egypt usually gets its way.
And who is the usual suspect that could precipitate a conflict? China. Unconstrained by World Bank diplomacy it could possibly enrage Egypt if it ever helped the Ethiopians divert part of the Blue Nile to agriculture. Even as Egypt has softened its public stance and reached out to its riparian partners, its intelligence is active in the Horn of Africa.
Still, as the Economist notes, there are risks.
In Uganda, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan and Egypt, the Nile basin has some of Africa’s most militaristic countries. The inability to manage the waters of Lake Victoria, which is increasing in turbidity, bodes ill for the management of the White Nile. Already, the annual death toll from battles over water and grazing in the badlands of south Somalia, southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya is in the hundreds. Aid-workers say growing numbers of people and livestock, escalation from rifles to machineguns, erratic rainfall and especially the increased rates of evaporation expected in the future will put the toll into the tens of thousands. That still doesn’t add up to a real war between proper armies—but a thirsty planet is unlikely to be a stable and peaceful one.
by Jules Evans | May 1, 2008 | Influence and networks, Off topic
One of the trends we’ve seen in investment banking over the last two or three years is what PWC calls the ‘global war for talent’. Local banks in rich emerging market countries have more money to spend than their troubled rivals on Wall Street, so they’re hiring the top talent from western banks to join them.
We’re seeing a similar process slowly occurring in the media. Western media are in financial trouble. Sales at every American national newspaper except the Wall Street Journal and USA Today are on a long-term downwards trajectory. The same is true in the UK, with the exception of The Sun and The Observer, whose circulations are slightly rising.
Papers are being undercut by sites like Google News and Yahoo News, and by free rags like Metro and London Lite, which have skeleton editorial staffs and rely on recycling press releases and paparazzi photos.
However, in the emerging markets, the story is much rosier. The World Association of Newspapers says that in India, daily newspaper sales rose by 33% between 2001 and 2005, while in China, circulation rose by 28% between 2000 and 2004.
As the Guardian’s media section noted last year:
The seemingly inexorable decline of the newspaper in Europe and, more dramatically, in North America sometimes makes the industry sound doomed, regardless of its heavy online presence.
Overall, however, global newspaper sales are on the increase, a fact which is all too often ignored by gloomy commentators in the West, who need only look eastwards when optimism is in short supply at home.
That means western media firms are now targeting markets like India and China. Journalists at The Times, for example, were told to keep the Indian market in mind while writing web stories (how does one do this exactly? Describe the new budget as ‘pukka’?) The Sun, The Independent and The Daily Mail have all launched joint ventures in India in the last 12 months.
But it also means local media firms having the capital to attract western journalists onto their staff for English language ventures. This often involves quite serious culture clashes, and the results can be quite comic. (more…)
by Daniel Korski | Apr 30, 2008 | Conflict and security, South Asia
Prince William, the second in line to the British throne, just finished a trip to Afghanistan, which probably happened at the same time as Taliban gunmen failed to kill Afghan President Hamid Karzai and a slew of international officials.
Despite Prince William’s safe return and President Karzai’s lucky escape, it should be clear to anyone that things are not going particularly well for NATO’s Afghan mission.
All is not lost, but it could be unless there is a change of strategy. What should such a change entail?
(more…)
