by Alex Evans | Mar 17, 2008 | Global system, Influence and networks, South Asia
While China is blocking websites in the hope of preventing news of security force brutality from seeping out, Xinhua is busy denouncing the Dalai Lama as a “master terror maker”. In fact,
The Dalai Lama and his clique have never for a day refrained from violence and terror. His childhood teacher, an Austrian, was a Nazi…
You have to be kidding. Hard to see how China’s going to make a success of the Olympics if this is the best they can come up with on media relations. Moises Naim looks pretty prescient in the light of his observation last November that when the world’s entire activist contingent descends on Beijing,
…the government will inevitably attempt to control and repress the activists. And that will be a new and frustrating experience for a centralized government that is not used to containing well-organized, media-savvy foreigners who work through highly decentralized, international, nongovernmental organizations that know how to mobilize public opinion to advance their causes.
Charlie Beckett, who runs the Public Media Forum at the London School of Economics, reports that the Chinese have been seeking his advice on managing the media better – though it’s not clear how they’d manage to effect such a sea change in so little time, even assuming they were inclined to.
It’s tempting to feel a sense of schadenfreude as China trips itself up over and over again while carrying the Olympic torch, given its appalling human rights record. But on the other hand, remember David Miliband’s observation when he spoke in China last month:
We will only resolve [shared threats like climate change and fragile states] through a new bargain between major states in the international community, embedded in our bilateral relationships, multilateral institutions, and not least the partnership between China, the world’s fastest growing economy, and Europe, the world largest single market. Isolation would be a disaster for that process and there is too much at stake. That is why my message to British people back home is simple. Do not boycott the Olympics, celebrate them instead.
The risk is that if China manages to cock up the Olympics as royally as she seems poised to, then at best it will make it harder to engage her on issues like climate change where there can’t be any solution without her. The world needs China to feel safe to come out of her shell – and this is the best prospect for long term progress on human rights record too (look at Burma, after all – hard to see many signs there of isolation being an effective driver of change).
At worst, of course, the Olympics could go bad at the same time as other chickens (like food inflation or a sharp economic slowdown) come home to roost too – and then all bets would really be off. As Naim commented last year,
It’s fair to say that the Chinese government probably had no idea what it was getting into when it applied to host the Olympics in 2000.
Update: some good reporting here from ITN.
[youtube:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbTsNu08Xqs]
But as Blake Hounshell notes, the LA Times reckons that China’s media strategy is working well for its intended audience – at home:
One key factor is a media strategy that, while still blunt and heavily reliant on censorship and propaganda, shows more nuance than usual for the lumbering Communist Party.
This last week the government has used something it traditionally viewed as a big negative, any suggestion that it’s not in total control, to its advantage by going large with print, still and video coverage of Tibetans attacking Han Chinese in the Tibetan capital, Lhasa, and destroying their property.
Not only does this rather ironically paint the Chinese state and its massive police force as something of a victim, analysts said, but it also stirs up feelings of fear and anger among many Han, the nation’s majority population, that add a personal dimension to the riots.
by Charlie Edwards | Mar 5, 2008 | Global system, Influence and networks
I am sure Alex and/or David will post something about Miliband’s speech to the FCO leadership conference which happened yesterday. My advice – don’t get too carried away with the speech – it’s good and runs through a familiar set of themes, instead watch the video embedded into the speech.
Two things stand out. Miliband’s plea for a culture of creativity and challenge in the FCO and secondly, the need for the FCO to do the vision, strategy and the detail.
There is also a nice line about diplomacy no longer being solely about relations between governments but about governments and civil society.
by Alex Evans | Feb 21, 2008 | Conflict and security, UK
FCO has been briefing journalists in the last few minutes: here’s the Times –
David Miliband is expected to apologise to the Commons today as he discloses that two American “extraordinary rendition” flights did, after all, land on British soil.
The Government has always insisted that there was no evidence that such flights had occurred, but ministers have recently received information from Washington that two flights – one en route to Guantanamo Bay and one to Morocco – stopped over at Diego Garcia, the British overseas territory in the Indian Ocean.
The Foreign Secretary is expected to say that the Government did not know of the flights at the time it assured MPs that none had taken place and that efforts are under way that it never happens again.
Miliband is making a statement to the House now – watch it live here. More to follow.
Update: the BBC says both flights landed in 2002. And The Times has now added this:
Campaigners pointed out that when any such flight had landed on British soil it came under British jurisdiction. In late November Jack Straw, the then Foreign Secretary, wrote to the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to ask for clarification on the purpose of some 80 flights that were known to have passed through the UK.
Downing Street denied that UK airports had been used for rendition flights “so far as we are aware”. Questioned by the parliamentary committee on foreign affairs on December 13, Mr Straw denied that any CIA flights carrying prisoners abroad had passed through British airfields.
He dismissed suggestions that a judicial investigation should be launched into reports that over 400 CIA flights have flown in and out of Britain since September 2001, saying the world should accept the “serious assurance” of the United States that it was not transferring prisoners abroad to be tortured.
To which the obvious rejoinder – assuming that the British government really did know nothing about UK airports being used for rendition flights – is: with allies like these…
The Guardian has just added that “Miliband said he had expressed his “deep disappointment” to the US government that the nature of the flights had not been revealed earlier”. Too bloody right.
by Alex Evans | Feb 7, 2008 | Cooperation and coherence, Economics and development, UK
While we’re on the subject of Sue Cameron’s awesome Whitehall gossip network, note also her piece yesterday about DFID (or ‘Difid’ as she enchantingly calls it) – which bears all the hallmarks of hostile briefing from King Charles Street.
Could the horror engulfing Kenya change the balance of power in Whitehall? I am told that questions are being asked at the highest levels about Britain’s “limp-wristed” response to the Kenyan crisis. Senior Foreign Office people blame their colleagues at the Department for International Development for not realising that Kenya was, as one put it, “about to blow”. Difid is now the major arm of British policy in Africa because it has all the money for development.
Yet I am told its people are unwilling to discuss abuses of aid – which are widespread – and have little idea about good governance and how to bring it about. Now there are inquiries as to why pressure was not brought to bear on the Kenyan government. Why was aid not restricted? Why were Kenyan politicians – such as vice-president Stephen Kalonzo, now in London – not banned from visiting? We have spinelessly allowed him in even though Kenya has just declared Sir Edward Clay, our former high commissioner to Kenya, persona non grata. The outspoken Sir Edward once attacked “the massive looting and grand corruption” of Kenya. He accused Kenyan officials of behaving “like gluttons” and “vomiting on the shoes” of donors. His successor Adam Wood, a Difid man, has been more emollient. But change may be coming. Two months ago Mark Malloch Brown, Africa minister, said: “We have a development policy for Africa; is it time that the UK also has a foreign policy for Africa?” David Miliband, foreign secretary, shares this view. Difid’s ascendancy, which owes much to Gordon Brown’s influence, may be ending.
Now I’m not saying donors have their approach a hundred per cent right in Kenya. I’m unconvinced, for example, by arguments that Kenya was a suitable country for direct budget support; and I think donors have a lot of work to do to set out a clearer theory of how they work in developing countries that, like Kenya or Nigeria, could go either way – lift-off or basket case – especially given that such work has more to do with the quality of influence and political engagement than with the amount of aid spent.
But if it is indeed the case that DFID staff are “unwilling to discuss abuses of aid”, as the article charges, then it’s a bit of a stretch to see how bringing the debate to the diary column of the Financial Times is likely to coax DFID into a franker discussion. What kind of idiot thinks that this sort of approach will lead to policy coherence between the two departments?
The great majority of officials at FCO and DFID understand that their ability to work together is of paramount importance to their closely overlapping – if still distinct – missions. But in each department there are still a fair few old-fashioned turf warriors who know exactly which buttons to push in the other department to guarantee a rise.
Each time they press those buttons – especially in public – it makes life a bit harder for those officials who understand the need for the two departments to cohere with one another, by confirming the old stereotypes as to why you can’t trust DFID / FCO [delete as applicable].
Briefing stuff like this to the FT might be fun, but it does nothing to advance either department’s mission. The handful of turf warriors at each end of St James’s Park need to grow up.
by Alex Evans | Feb 5, 2008 | Climate and resource scarcity, Cooperation and coherence, Influence and networks, UK
The Foreign Office launched its new Strategic Framework yesterday. It seems rather a grand title for a leaflet that stretches to two pages of A4, but perhaps that means we can hope for a fuller exposition in due course. Here’s your cut-out-and-keep guide to how it’s different from the old strategic framework:
Stuff that was in before and is still in now: WMD, terrorism, conflict prevention, the EU, a high growth economy including support for UK business, energy security, climate change, human rights & good governance, migration, consular stuff, overseas territories.
Stuff that was in before but has disappeared: Organised crime (“reducing the harm to the UK from international crime, including drug trafficking, people smuggling and money laundering”); sustainable development.
Stuff that has appeared for the first time: More emphasis on conflict resolution (“including through an integrated civil-military approach to peacekeeping, stabilisation and sustained post-conflict peacebuilding”); an explicit reference to the Millennium Development Goals [happy faces over at DFID, no doubt]; and a reference to the international system in its own right [rather than just in the context of conflict prevention, as under Margaret Beckett].
FCO say that they’ve shrunk the list of priorities from ten priorities to four policy goals (counter-terrorism and weapons proliferation; prevent and resolve conflict; low-carbon, high-growth global economy; effective international institutions) and three essential services (support British economy; support British nationals abroad; support managed migration to Britain). But given that there are three distinct sub-points under each policy goal, and that 95% of the content of the old priorites is still in there, I’m politely sceptical.
Still, let’s offer up a small prayer of thanks for David Miliband’s special gift to us all: the defenestration of sustainable development, the world’s leading all-things-to-all-people concept. On the other hand, it’s a bit worrying that resource scarcity has effectively disappeared as a result, especially on the food and water front. A missed trick there (especially since Miliband really pioneered the concept of ‘one planet living’ hard while he was at Defra); it could have fitted in nicely alongside the energy security stuff.
So what happens now? David Miliband’s statement to Parliament on the new framework says a little about what it all means in practice:
We will be increasing substantially the overall level of resources the FCO puts into counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation; climate change; Afghanistan and other conflict regions; and key international institutions. All these areas will receive additional staff and money.
We have also decided that we should adapt the FCO’s overseas network of posts to align it more closely with our own priorities and those of HMG as a whole. So we will be shifting a proportion of our diplomatic staff from Europe and the Americas to Asia, the Middle East and other parts of the world, while continuing to sustain our global flexibility and reach…
In order to put more resources into these new priority areas and to sharpen our strategic focus, it is necessary to reduce the resources the FCO puts into certain other issues, notably where other Whitehall Departments in London are better placed to direct HMG’s international priorities, in particular in the areas of sustainable development, science and innovation, and crime and drugs.
Miliband also said that “we will be taking forward the detailed planning and implementation over the next few months, inside the FCO and with other Government Departments”. As that process gets underway, it would be good to hear more about FCO’s strategy in two particular areas:
1. Its role on policy synthesis. As David and I set out in our paper last April on Fixing the Foreign Office, one of the core problems in UK foreign policy is that with domestic departments all leading internationally on their little bit of foreign policy (Defra on climate, BERR on energy and so on), we have a problem with policy coherence arising from the fact that all of these organisational silos emphatically do not add up to a whole that’s more than the sum of its parts. Traditionally, overcoming this would have been a Cabinet Office job. But today, the Cabinet Office just doesn’t have the resources for such a complex task. So does FCO have a special role in effecting a strategic policy synthesis and in joining up the dots? And if so, how does it work?
2. Its theory of influence. Miliband is already clear that the new empowerment of non-state actors in foreign policy is a Big Deal (c.f. his idea of the ‘civilian surge’). But if diplomats’ work now extends far beyond just talking to other diplomats, does the FCO have a clear approach towards leveraging influence in this new context? (This is the question that David and I will be tackling in our forthcoming Demos pamphlet on The New Public Diplomacy.) And if so, how does it work?
