by Alex Evans | Apr 21, 2008 | Climate and resource scarcity, Global system, Middle East and North Africa
Interesting times for the peak oil debate. Last week came the news that Russian oil had peaked: its Q1 oil production in 2008 fell, for the first time in a decade. Later in the week, oil touched a new all-time high of $117 after Nigerian insurgents attacked a Shell pipeline there.
And today, the news emerges from Saudi Arabia that all future investment plans for increasing capacity have been put on hold: “in a series of statements, including one by the king himself, the kingdom has warned consumers it does not believe there is a need for further expansion”. According to Carola Hoyos,
Abdullah Jum’ah, chief executive of Saudi Aramco, the kingdom’s oil company, said in a closed-door meeting with oil ministers and executives in Rome yesterday that market signals were “imperfect” and that there were uncertainties created by the move away from oil, the world’s worsening economic outlook and the recent turbulence in the financial markets, according to one person who took notes at the discussions.
But I’m still wondering whether the problem here isn’t simply that Saudi Arabia hasn’t got any spare capacity to give, whatever it says about downturns and the terrible unfairness of climate policy.
Although we’re not quite at the point yet when you can talk about peak oil at conferences without feeling like a crank, you’d be amazed how many people think privately that the peak is pretty soon – including from governments and multilateral agencies.
Into the midst of this murky context sails a fascinating new survey from the always-good-value Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland:
A new WorldPublicOpinion.org poll finds that majorities in 15 of 16 nations surveyed around the world think that oil is running out and governments should make a major effort to find new sources of energy. Most think that future oil prices will be much higher. Only 22 percent on average believe that “enough new oil will be found so that it can remain a primary source of energy for the foreseeable future.” Only in Nigeria does a majority (53%) endorse the view that governments can rely on oil in the long term.
Instead, an average of 70 percent takes the position that governments should assume that “oil is running out and it is necessary to make a major effort to replace oil as a primary source of energy.” The largest majorities endorsing this view are found in South Korea (97%), France (91%), Mexico (83%) and China (80%). The smallest are in Russia (53%) and India (54%), while in Nigeria only a minority (45%) holds this view.
‘Course, you can rebut this in part by pointing out that (a) the two statements on which respondents were polled are slightly meaningless without dates, and (b) you can believe that enough oil will be found to satisfy demand by a given date while still believing that it’s “running out”; indeed, if you disagree with the second statement then you know something about geology that the rest of us don’t. Still; you get the point. Did someone say something about the wisdom of crowds?
by Alex Evans | Apr 21, 2008 | Climate and resource scarcity, Global system
So far, most of the consensus on what to do about food prices is (as you might expect) strongly focused on the short term: measures like spending more cash on humanitarian aid, or building up social protection systems for the poorest and most at risk. But one medium term measure also seems to command widespread consensus: we should press ahead with the Doha trade talks. Here’s Bob Zoellick at the World Bank, for instance:
If ever there is a time to cut distorting agricultural subsidies and open markets for food imports, it must be now. If not now, when?
Peter Mandelson, meanwhile, opines that “without a doubt” a trade agreement would help to restrain spiralling prices. And for once, this is something where he and Gordon Brown agree: Brown’s recent letter on food prices to G8 heads has trade as the very first action point, noting that
We should surely redouble our efforts for a WTO trade deal that provides greater poor country access to developed country markets and cuts distortionary subsidies in rich countries.
Now you can’t fault the political opportunism here, of course: part of the reason for the push on liberalisation now is that, as food importing countries frantically slash their import tariffs to try to keep the grain flowing in, they’re also achieving liberalisation where trade negotiations have failed.
But what effect will all of this have on food prices? If the US and EU start eliminating their subsidies too, isn’t there a risk that the short term impact could be to increase food prices to poor consumers? Why yes. Indeed, Gordon Brown actually says as much in his letter to G8 heads [emphasis added]:
…in the short term net food-importing countries may need support to cope with higher prices as a result of liberalisation…
by Alex Evans | Apr 17, 2008 | East Asia and Pacific, Global system
And now for the latest instalment of “how not to do public diplomacy”. Last time, readers will recall, we observed with interest as Chinese government sources called the Dalai Lama a terrorist and implied that he might be a Nazi. Later, of course, it transpired that these comments were merely a prelude, a limbering up before the real race, when Tibet’s Communist Party chief Zhang Quingli commented modestly that,
The Dalai Lama is a wolf wrapped in a habit, a monster with a human face and animal’s heart. We are now engaged in a fierce blood-and-fire battle with the Dali clique, a life-and-death battle between us and the enemy.
Not bad, not bad. But of course, if you really want to make an impact with your public diplomacy campaign, then you need to break out of regarding the state as your only communication platform. You need a coalition: a loose, decentralised network of advocates who are all animated by a central orienting idea.
And so to this morning’s New York Times. We start our tale on the day last week when the Olympic torch was being carried through San Francisco. In Durham, North Carolina, the campus of Duke University saw a face-off between two rival groups of activists: one pro-Tibetan, one (much larger) pro-Chinese. A student, Grace Wang, came out of the dining hall and saw that she had friends on both sides of the increasingly ugly confrontation. Now read on:
Ms. Wang tried to get the two groups to talk, participants said. She began traversing what she called “the middle ground,” asking the groups’ leaders to meet and making bargains [sic]. She said she agreed to write “Free Tibet, Save Tibet” on one student’s back only if he would speak with pro-Chinese demonstrators. She pleaded and lectured. In one photo, she is walking toward a phalanx of Chinese flags and banners, her arms overhead in a “timeout” T.
Clearly this sort of moderate, consensus-oriented position represented a massive threat to perceptions of China in the run-up to the Olympics. What was she thinking? Had she no pride in her nation? Fortunately, though, the network-based coalition was good to go:
The next day, a photo appeared on an Internet forum for Chinese students with a photo of Ms. Wang and the words “traitor to your country” emblazoned in Chinese across her forehead. Ms. Wang’s Chinese name, identification number and contact information were posted, along with directions to her parents’ apartment in Qingdao, a Chinese port city.
Salted with ugly rumors and manipulated photographs, the story of the young woman who was said to have taken sides with Tibet spread through China’s most popular Web sites, at each stop generating hundreds or thousands of raging, derogatory posts, some even suggesting that Ms. Wang — a slight, rosy 20-year-old — be burned in oil. Someone posted a photo of what was purported to be a bucket of feces emptied on the doorstep of her parents, who had gone into hiding.
“If you return to China, your dead corpse will be chopped into 10,000 pieces,” one person wrote in an e-mail message to Ms. Wang. “Call the human flesh search engines!” another threatened, using an Internet phrase that implies physical, as opposed to virtual, action.
So there we are: another public diplomacy triumph (this story ran on the front page of the Times today). Before, China’s main communications problem was perceptions of a monolithic, repressive state. Now, its more enthusiastic netizens have managed to start the ball rolling on getting its people seen as mad, foaming-at-the-mouth nationalists as well. Score!
by Alex Evans | Apr 13, 2008 | East Asia and Pacific
Australia’s PM Kevin Rudd – who as David noted is “surely the wonkiest head of state ever” – continues to charm the pants off everyone he comes across.
While Gordon Brown manages to annoy everyone with his foreign policy equivocations (FT: “He will not be going to the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics, but that should in no way be construed as a boycott. He receives the will-o’-the-wisp Olympic flame at 10 Downing Street but lets it be known that he did not touch it.”), Kevin achieves the opposite: he goes to Beijing, wags the finger on human rights, and leaves his audience purring.
Here’s an excerpt from his Beijing speech last week:
This year, as China hosts the Olympics, the eyes of the world will be on you and the city of Beijing. It will be a chance for China to engage directly with the world, both on the sports field and on the streets of Beijing. Some have called for a boycott of the Beijing Olympics because of recent problems in Tibet. As I said in London on Sunday, I do not agree. I believe the Olympics are important for China’s continuing engagement with the world.
Australia like most other countries recognises China’s sovereignty over Tibet. But we also believe it is necessary to recognise there are significant human rights problem in Tibet. The current situation in Tibet is of concern to Australians. We recognise the need for all parties to avoid violence and find a solution through dialogue. As a long-standing friend of China I intend to have a straightforward discussion with China’s leaders on this. We wish to see the year 2008 as one of harmony, and celebration – not one of conflict and contention.
So obviously that would lead to swift condemnation from the Chinese press for ‘meddling’, together with vociferous outrage from students, nationalists and other hotheads, right? Er, not quite. The Australian newspaper polled some of the audience afterwards:
Although Mr Rudd’s comments about “significant human rights problems in Tibet,” might draw ire from his hosts Premier Wen Jiabao and President Hu Jintao, China’s top students appeared unfazed. Many went so far as to agree with Mr Rudd that handling ongoing unrest in Tibet peacefully and through dialogue was the best way to resolve the issue that has placed China’s communist leaders under the global spotlight for nearly a month.
“I agreed with what he said,” Li Yang, a graduate student in environmental sciences, said following the speech. “The Tibetan issue should be resolved without violence and through dialogue, this is correct.” Although Mr Rudd’s speech touched on many such sensitive issues, he also received praise for voicing intentions to become a friend in the true Chinese tradition, who can “offer unflinching advice and counsels restraint”.
And of course, it can’t have hurt that the whole speech was delivered in flawless Mandarin:
“His Chinese is very good, he speaks Chinese very well,” said Hong Ziyun, a first year law student. “He really understands Chinese history and culture.”
Meanwhile, China Daily had this to say: “Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd enthralled his audience at Peking University with an intimate grasp of China affairs and a thorough understanding of global politics yesterday.”
Top marks to Rudd for diplomatic deftness. But also a clue, maybe, as to what kind of approach towards dealing with current concerns over Tibet is likely to have most influence…
by Alex Evans | Apr 9, 2008 | Climate and resource scarcity, Economics and development, Global system
I’m a big fan of Foreign Policy editor Moises Naim – he was the first person to spot the potential for China’s Olympics to become a debacle, for instance – but I was left a bit cold by his LA Times article yesterday on the pressures that accompany the emergence of a truly global middle class. As he observes, the global middle class is growing at an explosive rate:
Homi Kharas, a researcher at the Brookings Institution, estimates that by 2020, the world’s middle class will grow to include a staggering 52% of the total population, up from 30% now. The middle class will almost double in the poor countries where sustained economic growth is fast lifting people above the poverty line.
For Naim, the central question is, ‘can the world afford a middle class?’. As he points out “the lifestyle of the existing middle class will probably have to drastically change as the new middle class emerges. The consumption patterns that an American, French or Swedish family took for granted will inevitably become more expensive…” This is above all because of the intensifying resource pressures that come with a growing middle class, especially on food (which Naim discusses at length) and energy. Naim’s conclusion is that,
The debate about the Earth’s “limits to growth” is as old as Thomas Malthus’ alarm about a world in which the population outstrips its ability to feed itself. In the past, pessimists have been proved wrong. Higher prices and new technologies that boosted supplies, like the green revolution, always came to the rescue. That may happen again.
But the adjustment to a middle class greater than what the world has ever known is just beginning. As the Indonesian and Mexican protesters can attest, it won’t be cheap. And it won’t be quiet.
But what’s missing for me in Naim’s article is what the emergence of a global middle class means for the poor: the ‘billion at the bottom’ (who may be more like the two to three billion as we get closer to 2050). Yes, there’s a question about how to increase supply (of food, energy and other key resources). But there’s also a demand side – which is all about fair shares.
Take food prices as an illustration. In his book Development as Freedom, Amartya Sen observes that in some cases, famines happen because of relative inequality rather than because of an absolute shortage of food:
“…[some people] who buy food may be ruined because the real purchasing power of their money incomes may have shrunk sharply. Such a famine may occur without any decline in food output, resulting as it does from a rise in competing demand rather than a fall in total supply…”
So what happens if we start to see this globally – whereby a burgeoning global middle class inadvertently takes food beyond the purchasing power of the world’s poorest people?
All of us can see the two megatrends of (a) the increasing tightness of food supply – likely to grow further as population, affluence and scarcity continue to rise – and (b) the growing gulf between the haves and the have-nots. In combination, those trends have the potential to multiply each other’s impact as far as the poorest are concerned. What we’re only just beginning to realise is this: in a world of limits, relative inequality can have absolute implications for the world’s poor.
