by Daniel Korski | Oct 21, 2008 | Conflict and security, Cooperation and coherence, Europe and Central Asia
As conflict continues to rage in Chad and Afghanistan and the threat of terrorism at home persists, maximising the effectiveness of the current European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) remains a high priority. With the United States calling for a stronger, more cohesive approach, is it time to redefine European security priorities? How can a collective European security and defence strategy take into consideration the capabilities, weaknesses and resources of individual member states?
In this submission to the IPPR National Security Commission I argue that to create the necessary civilian capabilities in crisis situations for both common and unilateral use, the UK and like-minded allies should consider establishing a European civilian reserve – a reserve corps of 2,000 civilian specialists – with European citizens on stand-by for deployment.
by Charlie Edwards | Oct 20, 2008 | Influence and networks, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia
The soldier-scholar General Petraeus is launching a major reassessment of U.S. strategy for Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq and the surrounding region, the result of which will be a new campaign plan for the Middle East and Central Asia.
Two major themes have emerged from some of the initial brainstorming:
1. A Government-led reconciliation of Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan and Pakistan,
2. Leveraging diplomatic and economic initiatives with nearby countries that are influential in the war.
Interestingly:
In appearances this month in Washington, however, Petraeus has sought to manage expectations of any repeat of the Iraq performance in Afghanistan – often suggested by Republican presidential candidate John McCain – stressing that Afghanistan is not Iraq, and that while some concepts are “transplantable,” Afghanistan has daunting challenges likely to require a far lengthier effort.
As befits a soldier-scholar Petraeus is now recruiting a brain trust of advisers, to join his Joint Strategic Assessment Team – led by a longtime adviser, Col. H.R. McMaster. Experts will be handpicked from State Department, Pentagon and other civilian and military officials as well as from outside. To begin with the 100 people, will be split into six subregional teams, tasked with investigating the root causes of insecurity in the region with the goal of finding solutions that integrate military action, diplomacy and development work. Experts currently touted to join the assessments group include: Shuja Nawaz, Ahmed Rashid, and Clare Lockhart.
by Daniel Korski | Oct 16, 2008 | Conflict and security, Cooperation and coherence
Developing effective indigenous forces has turned out to be one of the most important counter-insurgency tasks , whether in Afghanistan or Yemen. Yet it is a task that both the U.S and NATO allies struggle with.
The U.S Army is therefore thinking about creating standardized units to undertake the training tasks while in Britain, the head of the army, General Sir Richard Dannatt, has argued that the British army needs to be restructured, grow bigger, and acquire new peacemaking and reconstruction skill, including by establishing specialized reconstruction units as part of eight “organic” manoeuvre brigades.
But what is lacking is a NATO “chapeaux”, which could help build capabilities elsewhere, ensure greater interoperability and guarantee that the new security assistance mission is a priority for all NATO allies. Creating a 2000- person NATO Military Advisory Force supported by a Military Advisory Centre,would be the next logical move to achieve this. Read more about this idea in this article in World Defence Systems
by Richard Gowan | Oct 11, 2008 | Climate and resource scarcity, Conflict and security, Cooperation and coherence, Europe and Central Asia, Global system
The UN and NATO have signed a – not very radical – declaration about their cooperation in places like Afghanistan and Darfur, and the Russians are peeved:
Moscow on Thursday accused NATO and the United Nations of secretly forging an agreement that tightens their cooperation without informing Russia, a U.N. Security Council member whose relations with NATO are badly strained.
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said Russia was aware an agreement was in the works and assumed it would be shown to member states for review. “This did not happen, and the agreement between the secretariats was signed in a secretive way,” Lavrov said.
Russia’s anger reflected its wariness that closer relations could give NATO more clout at the United Nations, where Moscow holds veto power as a permanent Security Council member. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Andrei Nesterenko suggested that top U.N. officials went back on their word. “We were assured at the highest level of the U.N. secretariat that no such document would be signed without informing us in advance,” he said.
It was silly of the UN to let this come out the same week that the Security Council agreed to extend the UN monitoring mission in Georgia. But this agreement has been in the works for ages. I recall seeing a draft in 2006, although this was covered in scribbled deletions from the French, who didn’t want it to overshadow cooperation between the UN and EU. For a time, it looked like the deal was dead, but there’s been a lot of interest in it at the very top of both NATO and the UN.
I don’t think the Russians should worry too much: this is a piece of paper that summarizes a vast amount of UN-NATO cooperation that is already happening.
But signing it was a mistake for the UN. As a report overseen by Lakhdar Brahimi implied earlier this year, UN staff are seen as legitimate targets for terrorists and malcontents worldwide because it is associated with U.S. and Western interests. The challenge in an Afghanistan is for the UN to maintain some political autonomy. Even a low-profile declaration like this makes it just a little harder to do that.
And this minor diplomatic incident points to a growing conceptual problem for fans of multilateral security cooperation. This is a naive belief that all international security institutions have, or could have, shared goals and that we simply need to link them up better to meet those goals. This is a hangover from the happy days of the 1990s, when the West still had a grip on pretty much every organization from the UN to Boy Scouts, but it’s not sustainable in a more competitive world.
NATO and the UN have fundamentally different roles: the first is still, in the final analysis, a framework for Western security while the latter is a place to do deals between disunited states. The two can cooperate case-by-case, but this deep political difference remains. And it should remain – our best hope for resolving threats in a competitive world is to keep our range of political options open.
I think the only really interesting question in security cooperation at present is how we maintain and nurture sufficient institutional pluralism in the international system. “Diverse institutional responses to diverse threats” is my new slogan.
Acute readers will note that this is rather different to what Alex and David have been saying about climate change, commodity prices, etc. – i.e. we need shared awareness and shared platforms to tackle new challenges – not to mention the swirling demands for an international response to the financial crisis.
I’ll freely admit that I’m skeptical about the idea of truly shared understanding in ANY political realm (isn’t it just an old Enlightenment fallacy back to disturb the system?) but I do share the analysis that on an issue like climate change, international convergence on a (probably rather minimal) shared awareness of the threats involved and mechanisms to respond is necessary and just possible. Maybe. Climate change now is probably in the same category as nuclear proliferation during the Cold War: everyone can be scared into signing a big deal to tackle it, which is how we got the NPT, a pretty amazing treaty in retrospect.
But even as Russia and the U.S. were moving towards the NPT, they were on alert in Europe and Asia. It is possible to converge on global problems while competing on diverse localized security issues. So I’ll leave the search for common platforms to my colleagues, and argue for uncommon platforms down below.
by Charlie Edwards | Oct 3, 2008 | UK
As news of Hutton’s new role as Defence Secretary travels across Politics Home, Twitter and email a few quick thoughts:
Next week John Hutton will face his first test as Defence Secretary when he walks down Whitehall to Parliament for a debate on Defence in the World. Given his new brief, politicians from across the floor may be gentle in their questions and speeches. Some people may even advise him that he should stay away and let Bob Ainsworth do the job. But this would be bad idea.
The MoD is not in a great place right now, morale is low, there is no strategic direction and people are exhausted. Unlike Browne, Hutton has to show commitment right from the start. On Sunday, having spoken to senior officials he should board a plane and visit Iraq and Afghanistan. There he should listen to senior commanders, FCO and DFID personnel, get up to speed with what’s happening on the ground and give a short pep talk to the troops before coming home. When the debate comes around next week he should enter the chamber and let it be known there are three things he cares about in his new brief – people, people, people.
Back in Main Building things won’t be so easy. There are three key things he will need to focus on. First: Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. As has been reported in the French press – not all is well in Helmand – and while the people on the ground are the one’s who will stabilise the situation, getting a grip on Whitehall is as just as important.
Second: Strategy – Main Building is rudderless, that said there is hope in the shape of a new Director of Strategy, and a new head of policy & planning is also on the way. Coupled to this political consensus on a strategic review is close to reaching a tipping point – all parties publicly and privately now agree that a a review must happen, but when? With limited time until a General Election it may not be in the best interests politically and organisationally to kick a big review off now, instead it would be better to prepare the ground work. Laying the foundations is crucial and should never be underestimated. It may be a thankless task but Hutton will get kudos for doing it.
Third: Strategic Communications. Forget we are staring into an economic abyss for a moment and the other important issue the British Government is dealing with today are the conflicts in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the fragile peace in Iraq and general instability in East Africa and elsewhere. And yet no one is entirely sure what we are doing and why these places are important. For reasons best known to the MoD senior commanders and officials don’t seem to be able to get their message out – this may be down to personal, bureaucratic and organisational interests but this needs to be corrected in days not weeks – the British public need to know what their armed forces are doing abroad and how it connects to issues like terrorism at home. Newspaper features on our men and women [insert country/ operation here] isn’t a sustainable policy. If Hutton is feeling bold he should copy No.10 and the FCO and overhaul the entire of MoD’s communications – website and all.
And what about procurement? This may prove, in time, to be Hutton’s Achilles heel. His constituency is home to a major defence contractor (BAE Systems) so it may be advisable to steer clear of procurement issues to begin with. He will have enough on his plate with savings that still need to be found, projects and platforms given the chop – a bit more transparency around the MoD budget wouldn’t go a miss either (but perhaps save this for another day). He should learn from US SecDef Bob Gates who has been weaving a completely new approach in the Pentagon and set the context and narrative first before doing anything major on procurement. After all – the question that has been buzzing around Main Building for the last couple of years is relatively straight forward: what is defence for?
