by David Steven | Dec 11, 2008 | UK
The Barclay twins – billionaire owners of the UK’s Telegraph newspapers and various other interests – are famously reclusive. So in the early 1990s, they bought the island of Brecqhou, which can be seen in the picture below from its (not much larger – it’s three miles long) neighbour Sark.
On Brecqhou, they built a huge castle, said to be the largest built in the 20th century, and at a cost of £60m or so. Sark’s inhabitants weren’t happy:
Round-the-clock construction is said to have polluted the pristine skies of the island, which has nary a streetlight, with a sodium glow. And size is its main architectural achievement; from the air it has been mistaken for a prison, and indeed the construction crew is said to have called it Alcatraz. One islander said of the brothers, “They have the taste of Saddam Hussein.”
In 1996, the Barclay brothers tried to declare Brecqhou’s independence. They took no services from Sark and travelled to and from their island by helicopter. They were said to resent visits from Sark’s police (when, say, a worker on their estate met an accidental death). They may also have been looking to more fully protect their financial affairs from scrutiny.
When their plans were frustrated, they began to lobby for replacement of Sark’s political system – often described as the last remants of feudalism in the Western world. Thus began a long legal battle, with the brothers fighting for what they describe as “modern democratic principles and the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights.”
Meanwhile, they embarked on a buying spree, which saw them took control of large swathes of Sark itself. According to the FT, they bought hotels, shops, golf courses – and were said to be pushing for an end to the ban on cars (and helicopters) on the island.
Finally yesterday, Sark’s 474 voters headed to the polls for the island’s first ever democratic election (even Afghanistan didn’t have to wait so long). You can see what the islanders made of it here. The Telegraph’s Chief Reporter, Gordon Rayner was sent to cover this momentous event. The owners of his paper, he reported, had endorsed a slate of ‘reform’ candidates. They’d better get the result they wanted or there’d be trouble:
The Barclays, proprietors of Telegraph Media Group, feel so strongly about the future of Sark that they have threatened to withdraw their multi-million pound investments in the island if pro-reform candidates do not hold sway in the new parliament.
The Barclays have invested in hotels, property and agricultural land on Sark, employing around 140 people either directly or indirectly.
But all did not go according to plan. After each of the intricate ballot papers was read out aloud, in a session lasting ten hours or so, it became clear that the Barclay’s candidates had been heavily defeated – the ‘establishment’ had gained a clear majority of seats.
So how have the Barclays reacted? Well it seems they have done just what they threatened to do – immediately close down all their businesses, throwing about a sixth of the population out of work (the island has no welfare state). The twins’ lawyer told the BBC that:
The people of Sark are reaping what they sowed the day before. They only have themselves to blame. They could have co-operated with Barclays Investment but they chose to obstruct it. It was clear the Barclays were clear on their commitment to the island with support – they got no support at all.
Sark doesn’t appear to want or appreciate the Barclays’ investment and so it doesn’t have it. The island cannot at the same time treat the Barclay family in the way that it has and expect them to continue investing large sums of money into its economy.
Sark is going back to where it was before the Barclay brothers were there.
I just heard from a BBC reporter who was not expecting his hotel to be open when he got back to it. Sark’s voters have not come up with the ‘right’ democratic answer. And they’ll be punished, it seems…
Update: Another sympathetic quote from Gordon Dawes – the Barclay twins’ lawyer:
I find it very hard, particularly at this time of year, not to wonder about the old saying to do with turkeys and whether or not they would vote for Christmas; well it seems we have our answer. I am genuinely saddened. The people of Sark have spoken.
Apparently the Barclays produced a newsletter characterising one of their opponents as a “feudal talibanist” and another as having a “socialist streak”. Can’t think why that didn’t go down well with Sark’s electorate…
by Daniel Korski | Dec 11, 2008 | Conflict and security, Cooperation and coherence, UK
A couple of posts ago, Charlie drew our attention to the fact that a new report would be recommending the appointment of a Minister for Security Diplomacy. “What the f*** is security diplomacy?”, our resident security expert asked.
I haven’t read the report, but the question got me thinking. What, indeed, is security diplomacy? I don’t mean in a traditional way — working with NATO; on security policy issues; and managing defence relationships. I mean in a 21st century kind of way. So here is my stab at what it could be.
One of the 21st century’s biggest national security challenges – and therefore diplomatic tasks — will be to affect people who we cannot affect. By that, I mean that European governments have to affect security outcomes in countries with whom they have only weak links or little leverage over. They have to do so because what happens in these countries affect our security, well-being, safety. . . you know the arguments.
Take the case of Pakistan and the country’s military-security establishment. Everyone acknowledges that working with the Pakistani military will be key in lessening Indo-Pakistani tensions, containing the Taliban insurgency, clamping down on WMD proliferation, and defeating Al Qaida. Everyone acknowledges that achieving these goals is vital to Britain’s and Europe’s security.
But there are only four countries that have any real leverage on Pakistan and her security establishment: the U.S, China, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. Despite being Pakistan’s largest trading partner and a major donor, Europe has only limited leverage over Islamabad (and the military HQ in Rawalpindi), even if Britain is a (small) exception to the rule.
So the question becomes – how can Europe get the countries that do have leverage over Pakistan to act, or act in ways that may be beneficial to Europe’s interests? What incentives can be offered? Could the EU, for example, ask Turkey to lead diplomatic talks with Pakistan on the EU’s behalf, with the Turkish Prime Minister briefing the EU Heads of State? And if that is indeed what is needed, what can Turkey be offered in return?
If this is “security diplomacy” does it go beyond what it traditionally the focus of bilateral relationships and diplomacy in a non-polar world i.e. where we cannot rely on the hegemon to sway third-countries to its will? Many diplomats will argue that this is already what they doing. They are already lobbying diplomats in Beijing for China to help in Afghanistan etc.
But perhaps using the rubric “security diplomacy” makes this a concrete line of activity, ensures resources and prioritization? Much like the way Britain’s European network of embassies now focus primarily on how to leverage votes in the European Council rather than on, say, managing the UK-Romanian relationship, so implementing this kind of diplomacy may mean suborning the normal bilateral links in a number of cases (of which Pakistan is clearly one), to the so-called “diplomatic security interest”.
I am not arguing for a Minister for Security Diplomacy. Rather, I have long argued for a top-to-bottom assesment of the government’s capabilities, a National Security Review, rather than piecemeal solutions. But I’d be interested to hear what people think of the notion of security diplomacy.
by Daniel Korski | Dec 10, 2008 | Conflict and security, Cooperation and coherence, UK
In a letter to Robert Gates, cleverly disguised as an op-ed in The Times, soldier-author Allan Mallinson asks a very simple question: “Why, for example, are we so overstretched keeping 8,000 troops on the ground in Afghanistan out of an Army of 100,000?”
It is a very good question, the answer to which lies in the MoD’s “concurrency assumptions”, the assumptions military planners use to foresee the required structure, size and capability of the armed forces. In Delivering Security in a Changing World Future Capabilities, the MoD estimated that Britain could mount “as a norm, and without creating overstretch”:
- an enduring Medium Scale operation; simultaneously with
- an enduring Small Scale operation; and
- a one-off Small Scale intervention operation
It went on to say that the government reforms would allow a reconfiguration of the armed forces so they could rapidly carry out:
- the enduring Medium Scale operation; and
- an enduring Small Scale operation; simultaneously with
- a limited duration Medium Scale intervention operation.
And given time to prepare, British armed forces should be capable of undertaking:
- a demanding one-off Large Scale operation; while still maintaining a commitment to
- a simple Small Scale peace support operation.
The first problem with all these assumptions is that they were based on a notion of a time-limited engagement i.e. getting the troops in and then out quickly. But it has not turned out this way. Both Operation Telic (Iraq) and Operation Herrick (Afghanistan) turned into enduring medium-size operations (and latterly one medium, and one small), which the armed forces struggled to sustain.
This begs the question: if the MoD cannot manage two enduring medium-size operations can it handle an enduring Medium Scale operation, an enduring Small Scale operation and a limited duration Medium Scale intervention operation all the same time, as the White Paper suggested? If the answer is negative, Britain either needs to drastically adjust its ambitions downwards or the armed forces need to grow dramatically.
by Daniel Korski | Dec 9, 2008 | Conflict and security, Cooperation and coherence, Europe and Central Asia, Global Dashboard, Influence and networks, North America
Following Barack Obama’s election, the intellectual market has filled up with policy papers about how the U.S and Europe can cooperate on substantive issues like China, Russia, CT, climate change etc. But little time has been devoted to the way in which the EU and the U.S cooperate, that is, the institutions of the trans-Atlantic relationship.
NATO will continue to have an important role in the Euro-Atlantic community, but the North Atlantic Alliance is no longer the place where Americans or Europeans go to talk about big strategic questions. This is true not only for non-military topics such as the global financial crisis or climate change, but also for classic foreign policy problems.
In this paper I — and two other colleagues — have tried to lay out what kind of new institutions could boost U.S-EU cooperation. Recommendations include:
- That the President of the United States be invited once a year to the European Council
- Back-to-back EU and NATO summits
- That the US Secretary of State join the GAERC twice a year
- That American Cabinet officials be invited to European Commission meetings from time to time
- That US/PSC discussions be held alternately in Brussels and Washington.
- “Double-hatting” the EU Head of Delegation in Washington as an EU Special Representative
- Establishing a small European Legislatures Liaison Office in Congress, comprising representatives from the EP and national legislatures, as well as setting up Congress/EP task forces on key issues like Afghanistan/Pakistan and climate change.
- Setting-up a US-EU Conflict Prevention Task Force, with a permanent secretariat housed in Brussels.
- Establishing a NATO/EU School for Conflict, Post-Conflict and Stabilisation to provide training for deploying personnel
New transatlantic institutions cannot in themselves help the EU develop policies or come up with a better way of thinking strategically about foreign policy issues; but at a time of considerable transatlantic policy convergence, the absence of a solid framework for US-EU discussion will see both sides miss out on a valuable opportunity for cooperation on shared challenges.
by Daniel Korski | Dec 8, 2008 | Conflict and security, Cooperation and coherence, South Asia
I recently came across the late Russian journalist Artyom Borovik, who saw and wrote about the Soviet War in Afghanistan. His book Hidden War, has this eerie paragraph:
Anyone who stayed in Afghanistan for a long period of time, or who was sent there on a regular basis, typically went through four phases.
The first stage (which would usually last up to three months) went something like this: “The war is proceeding on a normal course. If only we can add another twenty or thirty thousand men, everything will be fine.”
Several months later the second stage : “Since we’ve already gotten ourselves into this jam, we should get the fighting over with as quickly as possible. Adding another thirty thousand men isn’t going to do it. We need at least another army to shut off all the borders.”
Five or six months later, the third stage: “There is something desperately wrong here. What a mess!”
Then, half a year or so later, the fourth and final stage: “We’d be wise to get the hell out of here – and the sooner the better.
I don’t think this needs much comment, really….
