by Richard Gowan | Aug 21, 2008 | Conflict and security, Europe and Central Asia
A story, and telling statistic, from Afghanistan:
According to a report in the Rheinische Post on Thursday, a German patrol was attacked late on Tuesday night not far from the base in Faisabad. The soldiers on the patrol, none of whom were injured, returned fire and killed one person. The event is noteworthy because it marks the first time in the six-year operation that the German army has killed someone there.
The person they killed, though, may not have been from the Taliban at all. According to a Wednesday report from a German news agency, the victim may have been an unarmed shepherd. The agency cites the police chief from the province of Badachshan, Agha Noor Keentoz, as saying that the man merely wanted to signal the patrol away from his herd of sheep. The German army is investigating the incident together with state prosecutors.
by Richard Gowan | Aug 20, 2008 | Africa, Conflict and security, Cooperation and coherence, Europe and Central Asia
In early August, Daniel wrote a punchy post entitled “After state-building”. Looking at American debate about what to do in Afghanistan and Iraq, he concluded “we may be about to witness a paradigmatic shift away from state-building. But what replaces it?” I’d come to a parallel conclusion for the UN: “the idea of large-scale, multi-dimensional UN missions overseeing countries stumbling out of conflict may have run out of road.” But I didn’t have an answer about what comes next.
And I still don’t. But I’ve outlined some initial thoughts in a piece over on the Guardian website, timed to pre-empt the arrival of the UN’s new peacekeeping boss – Alain Le Roy – next Monday. I run through the current list of short-term UN woes (where are the helicopters?), but then turn to “longer-term, strategic challenges”:
These aren’t about management. They involve adapting to a less American, more multipolar world. The current scale of UN peacekeeping is a product of the last, all-too-American decade. The Bush administration favoured hefty UN missions to stabilise places where it did not want to get bogged down itself: Haiti, Liberia, Darfur.
UN officials, shaken by their impotence over Iraq, have often felt obliged to look “relevant” elsewhere. The result has been a trend towards bigger peace operations with ever-more ambitious, perhaps unrealistic, mandates to rebuild these shattered states. In private, many of the organisation’s experts worry that they cannot fulfil these mandates – almost all would prefer less expansive alternatives with realistic targets.
But the greatest obstacle to effective peace operations is that tensions between the US and its rivals can reduce the UN to paralysis. China has ensured that the UN mission in Darfur cannot push back much (if at all) against pressure from the Sudanese government. Throughout 2008, Russia has stymied efforts to transfer UN peacekeeping responsibilities to the EU in Kosovo. UN observers in Georgia evacuated as Russian troops advanced this month.
If great power tensions increase further, the chances for more UN missions can only decrease. That would be tragic for the vulnerable who rely on the UN from, Port-au-Prince to Kinshasa. It might be dangerous for the great powers too. Without the UN to provide basic security, the odds of small flare-ups escalating into big crises will grow.
So as Alain Le Roy looks beyond his first round of crises, he may decide that his overarching strategic task is to build up a minimal consensus between the US, its allies and its rivals about what UN peacekeeping is for in an age of tensions between them.
Minimal consensus, eh? What might that look like? Stand by for answers sooner or, more probably, later. But I have started to spot quite a few symptoms of a “new minimalism” around the UN of late. These include its first ever peacekeeping doctrine, which is sharp and thoughtful document but feels conservative relative to earlier UN statements on peacebuilding and statebuilding (there’s textual analysis in my recent International Peacekeeping article, if you like that sort of thing).
It’s also worth checking out the state of debate on the Responsibility to Protect – Ban Ki-moon’s staff have been rather skillfully guiding discussions, emphasizing “soft” aspects of R2P like conflict prevention over “hard” military interventions. It’s worth having a close read of this really good report on the subject from the International Peace Institute. Now, a couple of policy documents do not equal a new ideology, but I think we’re seeing the first signs of a deeper minimalist trend…
by Daniel Korski | Aug 18, 2008 | Cooperation and coherence, Europe and Central Asia, Influence and networks, South Asia
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf is resigning, thus opening a new chapter in this country’s history as the governing parties, PPP and PML-N, are bound to go at each other’s jugulars once the celebrations end.
But there is little time for festivities. The government has not been able to assume control over the military and intelligence apparatus or engage an increasingly capable alliance of Pakistani militant groups and al Qaeda, which looks set to control much of western Pakistan. Pakistan’s turmoil has pinched the country’s economy, and stoked inflation. In addition, relations with India have taken a turn for the worse.
The governing parties should be helped to re-draft the constitution to give way to a new, ceremonial President (like in India). But what is really needed is a new coalition agreement, which commits the government to deal with the economic meltdown, intelligence reforms, the emergence of a Pakistani Taliban and Pakistan-India links.
To bring the military on board to such an agenda, a revision is needed of US military assistance with the implicit promise of more and better-targeted assistance as a reward for a deal. A new U.S administration should use the threat of a suspension of military assistance if the Pakistani military balks at the necessary changes. Before the “nuclear option” of a legislative ban on assistance – which Barack Obama has supported in the past – a new administration could direct an audit of U.S military assistance.
While Europe can only play a limited role in moving the Pakistani military, it can play much bigger part in dealing with the Pakistani government. Over on the Spectator’s website, I offer suggestions for what shape this can take and the leverage the West has:
As a carrot for a new deal – which should include a balanced counter-insurgency strategy, regional peace initiatives and intelligence reforms – the Prime Minister could offer to host high-profile donor’s conference, which could lay the foundation for a UN-led assistance programme to be overseen by an assistance envoy. Perhaps this could be a job for Paddy Ashdown, who was lined up for the UN job in Afghanistan until Afghan President Hamid Karzai changed his mind.
No peace in Pakistan is possible without a regional peace process and Gordon Brown should persuade George W. Bush to appoint a Presidential Envoy – a regional version of Zalmay Khalilzad’s previous Afghan role – and for the EU to do the same. These two “tandem envoys” could then begin the long trek towards regional stability, helping to prepare the ground for a new strategy from a new U.S administration.
However much it spends, the U.S will get little for its aid dollars given its reputation in the region. Therefore, any international, UN-led assistance programme needs to be kicked-off by the Europeans.
by Daniel Korski | Aug 14, 2008 | Conflict and security, Cooperation and coherence, Europe and Central Asia, Influence and networks
Whilst the US has stolen a march on Europe by deciding to send aid with the US military, this will be palliative and humanitarian, rather than deal with the longer-term reconstruction requirements.
The EU has similarly released funds for humanitarian programmes – which will be needed to help and house the estimated 100.000 refugees. But for the longer-term, what’s needed is joint UN/World Bank Assesment Mission to survey the reconstruction requirements
Such a mission should then be followed up by a donor’s conference hosted by an EU state. There the US and EU can pledge aid and coordinate their contributions.
France, which has led mediation efforts and recently hosted similar events for the Palestinians and Afghanistan, are ideally prepared to lead the effort.
If the EU wants to play a larger role on the civilian side – given its likely subsidiary peacekeeping role – it would be logical to appoint an EU Special Envoy to lead a joint EU Council/Commission Reconstruction Mission with third-party participation ie the US (like ICO in Kosovo). Preferably UN-mandated but not strictly necessary as it could be by Tblisi’s invitation.
Adam Kobieracki, the Polish former NATO Assistant Secretary-General would be an ideal candidate unless the mandate of the current EUSR Peter Semneby is to be refocused from the South Caucasus (inc Armenia).
In most post-conflict scenarios, the host government is very weak and coordination therefore a task for the international community . This is patently not the case in Georgia and the sooner the Georgian president appoints someone to lead the reconstruction effort – or take the role himself – the better.
Two tricky questions, however, remain.
First, given the damage done to the Georgian security forces, it will be necessary to survey their state and propose an Security Sector Reform plan to rebuild these. Putting a plan together will require an assessment and a seperate donor conversation.
– although this will obviously be contentious with Russia. To start off, the US, Canada and the UK should field a joint mission which can report back to other donors.
Second, what to do about South Ossetia and Abkhazia? The fighting has clearly wrought considerable damage in the break-away republics and if the refugees are ever going to return, many of their houses will need to be rebuilt and the economy re-started.
But to what extent should this be Russia’s task as opposed to the EU’s? And if the EU gets involved – funding a large reconstruction programme – should this work be part of a quid pro quo over other issues, for example the role and independence of its peacekeepers? Any Assesment UN/World Bank mission should clearly spend time in the two break-away republics but the analyses should be seperate from the assesment of Georgia proper, not automatically be part of the donor’s conference and deal directly with the criminalised political economy of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
by Richard Gowan | Aug 13, 2008 | Conflict and security, Cooperation and coherence, Europe and Central Asia
The idea that EU personnel should help keep the peace in Georgia – noted here yesterday but in the air since last week – is gaining traction. Today, the European Council said that the EU would boost OSCE observers there, but that just means more Euros under the OSCE’s flag. But the Council left open the possibility of a mission under its own banner, and that’s reportedly being discussed in private.
Russia has indicated that it is open to a greater “international aspect”. One potential problem: the Russians may also insist that EU monitors operate within the framework of, or in very close coordination with, the existing (Russian-led) CIS “peacekeeping force” in South Ossetia. That could mean EU-badged troops taking orders from Russian officers, or at least having to defer to them.
That may be the price to pay to avoid more bloodshed (the European Council says it’ll support “every effort” and while it stipulates the UN and OSCE, that could mean the CIS too). And the EU would demand that the force in South Ossetia come under a UN mandate – previously, it’s relied on an agreement between Georgia and Moscow that the Georgians have voided by quitting the CIS.
But a Russian-EU hook-up will not impress those Georgians who had hoped that the EU might come to their aid during the war – experience in Kosovo and elsewhere indicates that it won’t be long before an angry war vet decides to take personal revenge. And it will be greeted with hoots from the Washington neocons: is this the marvellous European Security and Defence Policy? Are some EU members more comfortable with Russian command than with the U.S. in Afghanistan?
How can the EU limit the damage to its image? In operational terms, the answer must be to maximize the autonomy of its contingent as much as possible (in recent days, I’ve kicked ideas to and fro with Nicu Popescu of ECFR on this, and he’s reproduced part of the exchange on his blog). But the key is to ensure that the EU is also seen to be delivering humanitarian and reconstruction aid, and boosting Georgian democracy every way it knows. But the U.S. is ahead in that game – and this is Korski’s turf, so I challenge him to put forward a plan…
