Last night I had dinner with a group of security experts and sat next to Chatham House’s Robin Niblett . We got to talking about the role of Ministers and how they seem to struggle with their role in overseeing today’s counter-insurgency missions i.e. operations like in Iraq. They shy away from detail, but are forced into minutiae by events. They go for headline-grabbing figures – like withdrawal numbers – that rarely materialise. They oversell missions – does anyone remember John Reid’s comment that British soldiers would not fire a shot in Helmand? You get the point.
However, is this any different from the past; and if so, why?
Even a cursory reading of Churchill’s memoirs or those of any of his wartime colleagues (like his defense chief, Lord Alanbrooke) leaves you with the impression that no detail was too small, no maneuver too inconsequential for the PM to take an interest – and, frequently, a direct role. As we know, this did not always have the intended beneficial effects, but the PM’s involvement was clear, all-pervasive – and ultimately crucial for Britain’s war-time effort.
But in the 1950s, 60s and 70s as Britain fought countless battles against Soviet-backed, liberation movements – the heyday of counter-insurgency – the role of Whitehall seemed to decrease. Decisions were delegated to theatre level, as in the Malay campaign. It was only when the Troubles began – and the fight was brought home – that the day-to-day involvement of Whitehall began to increase.
But besides Northern Ireland, the Cold War did not include – indeed require – day-to-day ministerial oversight. Plans were laid to roll back a Red Army advance and the PM had to write a letter to submarine commanders bearing instructions for nuclear retaliation. But there was no day-today role. The Falklands War was may have been an exception to this hands-off, strategy-focused Cold War role.
In the modern world, however, wars like the Iraq War are fast-paced, cost billions of pounds, risk the lives of hundreds of soldiers and can cost ministers their careers. This drives greater ministerial involvement in decision-making than before. But, on the other hand, the complexity – and sometimes brutality – of modern counter-insurgency means many ministers are reluctant to get too involved in decisions, lest they be blamed for the choices made by a soldier in Basra or a diplomat in Kandahar.
Other issues drive the ambivalent role ministers today have in counter-insurgency missions. First, modern government is in many ways responsible for far greater areas than before, even after the Thatcher revolution. This has led ministers to conceive of a far sharper distinctions between supposedly policy and operational matters, lest they be held to account for an impossible vast number of issues. As the Cabinet Manual states: Ministers “should not be involved in their departments’ day-to-day operations. In general terms, Ministers are responsible for determining and promoting policy, defending policy decisions, and answering in the House on both policy and operational matters.”
This, naturally, reinforces a ministerial focus on presentation and stakeholder management. But if the distinction between policy and operational matters is difficult to make in domestic policy areas, in counter-insurgency it is almost impossible.
The second issue that may contribute to the ambivalent role ministers play is the fact that there is a dwindling pool of experienced ministers. New Labour has been in power for ten years and the attrition rate has been high. Only Jack Straw remains from Tony Blair’s original cabinet. The people who do remain have rotated through departments at alarming speed. Just think of John Reid’s tour of Whitehall. Six departments in all, I think. This, naturally, means less of a grasp of each department’s remit.
Third, fewer people come to ministerial office with a military background. OK – Winston Churchill may have been uniquely qualified for his role even for his time, but today no minister – besides Lord West – has any military background.
While senior officers are customarily elevated to the British House of Lords after their retirement and the Commons hold many a former colonel, few flag officers have in the past made it into Parliament. For many years, Lord Garden was a lone former three-star in the position of party spokesman. Other former defence chiefs will pipe up, like Lord Guthrie, on military debates, but they rarely hold official jobs. The appointment of Lord West, the former head of the Royal Navy, to a junior ministerial post in Gordon Brown’s government is remarkable precisely because it’s rare. This, too, may play a role in minster’s approach to military matters and especially operations. They are simply too far out of their comfort zone.
Clearly this question merits serious historical research, not just a half-remembered dinner conversation. I have skirted over many issues, like the different approaches to different wars (Iraq v Sierra Leone) and how different departments work i.e DfiD v the FCO. But the issue ought to be investigated further. Any takers?
