Despite having practically invented modern counter-insurgency, today Britain is woefully ill-equipped for this kind of complex, mosaic-style warfare. The Times, echoing David’s post from a few days ago, has picked up on the problems Britain has in spending money in places like Afghanistan.
As readers will know, even though the Labour government sought to overcome the problems of “departmentalism” in 1997 with the promotion of “joined-up” government and the creation of cross-departmental funding mechanisms, through the Global Conflict Pools, one of its main innovations – the creation of a stand-alone Department for International Development – militated against the kind of close civil-military cooperation necessary in post-conflict operations.
This stands in sharp contrast to the U.S, which – led by David Petraeus and his band of “neo-coins” – has revamped its approach entirely.
How to solve the problem in Britain is contentious issue, which I debated on the Guardian website a few weeks ago (see here and here).
The only way to resolve it is to rewrite the International Development Act. Yes, I know that the Act itself does not prevent DfiD from spending funds, but it creates a cultural ethos inside the department, which militates again the necessary kind of flexibility and cooperative links with the military.
So, here is my bid for amendments to the Act (amendments in italics):
1 Development assistance
(1) The Secretary of State may provide any person or body with development assistance if he is satisfied that the provision of the assistance is likely to contribute to a reduction in poverty or support strategic interests of the United Kingdom.
(2) In this Act “development assistance” means assistance provided for the purpose of-
(a) furthering sustainable development in one or more countries outside the United Kingdom, or
(b) improving the welfare of the population of one or more such countries.
(c) supporting conflict prevention and stabilisation activities in regions and countries of strategic importance to the United Kingdom.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2)(a) “sustainable development” includes any development that is, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, prudent having regard to the likelihood of its generating lasting benefits for the population of the country or countries in relation to which it is provided.
2. Stabilisation assistance
The Secretary of State may provide any person or body with assistance for the purpose of supporting military deployments and stabilisation activities.
Once these changes are made, it will be necessary to look again at the other components of a rejuvenated COIN approach, including developing a cadre of deployable civilians, a smaller group of senior ambassador-level mission managers, a battalion of military advisors, like the OMLET-style units in Afghanistan, and tighter strategizing, planning and oversight mechanisms in Whitehall.
Finally, someone – government or opposition – will need to develop a compelling narrative, which updates Tony Blair’s 1999 “doctrine of international intervention” for the post-Iraq world. For unless Britons believe in the mission at hand, no government can develop, fund and sustain the necessary COIN capabilities.
