Taking a quick tally of where some of my favourite US blogs stack up on the Russian / Georgian conflict, there are some interesting perspectives. Steve Clemons at the Washington Note is in forceful mood:
The U.S. has displayed a reckless disregard for Russian interests for some time. I don’t like Russia’s swing to greater domestic authoritarianism and worry about its stiffened posture on a number of international fronts — but [Nixon Center President Dimitri] Simes convinces me in his important Foreign Affairs essay, “Losing Russia,” that much of what we are seeing unfold between Russia and Georgia involves a high quotient of American culpability.
When Kosovo declared independence and the US and other European states recognized it — thus sidestepping Russia’s veto in the United Nations Security Council — many of us believed that the price for Russian cooperation in other major global problems just went much higher and that the chance of a clash over Georgia’s breakaway border provinces increased dramatically…
At the time, there was word from senior level sources that Russia had asked the US to stretch an independence process for Kosovo over a longer stretch of time — and tie to it some process of independence for the two autonomous Georgia provinces. In exchange, Russia would not veto the creation of a new state of Kosovo at the Security Council. The U.S. rejected Russia’s secret entreaties and instead rushed recognition of Kosovo and said damn the consequences.
Now thousands are dead. The fact is that a combination of American recklessness, serious miscalculation and over-reach by Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, as well as Russia’s forceful reassertion of its regional national interests and status as an oil and gas rich, tough international player means America and Europe have yet again helped generate a crisis that tests US global credibility.
Greg Djerejian – making a welcome return to regular posting on his site the Belgravia Dispatch – more or less agrees:
First, let us disabuse ourselves from the notion that Mr. Saakashvili is some glorious democrat (the election he barely won in January included irregularities, and there continues to be endemic corruption in Tblisi).
Second, let us recall that many south Ossetians and Abkhazians are not particularly keen to live under Tbilisi’s yoke, indeed some prefer Russian influence to predominate there for the time being.
Third, if there is any truth to Russian allegations that there are some 1,500 fatalities in the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali–and they were caused by a major initial over-reach by the Georgian military (we will need to wait for more details to emerge)–expect many more brutish bombardments like the Russians apparently have conducted in the Georgian town of Gori, alas.
Fourth, some context: ever since the overly hasty recognition of Kosovo went live, Putin has been very keen to intimate what’s good for the goose is good for the gander, having personally threatened Saakashvili that Russia would formally recognize as independent states Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Meanwhile, Ben Smith at Politico notes that the sudden outbreak of conflict presented McCain and Obama with “a true ‘3am moment'”, and furthermore that “their responses to the crisis suggested dramatic differences in how each candidate, as president, would lead America in moments of international crisis”:
Obama’s statement put him in line with the White House, the European Union, NATO and a series of European powers, while McCain’s initial statement – which he delivered in Iowa and ran on a blog on his Web site under the title “McCain Statement on Russian Invasion of Georgia” – put him more closely in line with the moral clarity and American exceptionalism projected by President Bush’s first term.
A McCain adviser suggested that Obama’s statement constituted appeasement, while Obama’s camp suggested that McCain was being needlessly belligerent and dangerously quick to judge a complicated situation.
Finally, lots of praise all over for James Traub’s excellent backgrounder in yesterday’s New York Times, which provides a wealth of historical context. One angle that jumped out was the pipeline politics dimension (about which I blogged on Friday):
Marshall Goldman, a leading Russia scholar, argues in a recent book that Mr. Putin has established a “petrostate,” in which oil and gas are strategically deployed as punishments, rewards and threats. The author details the lengths to which Mr. Putin has gone to retain control over the delivery of natural gas from Central Asia to the West. A proposed alternative pipeline would skirt Russia and run through Georgia, as an oil pipeline [i.e. the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline] now does. “If Georgia collapses in turmoil,” Mr. Goldman notes, “investors will not put up the money for a bypass pipeline.”
