This afternoon I’m giving a presentation to the Sandhurst Defence Forum. The subject of my talk: Strategic Myopia develops some of the themes from the report I wrote last year and focuses on a number of issues resulting from the publication of the UK’s first national security strategy.
There hasn’t been much news on the UK NSS for sometime (no one seems to have noticed, for example, the civil defence force initiative has been quietly dropped). That said, today’s papers are ablaze with news of Sir Jock Stirrup’s warning that sustaining operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq is becoming almost impossible. From his interview with the press gallery:
“We are not structured or resourced to do two of these things on this scale on an enduring basis but we have been doing it on an enduring basis for years,” Sir Jock said. “Until we get to the stage when one of them comes down to small scale, we will be stretched beyond the capabilities we have.”
3 things spring to mind:
- Where is the Defence Secretary Des Browne? Aside from the MoD’s official spokesmen, General Sir Richard Dannatt and the CDS seem to be the only ones who speak on behalf of the department. Is there any political leadership in the MoD?
- Have the MoD really developed any sustainable planning assumptions going forwards (see after the jump)?
- Is this all actually a ruse to get a better deal out of the forthcoming white paper on support for the military?
Stunts like Liam Fox’s announcement last week for military families to get preferential access to public services is nice PR but hideously impractical. But it plays well with the media (though I doubt it plays well with the military).
The point is that announcement like Sir Jocks increases the need for a new defence review. Given this is very unlikely before the general election in 2010, the MoD has got to come up with a sound strategy for the next couple of years. Keeping Minister’s quiet and letting General’s do the talking should not be part of it.
Bonus post: If like me, you have been wondering why the defence planning assumptions seem to increasingly irrelevant and out of step with current operations I’ve posted some information on the current DPAs after the jump
Strategic Defence Review (1998)
The planning assumptions for contingent operations overseas outlined in the SDR envisaged the Armed Forces being able to undertake either:
- A single medium-scale, long term peace support operation whilst providing for training and leave for all forces;
- A medium-scale, long term peace support operation plus a medium-scale intervention operation of limited duration;
- A one-off large-scale commitment.
The 2003 white paper suggested without creating overstretch, the UK should be able to mount:
1. An enduring medium-scale peace support operation simultaneously with an enduring small-scale peace support operation and, a one-off small-scale intervention operation.
2. The UK should be able to reconfigure its forces rapidly to carry out:
– an enduring medium-scale peace support operation and,
– a small-scale peace support operation simultaneously with,
– a limited duration medium-scale intervention operation
3. Given time to prepare, the UK should be capable of undertaking:
– a demanding one-off large-scale operation while still maintaining a commitment to a simple small-scale peace support operation.
In addition, these assumptions take account of the need to meet standing commitments with permanently committed forces, including Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) Aircraft tasked with defending UK airspace
