Two months ago the EU Council mandated a military mission called EUFOR Libya to help get aid to Libyan citizens and refugees – but only if the UN asked for help. There was a lot of excited talk of EU troops deploying to the besieged city of Misrata. But the UN never asked, and so far EUFOR Libya has consisted entirely and solely of a headquarters unit in Rome. To celebrate the anniversary of the EU’s decision to approve the non-mission back on 1 April (what a symbolic date…) I’ve written a short and scaborous piece for E!Sharp about how a deployment might have gone awry:
In Misrata, where NATO warplanes were attacking Colonel Gaddafi’s ground forces, the idea of EU-flagged soldiers was a non-starter. Diplomats in Brussels might distinguish between NATO and EU-commanded European forces, but Colonel Gaddafi’s fighters were unlikely to be so discriminating. Even rebel spokesmen questioned the advisability of an EU mission, asking for more air strikes instead.
Even if European troops had deployed during a ceasefire, there was always a risk that some could be snatched by Gaddafi loyalists and held as hostages – just as European troops were seized by the Bosnian Serbs in the 1990s to halt NATO air strikes. Equally, the rebels in Misrata would have realized the media value of having European troops in their midst, and might have tried to bar them from leaving in a crisis. It’s easy to imagine a scenario in which EU soldiers became stuck in Misrata as pawns in the civil war.
The EU’s commanders could have minimized this risk by ordering their soldiers to operate in Misrata’s port area, ensuring supplies came ashore, but not to venture any further. But even this would have had risks: what if Gaddafi’s forces had carried out a massacre just a few kilometers from where German soldiers were unloading food and medicines? EUFOR’s mandate and capabilities would have prevented the Germans from getting involved. The next day’s headlines would have declared a new Srebrenica.
Under those circumstances, European leaders would have been faced with an appalling choice: pull their forces out in ignominy or escalate from a humanitarian operation to all-out war-fighting. Cue blazing rows in NATO headquarters, at the EU and in the UN…
So why did the EU’s members OK this flawed mission concept at all?
European officials must have been cognizant of these risks when the idea of deploying to Misrata came onto the horizon. What were they thinking? One depressing interpretation is that the whole idea was a cynical ploy: by making an offer that the UN simply had to refuse, the EU looked good but took no risks.
This interpretation is probably incorrect, however. By most accounts, the EU Council and German government in particular were genuinely keen to “do something”, both for humanitarian reasons and to distract attention from the intra-European divisions over NATO’s air campaign. These priorities may have briefly overshadowed all the problems inherent in a Misrata operation. But that is depressing too.
It’d be a pity to waste a good crisis. As my article concludes, EU planners should take time to look closely at the political and operational assumptions under-pinning EUFOR Libya. Recognizing the flaws involved could help avoid repeating them in future.
