by Alex Evans | Mar 18, 2011 | Climate and resource scarcity, Economics and development
ODI have some new research out this week on this, looking at the potential impacts of a one third increase in oil prices over the next two years (which they argue is a reasonable projection, given historical experience of the effects of MENA region conflicts on oil prices):
The study suggests that some of the poorest countries could lose up to 4% of their GDP. Those likely to lose more than 3% of GDP as a result of a one-third increase in oil prices include Ghana, Honduras, Lesotho, Swaziland, Togo, Moldova and Nicaragua. Those likely to lose more than 1% of GDP include Burkina Faso, Burundi, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nepal and Niger. This is assuming that there are no market or policy interventions.
At national level, government balances could worsen in countries where oil prices are controlled, and changes in oil price structures may lead to protests as seen in Indonesia (1998), Nigeria (2000) and Yemen (2005). For example, there are already question marks surrounding the affordability of oil price subsidies in Thailand, where oil products constitute around 10% of the consumer basket. Fortunately, the fiscal position in some developing countries that have been growing is fine, but this certainly not the case for others that have seen the fiscal balances worsen due to a number of shocks.
At the household level our review of the evidence finds that both rich and poor households suffer as a result of oil price increases, but the poor tend to suffer more. There are direct effects, with the poor spending a large share of their small incomes on oil and oil products. In Ghana,x Guatemala, India, Nepal, South Africa and Vietnam, the poorest households may spend as much as 3-4% of their income on kerosene, compared to little more than 1% of the richest households. There are also indirect effects, with rising transport costs affecting the poor more than the rich.
The evidence suggests that rising oil prices and falling GDP have a direct impact on the most vulnerable people. A drop of 1% in African GDP could increase the number of infant deaths by 5,000 each year, and child deaths by around 10,000. In countries that are more sensitive to falling incomes the impact could be worse.
by Claire Melamed | Mar 16, 2011 | Economics and development, Influence and networks, UK
I’ve been moonlighting on other blogs this week. First up was round two on results – I posted here on GD a few weeks ago about what a results agenda could do for development, and I had round two of this debate with Ros Eyben from IDS on Duncan Green’s blog this week.
My argument is that the right information, in the right hands, can be revolutionary. The push to results shouldn’t be resisted, but instead used to put power in the hands of poor people. If donors have to define what they are trying to do, and why, then they are more accountable. And if we know what results people want, then it’s easier to judge if donors, governments and NGOs are actually delivering them.
Without a commitment to do what poor people want, and the information to know what this is, the result, in the worst case, can be a development agenda driven by fashions and fads and not by evidence. Take the example of HIV funding – even though there was, and is, a need for substantial funds to tackle the epidemic, even some HIV activists are now saying privately that perhaps their sector has been overfunded compared to others where the need is as pressing but the cause just not so fashionable.
There are grounds to be optimistic that the ‘value for money’ agenda could be used to find out what poor people themselves value. Then the cost of different policies and programmes that might deliver this can be compared to to produce an idea of the ‘value for money’ of different development interventions. I’ve just published this paper at ODI on methods for finding out what poor people want and translating that into policy. There are precedents: in the UK’s National Health Service, information on what health outcomes people value, and how much they value them, is used to measure the effect of different treatments, and to allocate resources.
If we could use this methodology, or something like it, to measure how poor people themselves (or, more likely, different groups of poor people – men and women, rural and urban etc) define ‘value’ in development, then we’d really be on to something.
by Arjan van Houwelingen | Mar 15, 2011 | Conflict and security, Middle East and North Africa
As the once so secure Arab regimes appeared to be falling like dominoes in the face of popular demands for regime change (read: freedom and democracy), the abundant commentary in the Western media often used analogous revolutionary moments in time to outline the importance of events, or offer guidance to US and European leaders on ways to resolve their foreign policy conundrum (how to support democracy and human rights without threatening the stability needed for security and economic growth). From the fall of apartheid to the violent suppression of student protests at Tiananmen Square and the ousting of South-American generals, most recent ‘liberation events’ have featured in numerous articles but none more so than the 1989 fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe.
At first glance, the analogy seems apt. Then and now we see populations rising up against autocratic regimes propped up by vast security forces and the financial, military and political tutelage of a superpower. At closer inspection however, the differences are significant enough to suggest that the smooth trajectory from Warsaw Pact to Lisbon Treaty will not be afforded to the current batch of freedom seeking populations. Three main differences stand out.
One, these days there is no Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev’s policies of Glasnost and Perestroika were not so much informed by popular demands for reform but rather proved to be the loosening of reigns necessary for people to believe that change was possible and that the risks involved in protesting and demanding change were manageable. Of course, for Gorbachev, demokratizatsiya did not necessarily mean free elections and a multi-party system but once change was happening, Mikhail did not stand in its way. In fact, in no uncertain terms did he make it clear to the leaders of Central and East European countries that violence against their own populations would not (or no longer) be accepted.
(more…)
by Richard Gowan | Mar 14, 2011 | Africa, Climate and resource scarcity, Conflict and security, Global system, Influence and networks
A few weeks ago, David Bosco and I had a rapid-fire exchange (look here, here and here) over how Ban Ki-moon measures up to Kofi Annan as UN Secretary-General. Now I’ve set out my views on the matter at greater length in IP-Global (the English-language version of Internationale Politik). My essay, entitled “A Second Chance for Ban Ki-moon”, doesn’t exactly start with a blaze of praise for the current SG:
Something strange is happening at the United Nations. Ban Ki-moon, who has received lackluster reviews since he became Secretary-General in 2007, wants a second five-year term. Although widely criticized as an insipid leader and feeble manager, Ban faces no challengers. Diplomats in New York expect the Security Council to nod through his renewal sometime later this year. If Ban strolls to victory, he may miss one of his last opportunities to lay out a compelling vision of why the UN still matters—something he has consistently failed to do so far.
I go on to criticize Ban for failing to gain a real understanding of the UN during his early years in office – although I posit, as I have before, that he has started to show a better grasp of the organization of late. In the past, the SG has tended to focus on high-level diplomacy – especially around climate change – rather than the down-to-earth realities of UN crisis management, peacekeeping and humanitarian ops.
His earlier efforts to define himself as a climate warrior now look like a bad bet: Ban seized on a high-profile policy issue over which he had little leverage, while paying the UN’s crisis managers too little attention. This has done clear harm. The UN’s operation in Darfur has stumbled from humiliation to humiliation, preyed upon by bandits and repeatedly obstructed by the Sudanese government. In 2008, the UN was blindsided by a predictable crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo in which rebels displaced over 200,000 civilians in an area patrolled by UN troops and attack helicopters. The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan—arguably its single most important operation in American and European eyes—descended into complete confusion after Hamid Karzai allegedly rigged the national elections in 2009.
Even if Ban had devoted his every waking moment to preventing these shocks, they might well still have blown up, but the UN has seemed to lack strategic foresight too often.
In spite this harsh reckoning, it isn’t all over for Ban. My article lays out elements of a new political narrative for his second term at the UN, based on a realistic assessment of how energy and resource scarcity issues are likely to destabilize poor countries (where the UN will have to respond) and create tensions between major powers (hampering how the UN works). To gain traction, the SG needs to do three big things:
First, he must convince the leaders of poor countries—who often view the UN as a neo-colonialist outfit, and would very happily get it out of their affairs—that his organization can help them through periods of instability ahead. Second, he must persuade skeptics in the United States and Europe that UN programs and operations remain the best-value tools for tackling new threats. Third, and most difficult, he must make the rising powers believe that the UN can help secure their growing global interests by fostering stability in weak states.
Easier said than done, perhaps. But it all needs doing.
by Alex Evans | Mar 14, 2011 | Climate and resource scarcity
This Report rejects food self-sufficiency as a viable option for nations to contribute to global food security, but stresses the importance of crafting food system governance to maximise the benefits of globalisation and to ensure that they are distributed fairly. For example, it is important to avoid the introduction of export bans at time of food stress, something that almost certainly exacerbated the 2007 – 2008 food price spike.
The food system is globalised and interconnected. This has both advantages and disadvantages. For example, economic disruptions in one geographical region can quickly be transmitted to others, but supply shocks in one region can be compensated for by producers elsewhere. A globalised food system also improves the global efficiency of food production by allowing bread-basket regions to export food to less favoured regions.
From the excellent UK government Foresight report on Global Food and Farming Futures.
