Chris Albon has an excellent post over at The Atlantic, which has this to say:
Warfare has changed much since Napoleon’s Grande Armée marched across Europe, but one of the Little Corporal’s maxims is just as true in Libya today as it was near Waterloo two centuries ago: armies march on their stomachs. The anti-Qaddafi rebels are no different. The push to Tripoli would require consistent access to — amongst other things — food supplies. While having adequate food alone would not be sufficient to take the capitol (they also need war materials, training, and transportation), it is an absolute necessity. And, right now, the rebels don’t have enough. But we do.
The United States has the capacity and infrastructure to supply rebel-controlled eastern Libya with substantial amounts of food aid. These shipments could be transported directly into the rebel center of Benghazi, a major seaport with more than adequate facilities. The food aid would not only alleviate the emerging humanitarian crisis in eastern Libya — an important effort in itself — it would help the rebel cause. The shipments would boost the morale of rebel fighters and, more important, provide the supplies necessary to feed the newly formed army during any push towards Tripoli.
I think Chris makes a good argument – but it’s also interesting to pause and reflect on the question of how to square his proposal with the concept of humanitarian space.
The obvious answer to that is that the international community ought to be sending humanitarian assistance to both sides of the front line without prejudice or preference because, well, it’s humanitarian. But as Chris’s argument flags up, the rebels would still be net beneficiaries – because they don’t currently have the food supply lines in place, whereas pro-government forces do.
I don’t think that undermines Chris’s argument – instead, I think it serves as a useful reminder that any decision to give humanitarian assistance, development aid or whatever always turns the donor into a political actor in that arena, because there are unavoidable issues of winners and losers at play.
But this does still leave the fact that as humanitarian space gets blurred, so humanitarian workers are exposed to greater risk (see e.g. this Guardian piece by James Denselow). Pro-Gaddafi forces could easily start attacking WFP workers if they’re seen to be working to the advantage of rebel forces.
So while I agree with Chris’s logic, and think the risks involved in setting it out in a forum like The Atlantic are minimal, I also think it would be risky indeed for humanitarianism and for the safety of aid workers if the US Administration publicly espoused the same logic. The State Department and USAID should follow Chris’s advice – but whatever happens, they mustn’t admit to doing so.
