by Alex Evans | May 27, 2010 | Economics and development, Global system
We interrupt our regular coverage to bring you breaking news from Geneva: WTO negotiators have managed to agree on something in the Doha Round!
Unfortunately, what they’re agreeing on is that we’re screwed, as ICTSD reports:
A meeting of senior officials from 19 WTO members last week was valuable primarily for helping participants reach “a common diagnosis” of the “seriousness and depth” of the problem governments face in trying to conclude the Doha Round trade talks, officials said.
Plus ca change. In other news, negotiators at the NPT review conference had been underway for 19 hours as at 6.30am UK time today – but John Duncan, the UK’s Ambassador for multilateral arms control, tweets that they’re “still some way from an agreement”.
Come on, multilateralism. Give us something this year. Anything.
by Richard Gowan | May 26, 2010 | Conflict and security, Cooperation and coherence, East Asia and Pacific, North America
With things looking very bad on the Korean peninsula – and quite a few experts wondering whether the Pyongyang’s aggressive behavior is a sign that the regime is falling apart – it’s worth rereading an article Robert Kaplan wrote for the Atlantic in 2005 entitled “When North Korea Falls”. This looks at what the U.S. and other big powers would have to do if a war led to the collapse of central authority in the North:
In order to prevent a debacle of the sort that occurred in Iraq—but with potentially deadlier consequences, because of the free-floating WMD—a successful relief operation would require making contacts with . . . various factions of the former North Korean military, who would be vying for control in different regions. If the generals were not absorbed into the operational command structure of the occupying force . . . they might form the basis of an insurgency. The Chinese, who have connections inside the North Korean military, would be best positioned to make these contacts—but the role of U.S. Army Special Forces in this effort might be substantial. Green Berets and the CIA would be among the first in, much like in Afghanistan in 2001.
Obviously, the United States could not unilaterally insert troops into a dissolved North Korea. It would likely be a four-power intervention force—the United States, China, South Korea, and Russia—officially sanctioned by the United Nations. Japan would be kept out (though all parties would gladly accept Japanese money for the endeavor).
How would this intervention work, and where would it lead?
South Korea would bear the brunt of the economic and social disruption in returning the peninsula to normalcy. No official will say this out loud, but South Korea—along with every other country in the region—has little interest in reunification, unless it were to happen gradually over years or decades. The best outcome would be a South Korean protectorate in much of the North, officially under an international trusteeship, that would keep the two Koreas functionally separate for a significant period of time. This would allow each country time to prepare for a unified Korea, without the attendant chaos.
Following the Communist regime’s collapse, the early stabilization of the North could fall unofficially to the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) and U.S. Forces Korea (which is a semiautonomous subcommand of PACOM), also wearing blue UN helmets. But while the U.S. military would have operational responsibility, it would not have sole control. It would have to lead an unwieldy regional coalition that would need to deploy rapidly in order to stabilize the North and deliver humanitarian assistance. A successful relief operation in North Korea in the weeks following the regime’s collapse could mean the difference between anarchy and prosperity on the peninsula for years to come.
And you think Afghanistan’s hard?
by David Steven | May 26, 2010 | UK
Last night saw a well-attended late night debate in the Commons on the proposed 55% for dissolving Parliament, which I picked up on when it popped up in the initial coalition agreement.
The debate was initiated by a Conservative backbencher, Chris Chope, indicating the potential for the bill itself to trigger an early backbench rebellion when it is finally debated.
The Liberal Democrat Deputy-Leader of the House, David Heath (“without wishing to sound too much like Mr. Pooter, I want to record the fact that the hon. Gentleman has given me the opportunity to be the first Liberal Minister to speak from the Dispatch Box since Sir Archibald Sinclair on 16 May 1945”), defended the Coalition’s proposal:
A strong Parliament is able to remove the Government of the day. A strong Government should not be able to remove the Parliament. That is the distinction that we are trying to address.
The Government will still have to resign if they lose the confidence of the House, and that will still be on a simple majority. There is no ambiguity about that. If the Government lose a vote of confidence, they are no longer the Government of the day.
He was very light on details though, suggesting the level of the threshold was open for debate, while admitting that, as in Scotland, a time limit would need to be set to ensure that “a zombie Government that had] lost the confidence of the House” from sticking around in office.
The plan is to push legislation through before the Summer recess.
by Richard Gowan | May 25, 2010 | Conflict and security, Europe and Central Asia, Influence and networks, UK
Over at E!Sharp, I’ve just published a piece arguing that Catherine Ashton’s tenure as the EU’s foreign policy chief could be defined by a crisis somewhere:
Catherine Ashton needs a good crisis. While all eyes have been on the fight to save the euro, the EU’s foreign policy chief has been focused on setting up the new External Action Service. Her supporters argue that she will be judged on how well this bureaucracy works – so she should not get distracted by bad news from, say, Thailand or the Koreas.
That is true up to a point. But Ashton is canny enough to know that real foreign policy influence comes from being able to take the lead in solving a crisis that others cannot stop. Call this “Sarkozy’s First Law of International Politics”. The French president may be a bit volatile, but he won kudos for his personal diplomacy during the 2008 Georgian war.
“Hold on!” some readers will be crying, “what about Haiti, doesn’t that count?” My answer, sadly, is no: the January earthquake was a disaster and a tragedy, but I’m thinking about a political crisis. People shooting at each other and all that. So far, Ashton has been spared having to deal with that sort of thing.
Where might her first big crisis come from? Africa and the Middle East are both likely options.
There are signs of new trouble in Sudan and Congo, two countries the EU has tried to help stabilise. If either blows up, Ashton may find that European leaders – increasingly disinterested in African affairs – are all too willing to let her orchestrate their response.
The Middle East is another matter. Any crisis in the region is likely to centre on Iran, and Britain, France and Germany will all want a say in how to manage it – but may have very different solutions in mind. Ashton might find herself struggling to forge a consensus.
Harder still would be any crisis involving Russia, especially a new war in the Caucasus. Baroness Ashton would have to navigate between a bloc of member states from the eastern EU demanding a hard line on Moscow and some older members urging caution. Leaders in both camps would want to take the reins – President Sarkozy, for example, might argue that he should repeat his 2008 diplomatic dealings with Dmitry Medvedev. Ashton would find it hard to claim she represented a truly common EU foreign policy.
Isn’t this all a bit alarmist? Possibly. I’ve previously called for the EU to brace for nasty crises that never materialized – check out two of my Cassandra moments here and here. Then again, I failed to predict the 2008 Georgian crisis. But one thing is certain: at some point, Ashton will face a crisis, and have to decide whether or not to seize it. How she performs will have a decisive impact on her reputation.
