by David Steven | Jun 15, 2009 | Climate and resource scarcity, North America
US climate envoy, Todd Stern has tried to clarify exactly what the Obama administration wants from China on climate at Copenhagen (see post from Leo and me on the confusing signals the US has been sending out).
So here it is:
- “Very considerable” reductions on China’s business as usual emissions.
- These reductions to be binding, transparently measured and verifiable.
- No absolute emissions reductions but (preferably at least) a designated year when China’s emissions should peak.
- China’s commitment to be consistent with the world stabilising its emissions at around 450 ppm (“we don’t know whether it’s 445 or 460 or… but in that general range”).
- The package to be backed up by carbon offsets from the US to China – but these offsets should have “real environmental integrity” – and technology cooperation.
Obvious questions to ask Stern –
- Do you believe that President Obama’s domestic commitments on climate are consistent with a 450ppm stabilization target?
- Will the United States be pushing for a 450ppm target to be enshrined in the Copenhagen agreement?
- When does the United States think Chinese emissions should peak to meet 450ppm?
- When does the United States expect global emissions to peak?
by Andrew Pickering | Jun 15, 2009 | Africa, Economics and development, Europe and Central Asia, Global system
Development charity One.org has released its annual report examining how far G8 countries are meeting their Gleneagles commitment to double aid to Africa. The US, Japan and Canada are headed towards meeting or exceeding their pledges, while Germany and the UK are said to be ‘striving’ towards their ‘big commitments’. Unfortunately, France and Italy are letting the rest of us down. Apparently, they account for 80% of the shortfall in aid increases. Italy’s efforts in particular are described as an ‘utter failure’. Bob Geldof is quoted as having commented in a characteristically forthright manner:
Poor, sad Italy. That their economy is in such a disastrous meltdown condition that they must steal from the poor, rob the ill and snatch education from the minds of the young not only beggars the imagination, but must also surely beggar the soul of that most beautiful country. Shame on you. Your government disgraces you.
‘Nuff said.
by David Steven | Jun 14, 2009 | What we're watching
[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xlu-qx8ohL8&feature=player_embedded[/youtube]
by Alex Evans | Jun 13, 2009 | Middle East and North Africa
Andrew Sullivan provides a helpful graph plotting the ratio of Ahmadinejad to Moussavi votes in six different counts. That ratio proves to be remarkably consistent at each count:
Sullivan’s conclusion:
They didn’t even attempt to disguise the fraud. Which, to me, tells me they panicked. This graph is a red flag to Iran and the world.
Update: Nate Silver’s done a fairly comprehensive rebuttal of this graph – see here. He concludes,
these results certainly do not prove that Iran’s election was clean. I have no particular reason to believe the results reported by the Interior Ministry. But I also don’t have any particular reason to disbelieve them, at least based on the statistical evidence … I am not suggesting that any and all statistical analysis purporting to show tampering in Iran’s election results will turn out to be fruitless. I am merely suggesting that this particular analysis is dubious; it is not a smoking gun.
by Peter Hodge | Jun 13, 2009 | Conflict and security, East Asia and Pacific
Australian army signaller on patrol in East Timor, 2007 (photo: David Axe).
American strategist Tom Barnett thinks that Australia’s Defence White Paper is “a true work of goofy strategic paranoia”. He’s perplexed by Canberra’s “recent mental shift” and “sudden fear-mongering”.
I’m not sure why Barnett’s perplexed. Maybe it’s to do with the White Paper’s starting point, that over the next few decades Australia faces an uncertain and risky strategic situation. Or that Australia plans to buy 12 new submarines, 100 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters and sea-based land-attack cruise missiles.
I’ve read the White Paper and I don’t sense a “recent mental shift”. Canberra’s attitude towards Asia has long been one of guarded optimism: engage actively with regional powers, and thereby benefit from Asia’s growing prosperity, but be ready to defend Australia if things go wrong. It’s hard to quarrel with the idea that Australia’s strategic situation is uncertain and risky. Key dynamics include China’s rise as a great power, the greater reach of its military forces, the reaction of other Asian powers to China’s rise, and the relative decline of American power in the region.
Australia also faces the prospect of further turmoil in the island chain to its north – the so-called Arc of Instability – which stretches from Indonesia to Melanesia. Over the past 20 years this archipelago has seen a lot of conflict, with Australian forces intervening in East Timor, Bougainville, Solomon Islands and Tonga.
While Australia places great stock in its alliance with the US, self-reliance is the cornerstone of defence policy. Australia needs to be able to deter potential enemies and defend itself from attack. Hence the emphasis on enhancing maritime, strike, intelligence and surveillance capabilities.
With this in mind, Canberra’s stance doesn’t look like goofy paranoia and fear-mongering. It just seems cautious and prudent.
