by Mark Weston | Jun 4, 2009 | Africa, Conflict and security
Edwin Dyer
Back in February, I gave a talk on security in West Africa at a Demos leadership masterclass on International Security and Counter-Terrorism. Yesterday came news that Al Qaeda’s African arm had killed a British hostage, Edwin Dyer, whom they captured in Niger in January (they killed him in neighbouring Mali). In my talk, I predicted that the security threat from West Africa might be more of a long-term problem for Europe, but that it was one that was worth monitoring in the short-term too. It seems the threat might be more immediate than I feared. The talk is available here.
by Richard Gowan | Jun 3, 2009 | Global system, Off topic
It’s summer and that means cocktails! I’ve been searching for a tipple that reflects the cosmopolitan character of Global Dashboard (excluding, of course, the Cosmopolitan) and think we may have to plump for the World Traveler (sic) a new concotion from The Intoxocologist. I’m assuming that this isn’t a tribute to British Airways economy class seating, but instead a summation of international cooperation in a glass, mixing vodka, sake an, er, “Navan” (it’s from Madagascar):
Flavors from around the globe come together dramatically for the World Traveler. Deep spice mingles together with just the ideal hint of vanilla. A splash of sparkling sake takes beautiful to exquisite in a way champagne could not. Zipang Sparkling Sake maintains perfect balance with its light rice sweetness.
Actually, that could be vile. Let us know!
1 ounce Cielo Reposado Tequila
1 ounce Van Gogh Pomegranate Vodka
1/4 ounce NAVAN
1/2 ounce Fresh Lemon Juice
1/4 ounce Agave Nectar
1-1/2 ounce Zipang Sparkling Sake
Lemon Twist Garnish
Combine all ingredients (except sake and garnish) in a cocktail shaker with ice. Shake for fifteen seconds. Strain into a martini glass. Top off with Zipang Sparkling Sake. Garnish with lemon twist.
by Andrew Pickering | Jun 3, 2009 | Africa, Economics and development
Here in Britain, the fallout from recent revelations about MPs’ expenses continues. Meanwhile, it seems that World Bank officials have been up to similar tricks. Admittedly we cynics may scoff at their lack of imagination – after all, they haven’t been buying birdhouses or maintaining their moats with public funds. But Peter Bosshard at International Rivers, reviewing a book by former Bank staffer Steve Berkman, highlights some dubious claims all the same (hat tip: Bretton Woods Project). Berkman’s book:
reports how Nigerian officials charged $2,200 for 18 cups of tea and snacks at a roadside stall under a World Bank loan (and got away with it). A project office with eight staff in the same country charged a switchboard for 60 telephones, 48 air conditioners, 14 shredders and 12 refrigerators to the operating expenses of another Bank project – all at prices well above the going market rates. They also claimed expenses for television and video sets at 249,999 Naira apiece – more than ten times the equipment’s street value, but just one Naira less than the amount which triggers stricter controls.
Few will be surprised to hear about World Bank money disappearing – Berkman quotes an internal report which found that ‘stealing from Bank funds is the rule, not the exception’. But all the same (and perhaps I’m being naïve), one would have thought that World Bank employees would have enough problems with the endemic low-level fraud that their organisation is known for, without contributing to it themselves. Of course, unlike British parliamentarians, World Bank officials aren’t politicians and being insulated by their institution, will never have to face the wrath of the public.
by Peter Hodge | Jun 2, 2009 | Conflict and security, East Asia and Pacific
Oh dear, what has Robert D Kaplan been smoking? Here he is writing about Kim Jong-il, North Korea’s recent aggressive actions and the strategic situation in North Asia…
“And so Kim lives in dread of the Chinese slowly, methodically undermining his regime in a way that will lead to him being replaced—in a palace coup, perhaps—without the implosion of the North Korean state.
His only hope is to draw America into direct talks, with Washington implicitly recognizing his regime, so that he can leverage Washington against Beijing. Nuclear tests and missile launches are his own warped way of trying to get the attention of the new Obama Administration. He needs to be enough of a problem that Washington will have no choice but to deal with him directly, rather than merely as one party among several in the multilateral talks that have characterized negotiations with North Korea since 2003.”
Two issues here.
Firstly, how the hell does Kaplan know what Kim thinks? Reclusive tyrant, secretive society – enough said.
Secondly, the notion that Kim’s trying to snuggle up to the Americans by threatening war seems contrived. Another explanation that’s been bandied about, that Kim’s acting tough as part of a plan to ensure the succession of youngest son Kim Jong Un, also sounds fanciful. With both explanations, it’s hard to see the connection between (a) diplomatic manoeuvre / internal succession issue and (b) firing test missiles, detonating a nuclear device and threatening war.
Here’s a simpler interpretation of North Korea’s actions. Kim and his generals live in a militarized, tightly controlled and isolated society. They’re conditioned to see the outside world through a thick ideological lens. This includes the belief that all foreign powers are implacably hostile to the regime’s interests. Displays of aggression, to scare off enemies, are standard reactions when North Korea feels threatened.
In this case, just what the threats are – real or perceived – is anyone’s guess.
by David Steven | Jun 2, 2009 | Conflict and security, East Asia and Pacific, Global Dashboard
British Foreign Secretary, David Miliband has responded to Alex’s post questioning the wisdom of drone attacks in Pakistan. Citing David Kilcullen, Alex’s argument was that drones killed too many civilians, contradicting basic counterinsurgency doctrine, which is, above all, to secure and serve the population.
Miliband (cautiously) agrees:
The threat to US and Pakistani (and UK) interests is real, the danger and damage of civilian casualties serious, and the range of options limited.
US technology is vitally important, but Pakistan is fighting its own struggle against violent extremism. The drone attacks have undoubtedly hurt the core of AQ, but I see the dangers. The first best solution is obviously to build up Pakistan’s capacity, but first best solutions are not always immediately available.
Miliband’s is right, I think, but there are, unfortunately, much deeper and darker questions to address. As I argued in August last year, Pakistan’s “struggle against violent extremism” has been mounted very much at the America’s behest – and its urgings have been wrong-headed at best, disastrous at worst.
Last summer, the Pakistani Prime Minister was given “an earful” by the White House and told to sort the border regions out. All well and good, except that the United States was pushing the Pakistan military towards a conventional encounter with the militants, something that it’s own manual on counter-insurgency advises strongly against.
The pattern was similaar in 2004, when General Musharraf was persuaded to attack the tribal areas. That led to fury among tribesman, forcing them into the arms of the Taliban. It also led to humiliation for the army, with one poor Colonel taking shelter in a mosque and then emerging to beg for mercy with the Koran on his head. Tribesmen stripped him of his uniform and sent him on his way.
Now, in 2009, we have a massive attack on the Swat valley, which has killed some militants – sure – but has led to the forceful displacement of 2.5 million people, “an exodus that is beyond biblical,” according to the Independent. In the long run, will this campaign contribute to Pakistan’s security? Time will tell, but I suspect not.
I am not, in way, pleading for tolerance for extremism. But I am demanding that we – the Americans in particular – start to stand account for the counterproductive nature of their Pakistan policy since 9/11.
Throughout its time in office, the Bush administration seemed intent on showing it could push a functioning state to the brink of failure. Pakistan’s complicity in arming and supporting the Taliban was ignored by the Bush administration. Instead, it pursued its short term goals in the war on terror with little care for the long term impact on a nuclear armed state with a young, fast-growing, and deeply frustrated population.
In his time in office, Bush hosed billions on the Pakistan army, but dedicated only around 1% of total aid to non-military purposes. America’s political strategy has been non-existent. Its influencing strategy even weaker. It really beggars belief that so much money could be spent only to achieve the reverse of the desired result.
Now, the Obama administration wants to engage in nation building, but it continues to focus efforts on the country’s most unstable zones, rather than supporting a comprehensive, nationwide response from the government. It is also arriving with its cheque book open, only to find that neither it nor the Pakistan government has much idea as to how or where the money should be spent.
Above all, it’s unclear whether – unlike in Iraq at the beginning of the surge, where there was a doctrinal revolution – the protagonists have truly accepted just how badly they have got things wrong. The US counterinsurgency manual describes insurgencies as ‘learning competitions’. If so, I fear that the best that we – the West – and the various arms of the Pakistan state can hope is some kind of consolation prize for taking part. (more…)
