by Alex Evans | Mar 12, 2009 | Climate and resource scarcity, Economics and development
Let’s today step out of the normal boundaries of analysis of our economic crisis and ask a radical question: What if the crisis of 2008 represents something much more fundamental than a deep recession? What if it’s telling us that the whole growth model we created over the last 50 years is simply unsustainable economically and ecologically and that 2008 was when we hit the wall — when Mother Nature and the market both said: “No more.”
We have created a system for growth that depended on our building more and more stores to sell more and more stuff made in more and more factories in China, powered by more and more coal that would cause more and more climate change but earn China more and more dollars to buy more and more U.S. T-bills so America would have more and more money to build more and more stores and sell more and more stuff that would employ more and more Chinese …
We can’t do this anymore.
That’s Tom Friedman, no less. Another sign of the times: here’s Nick Stern in Copenhagen yesterday:
Do the politicians understand just how difficult it could be? Just how devastating 4, 5, 6 degrees centigrade would be? I think not yet. Looking back, the Stern review underestimated the risks and underestimated the damage from inaction.
by Charlie Edwards | Mar 11, 2009 | Climate and resource scarcity, Conflict and security, Cooperation and coherence, Economics and development
Andrew Marshall is the 87 year old Director of the Office for Net Assessment. This is how Wired described him back in 2003:
Known as Yoda in defense circles, Marshall doesn’t need to shout to be heard. Named director of the Office of Net Assessment by Richard Nixon and reappointed by every president since, the DOD’s most elusive official has become one of its most influential.
According to Fred Kaplan who profiled Marshall in his book Daydream Believers the key to Marshall’s longevity and influence is that he has:
built a far-flung network of acolytes and loyalists: officers whose unconventional projects he had encouraged and helped to fund; analysts whose work he had sponsored and whose ideas he had helped form; and high-ranking officials, as well as committee chairmen on Capitol Hill, who simply valued having a man of ideas so high up in the Pentagon. (h/t TPM)
ONA is the Pentagon’s think tank and looks 20 to 30 years in the future. The NIC futures work pales into comparison. Now thanks to TPM we can get an insight into one of the most secretive and innovative units inside the Pentagon.
The studies’ authors are generally listed as individual academics or outside contractors like the Hudson Institute, a Washington think tank, government consulting giant Booz Allen Hamilton, or lesser-known firms like Scitor Corporation and IHS International. The first thing you notice is how broad their remit is – there is literally nothing they haven’t looked into: Some of the studies include:
September 2008
Rearmed Japan
Europe 2025: Mounting Security Challenges Amidst Declining Competitiveness
May 2008
Turkish-Iranian Relations: Fated Rivalry, Compelled Sympathy
August 2007
The Future Of Europe And Its Muslims: Four Scenarios
June 2007
The End of Religiously Motivated Warfare: Lessons From The Puritans And Beyond [Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments]
November 2000
Water As A Strategic Commodity In Asia
June 1996
China Contingencies And Scenarios: 2020
by Charlie Edwards | Mar 11, 2009 | Conflict and security, Cooperation and coherence, UK
On Monday Gordon Brown announced the creation of a National Security Forum. The forum, which will be supported by the National Security Secretariat, is made up of twelve individuals and what a super list it is:
Professor Michael Clarke CBE; Ex Deputy Assistant Commissioner Peter Clarke CBE; Sir Ronnie Flanagan GBE; Professor Julia King CBE; Sir David Manning KCMG; Sir David Pepper KCMG; Sir Michael Rake, Professor Ziauddin Sardar; Professor Amartya Sen; General Sir Rupert Smith KCB, DSO, OBE, QGM and Dame Juliet Wheldon DCB, QC
It must have been a real coup to get Amartya Sen to agree to sit on the forum. Likewise Peter Clarke and Sir Ronnie Flanagan between them have years of experience in policing and CT. Julia King , the materials engineer is a brilliant choice as is Juliet Wheldon QC, Chair of the Human Rights Lawyers’ Association. For a dissenting voice I don’t think you could have chosen anyone better than Ziauddin Sardar . Michael Rake may be the token industrialist (although Juliet Wheldon worked at Rolls Royce) but he also sits on a number of academic boards – notably The School of Oriental and African, the Judge Institute at the University of Cambridge , Chatham House and the Oxford University Centre for Corporate Reputation . These links will be very useful when the NSF looks to identify a further 100 or so specialists. Sir David Manning was our man in Washington and recently (I gather) advised Brown and his team on relations with the new US administration. Sir David Pepper was Director General of GCHQ and will be, I assume, making sure cyber security is taken more seriously in HMG and is made one, of a number of number one, priorities . General Sir Rupert Smith – experience in UN and NATO and author of ‘war among the people’ – who else would you want to discuss the most pressing issues of defence? (It will be interesting to know how he and Lord West get on in the coming months).
But – and it’s a pretty big but – what is the national security forum going to do that couldn’t be done by the system already? If I were a betting man I would suggest that a number of these men and women are currently advising HMG – so why the need to bring them all together under one Lord?And if the forum is meant to be a visible challenge function (as has been suggested) why not make it’s minutes etc public? Why go to all the bother of creating a national security forum if we never hear about its work again?
I would also hazard a guess that the brace of Sir Davids, plus Sir Ronnie and Peter Clarke are all HMG pass holders and DV’d as well – which on the plus side means they can see classified intelligence but on the downside may mean they are too close to the machinations of Government to provide a broader/ independent perspective. This is why I wonder if the NSF is really an admission of failure by the Government that it’s own processes and structures don’t work – and instead of tackling the systemic issues inside HMG it has created an external body to challenge ideas and assumptions outside. I raise this point now as I am wondering whether it is of value – financially speaking – to make the NSF an NDPB in 2010 – when these men and women are already working with and sometimes for the British Government (I don’t believe the new team which will come into force in 24 months will be very different to those involved now).
Finally, Spy Blog make a good point when they ask why there is no pandemic disease, biotech or financial market, or cyber security expertise in the forum. If the NSF is there to provide advice it would seem sensible to have such experts on future risks involved…
by David Steven | Mar 8, 2009 | Conflict and security
In Small Wars Journal, Sergeant Michael Hanson laments the weight of the equipment that a US marine carries to keep himself safe. 40 pounds of body armour, plus a pack that can weight twice as much again (at a total of 120 pounds or 54 kilos, that’s like lugging Jennifer Lopez around wherever you go).
The consequences are predictable:
This weight limits their speed, mobility, range, stamina, agility and all around fighting capability. They can’t go out far and they can’t stay out long with all of this gear. It is simply too much. Combat patrols are typically four hours, and even that short amount of time is exhausting. Our Marines are being consistently outrun and outmaneuvered by an enemy with an AK, an extra magazine and a pair of running shoes.
Sergent Hansen believe that the flight to security (“all the best equipment for our soldiers”) – ends up making soldiers less secure. You’ll find a similar sentiment in General Petraeus’s admirably concise counterinsurgency guidelines. Walk, is one of his directives. You can’t commute to this fight, is another.
But where does this leave civilian agencies? I doubt there is a single British or American embassy in the world that hasn’t seen dramatically increased security since 9/11. Many now resemble prisons.
Aid agencies, meanwhile, operate from fortified compounds in a growing number of countries, while the Iraq operations of some international NGOs are said to have hidden their use of armed guards from their own head offices. Both struggle against the prospect of an ‘armed humanitarianism.’
Petraeus calls on soldiers to live among the people, deepening their cultural understanding and ability to navigate informal networks, through prolonged and regular face-to-face contact. Diplomats, of course, need to do the same.
He advises them to “understand how local systems are supposed to work – including governance, basic services, maintenance of infrastructure, and the economy-and how they really work.” That’s the mission of development workers.
I am not trying to make a glib point here. Soldiers have the means to defend themselves (and to prevent the kidnaps that, once amplified by the media, can be strategic game changers). Diplomats and aid workers do not.
But how can civilian agencies deepen engagement with populations, while responding to growing insecurity? And what will they do if they find that – like the overloaded marine – security measures are eroding their ability to do their job?
by Alex Evans | Mar 6, 2009 | Influence and networks, London Summit
White Band Action, the website of the Global Call to Action against Poverty, has some goodies to dish out: it’s got 50 places for bloggers at the G20 London Summit, and 20 of them are going to be handed out on the basis of readers’ nominations.
Now, I’m prepared to admit that recent posts of ours may not have been entirely aligned with Britain’s NGO community: David’s been cruelly taunting climate NGOs for being missing in action as Copenhagen beckons, Richard is running a recruitment drive for Nepal’s Maoist rebels, and I’ve been trashing 0.7 and suggesting that the pre-G20 Put People First march is an exercise in utter pointlessness (no, they still don’t have a policy platform).
But on the plus side, as regular readers will know, we’re all incorrigible summit nerds here at Global Dashboard – so we can promise you reams of top notch coverage if you nominate us for a place at the summit. And if you’re a fellow blogger: sure we’re open to a bit of vote-trading! This is the EU, after all; there are certain standards to observe…
