CONTEST 2 has been launched in both wonk version (172 pages) and, for those who want a brief overview of the strategy, a slim 13 pages (You Tube Video is here ). The most interesting chapter is the first one – where there has been a real attempt to provide a strategic context and make clear the planning assumptions on which HMG are basing their approach. These include:
– the Al Qa‘ida ‘core’ organisation is likely to fragment and may not survive in its current form;
– The stability, security and prosperity of the FATA of Pakistan will remain critical in determining the future of Al Qa‘ida; (note Obama’s ‘we’re at war in Pakistan )
– Al Qa‘ida affiliates will develop more autonomy;
– It will continue to be difficult and at times impossible to conduct conventional law enforcement counter-terrorist operations in and with fragile and failing states (watch out DFID)
But look at what isn’t stressed in CONETST 2. Can you spot the difference?
CONTEST 1 (2006)
CONTEST 2 (2009)
Answer after the jump
Word clouds (as above) are really useful for highlighting words that appear more frequently in the source text. Compare the two strategies and you see something I think is really interesting and potentially very important in how the Home Office is approaching CT policy: the focus on Muslims.
Individuals and communities inside and outside Government on the left and on the right have questioned whether it is sensible and appropriate to focus on ‘Muslim communities’. Others have (rightly) gone further, pouring scorn on the notion of moderate Muslims – one can hold extreme views,they argue, it is whether those individuals use violence in support of their beliefs that is more important. The strategy reflects this approach by focusing primarily on Al Qa‘ida and their affiliates and not identifying the ‘Muslim community’ as the problem.
CONTEST 1 (2006)
CONTEST 2 (2009)
Given the work that has gone into the new Strategy let’s hope this translates into a more nuanced and open approach by HMG when countering international terrorism.
