by Alex Evans | Jan 9, 2009 | Cooperation and coherence, Economics and development, Influence and networks, London Summit, UK
While everyone else is amusing themselves speculating about Obama’s picks for his Cabinet, here in New York everyone’s focused on a different question: what it all means for senior posts in multilateral agencies.
Start with the one thing we know for sure (as of yesterday): Kemal Dervis is leaving his post at the helm of the UN Development Programme, citing personal and family reasons. By and large most people think this really is why he’s leaving (his family is based in DC, so an NY-based job probably isn’t much fun). But at the same time, it also hasn’t escaped notice that Dervis might also be well placed to win another senior multilateral post, should one open up. He’s an intellectual heavyweight, not least on global governance reform (at a time when the G20’s evolving role makes that especially topical) – and he has impeccable economic credentials too.
So is another multilateral post likely to open up? With Strauss Kahn now clearly out of the woods at the IMF, speculation is revolving around two posts in particular: UN Deputy Secretary-General, and World Bank President.
The DSG post is currently held by Asha-Rose Migiro of Tanzania, the third holder of the post since it was instituted in 1997. Theoretically the DSG is supposed to have a key role in bringing coherence to the UN’s development activities, but in practice the current postholder is generally regarded as having underwhelmed. With everyone wondering just how robust Obama’s commitment to multilateralism will prove to be in office, some are speculating that this would be a good moment for Ban Ki-moon to shake up his top team – and with Migiro’s post soon due up for renewal anyway, a new face in the DSG’s office might be just the ticket.
Bob Zoellick, meanwhile, has been terrific for the World Bank. He’s been outstanding on the food price crisis (not least thanks to his alliance with WFP head Josette Sheeran, another former State Dept minister under Condi Rice), incredibly thoughtful on multilateral reform and he has brought calm to the institution after all of the Wolfowitz shock therapy. So why might he leave?
In a nutshell, because of the new Administration. To be sure, Zoellick is greatly respected by Republicans and Democrats alike; and there’s no precedent that a World Bank President (to date, always an American, though this convention may be crumbling) must leave when an Administration of a different political stripe arrives. But another precedent, one that may worry Zoellick, is that a World Bank President in such a situation can find himself eclipsed to some degree by the arrival of a new and powerful US Executive Director on the Board. There’s no sign of any whispering campaign against Zoellick – but he may decide that it’s a good time to move on anyway.
Kemal Dervis would be a credible candidate for either of these positions, of course – so who knows, perhaps some of this analysis features in his thinking. But there’s another angle to the story too: the UK dimension. From a British perspective, the departure of the UNDP Administrator and potentially of the DSG as well must have people at the Foreign Office and DFID thinking hard.
Historically, the UK has always had two USG posts at the UN. Until Mark Malloch Brown moved over to the SG’s office (first as chief of staff, and then as DSG), the two Brit posts were at the top jobs at UNDP and at the UN Department of Political Affairs. But when Mark became DSG, muttering about British over-representation started to be heard – and so the Foreign Office allowed an American to become head of DPA when Kieran Prendergast retired.
Today, the UK is more modestly represented. It still has two USGs, yes – John Holmes at OCHA and David Veness at Safety and Security. But these posts are rather more junior than DSG or DPA – and in any case, David Veness is leaving. (He resigned over the bombing of UN offices in Algeria – a deeply honourable action, taken simply on the basis that it happened on his watch, when in fact there’s universal agreement in the UN that Veness has been a truly outstanding head of security, who has delivered a quantum leap in the quality of UN security around the world. Ban Ki-moon was crazy to accept Veness’s resignation, but there it is.)
So with a vacancy open at UNDP, and another potentially opening up in the DSG’s office, the question in London must be wheter this is a chance to make up lost ground. Lists of senior Brits with international development experience are doubtless being compiled even now…
by Alex Evans | Jan 7, 2009 | Cooperation and coherence
Here is what happens when you arrive for a meeting at the United Nations (where David and I currently find ourselves).
Once you’re through security, you go to a reception desk in the large hall of the General Assembly building.
If you are naive enough to present yourself to one of the people behind the desk and ask for the person whom you’re due to meet, a rude awakening awaits.
Instead, you are pointed towards a small bank of telephones further along the desk, where you must phone the person you’re meeting yourself and announce your own arrival.
No, there is not a directory of staff phone numbers (duh). But let us assume that you display adaptability and have your contact’s number stored in your phone. What next?
In due course, someone will arrive from Upstairs to escort you.
Finding each other is no easy task. A number of people are waiting for meetings (this being the main reception hall for the whole UN); in addition, there are people waiting for guided tours, people using the free internet terminals, people buying special UN commemorative stamps and people looking at the nice exhibition organised by the Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
But let us assume that you manage to find each other. Together, you now move around to a new window on the reception desk.
Here, your escort will fill out a form with their details.
The person behind the desk takes your ID and scrutinises it carefully. He or she then fills in some more details on the form.
Your escort is handed a chit.
You and your escort then move another metre or so around the reception desk (for it is circular) to another window. Two uniformed security officers await you.
Your escort hands over the chit.
The first security officer warily examines the chit that their colleague (standing approximately half a metre to their left) has just issued.
Should it prove satisfactory, he or she will then fill out another chit (one assumes that there may be a degree of overlap in the respective content of the forms).
The second chit is then handed to the second security officer, who scrutinises it warily. Should it prove satisfactory, you are then awarded a special prize given to the UN’s most persistent guests: a Visitor’s Pass.
You are now back where you started before you were pointed to the phones.
Elegant, no?
by Daniel Korski | Jan 7, 2009 | Conflict and security, Cooperation and coherence, Global Dashboard
One of the presumed parts of Obama’s Afghan strategy will be to look at ways of coopting the country’s various tribes, much like General David Petraeus did it in Iraq. The idea has sparked off a torrent of criticism in the foreign policy community.
One of the smartest young Democratic things, Brookings security expert Vanda Felbab-Brown, wrote to Obama that his administration should cultivate Afghan tribal leaders, but it would be a mistake to expect them to play a military role in the counterinsurgency. Michael Williams, the US-born British academic spoke for many when he called the idea “a very high-risk strategy that cuts directly against counter-insurgency theory and will most likely be seen in hindsight as a serious mistake.”
Those with longer memories talk about the failure of the Red Army to work with the Afghan tribes. The Russians spent large sums of money arming and supporting tribes in their own “Vietnamization” strategy. So much money was, in fact, spent that Kandahar in the south of the country, saw an in-flux of clothes from Pakistan and shoes from France, were the norm. For a short period it worked. The defection of one commander, Esmat Muslim, to the Afghan government’s side was said to be a blow for the mujahedeen, who suddenly found all their routes to Pakistan had been compromised. But once the Soviets left the in-fighting began. Even Esmat Muslim was not able to manage all the problems in Kandahar.
Those who reject any comparison between Iraq and Afghanistan, like author Alex Strick van Linschoten highlight key differences in the two countries. The Taliban movement, even if it contains foreign fighters, has deep roots in Afghan society. Many Taliban commanders grew up through the 1980s jihad against the Soviets. In this, the Taliban are different than Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, who were run by Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and seen by many tribesmen as foreigners.
A key factor in Iraq was also the cruelty of Al Qaeda, which proved too much for the Anbari tribesmen. Though the Taliban have displayed similar cruelty -– for example in the recent Maiwand atrocities where many Laghmani civilians were killed –- but the Afghan government has not been able to spread information about such acts. The final problem in transferring solutions from Iraq to Afghanistan is the nature of the Taliban’s recent success. Since 2005, the Taliban has bandied together with a strong network of drug barons, while forcing many tribesmen to be supportive or, at the very least, remain passive towards the insurgency. Reaching out to these groups is unlikely to succeed, it is claimed, as they benefit from the status quo and the U.S cannot offer a better, long-term alternative.
But in Rageh Omar’s latest documentary for Al Jazeera — Pakistan’s War: On The Frontline – another side emerges. In Bajaur province – where Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s second in command, is believed to be hiding – the documentary shows how the Pakistani army has managed to do exactly what the U.S is now contemplating. In their fight against the Pakistani Taliban the army has armed a particular tribe, which is now charged with keeping the peace in a number of cities. So far, it has proven successful and is being emulated in other places.
Yesterday, Omar was careful not to say the strategy could necessarily work elsewhere. But he was emphatic that it seemed to work in Bajaur; and that he knew of several examples where tribesmen had asked to be armed or had risen up against the Pakistani Taliban spontaneously.
So far, both the strategy of working with the tribes -– and the backlash against the idea –- seemed to be based on speculation and hunches rather than the kind of hard empirical research the question merits. Before any steps are taken let us hope the Obama administration commissions research on the tribes, and comparative experiences. For this is exactly the kind of complex policy dilemma that requires an evidence-based approach rather than the gut-based policy-making of the Bush administration or the arm-chair soldiering so beloved by left and right alike in Washington, DC.
by Richard Gowan | Jan 6, 2009 | Influence and networks, South Asia
So, Benazir Bhutto’s daughter has released a rap video lamenting the loss of her mother just over a year ago:
[youtube:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5RxgiLARd5I&feature=related]
Now, I’ll admit I didn’t expect that. But those arbiters of taste at Vanity Fair know what this means. It means they can diss Puff Daddy (a.k.a Sean “Diddy”… you know the rest):
As tributes go, Bhutto’s video is superior to “I’ll Be Missing You,” Puffy and Evans’s musical memorial to the Notorious B.I.G., who was murdered on March 9, 1997. For one thing, Puffy’s big budget (and bigger ego) lured him off-topic, and there are too many shots of him riding his tricked-out motorcycle and spinning in the rain.
Bhutto’s video, while amateurish, is filled with inspiring montages of her mother campaigning shortly before her death and of the masses mourning her.
The songs are different too. Puffy’s shameless sample of the Police’s “Every Breath You Take” may have won him a Grammy, but it was also the first sign of his impending ubiquity. It’s all about him missing his dead friend. Bhutto keeps the focus on her late mother…
Which, evidently, would be too much effort for the VF guys. That’s 2009 off to a tasteful start.
by Richard Gowan | Jan 6, 2009 | Conflict and security, Influence and networks, North America, South Asia
Bob Herbert of the New York Times:
Our interest in Afghanistan is to prevent it from becoming a haven for terrorists bent on attacking us. That does not require the scale of military operations that the incoming administration is contemplating. It does not require a wholesale occupation. It does not require the endless funneling of human treasure and countless billions of taxpayer dollars to the Afghan government at the expense of rebuilding the United States, which is falling apart before our very eyes.
The government we are supporting in Afghanistan is a fetid hothouse of corruption, a government of gangsters and weasels whose customary salute is the upturned palm. Listen to this devastating assessment by Dexter Filkins of The Times:
“Kept afloat by billions of dollars in American and other foreign aid, the government of Afghanistan is shot through with corruption and graft. From the lowliest traffic policeman to the family of President Hamid Karzai himself, the state built on the ruins of the Taliban government seven years ago now often seems to exist for little more than the enrichment of those who run it.”
Think about putting your life on the line for that gang.
If Mr. Obama does send more troops to Afghanistan, he should go on television and tell the American people, in the clearest possible language, what he is trying to achieve. He should spell out the mission’s goals, and lay out an exit strategy.
He will owe that to the public because he will own the conflict at that point. It will be Barack Obama’s war.
