by Daniel Korski | Dec 9, 2008 | Conflict and security, Cooperation and coherence, Europe and Central Asia, Global Dashboard, Influence and networks, North America
Following Barack Obama’s election, the intellectual market has filled up with policy papers about how the U.S and Europe can cooperate on substantive issues like China, Russia, CT, climate change etc. But little time has been devoted to the way in which the EU and the U.S cooperate, that is, the institutions of the trans-Atlantic relationship.
NATO will continue to have an important role in the Euro-Atlantic community, but the North Atlantic Alliance is no longer the place where Americans or Europeans go to talk about big strategic questions. This is true not only for non-military topics such as the global financial crisis or climate change, but also for classic foreign policy problems.
In this paper I — and two other colleagues — have tried to lay out what kind of new institutions could boost U.S-EU cooperation. Recommendations include:
- That the President of the United States be invited once a year to the European Council
- Back-to-back EU and NATO summits
- That the US Secretary of State join the GAERC twice a year
- That American Cabinet officials be invited to European Commission meetings from time to time
- That US/PSC discussions be held alternately in Brussels and Washington.
- “Double-hatting” the EU Head of Delegation in Washington as an EU Special Representative
- Establishing a small European Legislatures Liaison Office in Congress, comprising representatives from the EP and national legislatures, as well as setting up Congress/EP task forces on key issues like Afghanistan/Pakistan and climate change.
- Setting-up a US-EU Conflict Prevention Task Force, with a permanent secretariat housed in Brussels.
- Establishing a NATO/EU School for Conflict, Post-Conflict and Stabilisation to provide training for deploying personnel
New transatlantic institutions cannot in themselves help the EU develop policies or come up with a better way of thinking strategically about foreign policy issues; but at a time of considerable transatlantic policy convergence, the absence of a solid framework for US-EU discussion will see both sides miss out on a valuable opportunity for cooperation on shared challenges.
by Charlie Edwards | Dec 8, 2008 | Conflict and security
The shooting of a teenager by police has sparked a wave of violent protests across Greece. In the past couple of days hundreds of hooded and helmeted protesters have poured into the centre of Athens, hurling petrol bombs and stones at shopfronts, banks, parked cars and police.
According to media reports the trouble began when a number of young people sitting at outdoor cafés in the centre of Athens hurled insults at a passing patrol car. After a verbal exchange between the police and the youths one of the policemen drew his weapon and fired three times, once towards the ground and twice in the air, one of the shots killed Andreas Grigoropoulos. Two policemen have been arrested over the killing and the officer who fired the fatal shot has been charged with manslaughter.
The majority of protests seem to have been led by Anarchist groups which continue to plague Greece. According to CSM, anarchist groups frequently set off small bombs throughout the city – last week a bomb damaged the offices of the French news service Agence France Presse and arsonists torched a Bosnian embassy car and a bank cash machine. But there is a limit to what the police can do. Years of heavy handedness against such groups have created mistrust between the public and the police – and public sentiment seems to favour the anarchists – given this situation was created by the police they are going to have to tred very carefully.
by Daniel Korski | Dec 8, 2008 | Conflict and security, Cooperation and coherence, South Asia
I recently came across the late Russian journalist Artyom Borovik, who saw and wrote about the Soviet War in Afghanistan. His book Hidden War, has this eerie paragraph:
Anyone who stayed in Afghanistan for a long period of time, or who was sent there on a regular basis, typically went through four phases.
The first stage (which would usually last up to three months) went something like this: “The war is proceeding on a normal course. If only we can add another twenty or thirty thousand men, everything will be fine.”
Several months later the second stage : “Since we’ve already gotten ourselves into this jam, we should get the fighting over with as quickly as possible. Adding another thirty thousand men isn’t going to do it. We need at least another army to shut off all the borders.”
Five or six months later, the third stage: “There is something desperately wrong here. What a mess!”
Then, half a year or so later, the fourth and final stage: “We’d be wise to get the hell out of here – and the sooner the better.
I don’t think this needs much comment, really….
by David Steven | Dec 8, 2008 | Off topic, UK
Yesterday, I posted on UK action to block a Wikipedia page because it includes an image from a 1970’s Scorpions album cover that the Internet Watch Foundation has deemed child pornography. IWF has now issued a statement:
A Wikipedia web page, was reported through the IWF’s online reporting mechanism in December 2008. As with all child sexual abuse reports received by our Hotline analysts, the image was assessed according to the UK Sentencing Guidelines Council (page 109). The content was considered to be a potentially illegal indecent image of a child under the age of 18, but hosted outside the UK. The IWF does not issue takedown notices to ISPs or hosting companies outside the UK, but we did advise one of our partner Hotlines abroad and our law enforcement partner agency of our assessment.
The specific URL (individual webpage) was then added to the list provided to ISPs and other companies in the online sector to protect their customers from inadvertent exposure to a potentially illegal indecent image of a child.
As I noted yesterday, you can buy this album from Amazon.co.uk (and presumably in the High Street) with original cover art. No word on whether PC Plod plans to take action (though presumably he’s still too busy arresting MPs for grooming fresh-faced civil servants) – but heavy metal fans are advised to throw out any potentially offensive vinyl (all of it, to be safe)…
by Daniel Korski | Dec 8, 2008 | Conflict and security, Cooperation and coherence, Economics and development, South Asia
A year ago when I was helping prepare Lord Ashdown for his (ultimately aborted) Afghan appointment, I wrote to a senior U.S official with my concerns about the security situation in Kabul. “Security”, I wrote “has deteriorated in once-safe areas like the capital Kabul”. This, I argued, would damage the already weak Karzai government, particularly as the Afghan authorities were scheduled to take control of the city’s security. To deal with this problem, I proposed a cross-departmental Kabul Security Plan akin to the Bagdad Security Plan, which the U.S introduced as part of the “surge”.
The two countries face different kinds of insurgencies. In Iraq, unless the U.S secured Baghdad the insurgency could not be defeated. In Afghanistan, even if Kabul is safe and prosperous the insurgency may still win. The Red Army held most of Afghanistan’s major cities but were still defeated by a largely rural insurgency. However, if the U.S coalition cannot hold Kabul and keep it safe from violent crime whilst building it up, there is going to be little hope for others parts of the country. I also lobbied for the EU to take a special role in the city, arguing in a memo for Javier Solana’s staff and later an article:
Renewed support for the city’s reconstruction is needed; the EU has experience in city reconstruction from the EU Administration in Mostar. It should offer the Afghan government a cross-disciplinary team, led by an experienced European city administrator, to help adjust existing political, military and reconstruction plans for, and international support to, Kabul’s stabilization and reconstruction
The reply I got from the U.S official to my original suggestion was curt: “Don’t you think you need to leave that sort of issue to someone with the word “general” in front of their name”. Annoyed, I wrote back quoting French World War I premier Georges Clemenceau that war is too important to leave to generals.
Now, after a year of waiting and a continuous worsening of the security situation both in the capital city and surrounding areas, the U.S has woken up to the problem. The New York Times reports that “most of the additional American troops arriving in Afghanistan early next year will be deployed near the capital, Kabul, American military commanders here say, in a measure of how precarious the war effort has become.”
Better late than never, I guess. But the failure to nip problems in the bud, face uncomfortable problems head-on coupled with a continued unwillingness to stray off talking points is what has undone the U.S-led effort and what the Obama administration must change if it hopes to change dynamics in Afghanistan.
