What, indeed, is Security Diplomacy?
A couple of posts ago, Charlie drew our attention to the fact that a new report would be recommending the appointment of a Minister for Security Diplomacy. “What the f*** is security diplomacy?”, our resident security expert asked.
I haven’t read the report, but the question got me thinking. What, indeed, is security diplomacy? I don’t mean in a traditional way — working with NATO; on security policy issues; and managing defence relationships. I mean in a 21st century kind of way. So here is my stab at what it could be.
One of the 21st century’s biggest national security challenges – and therefore diplomatic tasks — will be to affect people who we cannot affect. By that, I mean that European governments have to affect security outcomes in countries with whom they have only weak links or little leverage over. They have to do so because what happens in these countries affect our security, well-being, safety. . . you know the arguments.
Take the case of Pakistan and the country’s military-security establishment. Everyone acknowledges that working with the Pakistani military will be key in lessening Indo-Pakistani tensions, containing the Taliban insurgency, clamping down on WMD proliferation, and defeating Al Qaida. Everyone acknowledges that achieving these goals is vital to Britain’s and Europe’s security.
But there are only four countries that have any real leverage on Pakistan and her security establishment: the U.S, China, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. Despite being Pakistan’s largest trading partner and a major donor, Europe has only limited leverage over Islamabad (and the military HQ in Rawalpindi), even if Britain is a (small) exception to the rule.
So the question becomes – how can Europe get the countries that do have leverage over Pakistan to act, or act in ways that may be beneficial to Europe’s interests? What incentives can be offered? Could the EU, for example, ask Turkey to lead diplomatic talks with Pakistan on the EU’s behalf, with the Turkish Prime Minister briefing the EU Heads of State? And if that is indeed what is needed, what can Turkey be offered in return?
If this is “security diplomacy” does it go beyond what it traditionally the focus of bilateral relationships and diplomacy in a non-polar world i.e. where we cannot rely on the hegemon to sway third-countries to its will? Many diplomats will argue that this is already what they doing. They are already lobbying diplomats in Beijing for China to help in Afghanistan etc.
But perhaps using the rubric “security diplomacy” makes this a concrete line of activity, ensures resources and prioritization? Much like the way Britain’s European network of embassies now focus primarily on how to leverage votes in the European Council rather than on, say, managing the UK-Romanian relationship, so implementing this kind of diplomacy may mean suborning the normal bilateral links in a number of cases (of which Pakistan is clearly one), to the so-called “diplomatic security interest”.
I am not arguing for a Minister for Security Diplomacy. Rather, I have long argued for a top-to-bottom assesment of the government’s capabilities, a National Security Review, rather than piecemeal solutions. But I’d be interested to hear what people think of the notion of security diplomacy.
Who cares? R2P is RIP
Courtesy of The Times
What concurrency?
In a letter to Robert Gates, cleverly disguised as an op-ed in The Times, soldier-author Allan Mallinson asks a very simple question: “Why, for example, are we so overstretched keeping 8,000 troops on the ground in Afghanistan out of an Army of 100,000?”
It is a very good question, the answer to which lies in the MoD’s “concurrency assumptions”, the assumptions military planners use to foresee the required structure, size and capability of the armed forces. In Delivering Security in a Changing World Future Capabilities, the MoD estimated that Britain could mount “as a norm, and without creating overstretch”:
- an enduring Medium Scale operation; simultaneously with
- an enduring Small Scale operation; and
- a one-off Small Scale intervention operation
It went on to say that the government reforms would allow a reconfiguration of the armed forces so they could rapidly carry out:
- the enduring Medium Scale operation; and
- an enduring Small Scale operation; simultaneously with
- a limited duration Medium Scale intervention operation.
And given time to prepare, British armed forces should be capable of undertaking:
- a demanding one-off Large Scale operation; while still maintaining a commitment to
- a simple Small Scale peace support operation.
The first problem with all these assumptions is that they were based on a notion of a time-limited engagement i.e. getting the troops in and then out quickly. But it has not turned out this way. Both Operation Telic (Iraq) and Operation Herrick (Afghanistan) turned into enduring medium-size operations (and latterly one medium, and one small), which the armed forces struggled to sustain.
This begs the question: if the MoD cannot manage two enduring medium-size operations can it handle an enduring Medium Scale operation, an enduring Small Scale operation and a limited duration Medium Scale intervention operation all the same time, as the White Paper suggested? If the answer is negative, Britain either needs to drastically adjust its ambitions downwards or the armed forces need to grow dramatically.
Look, it’s really not easy being a pirate, don’t make it any harder…
From the BBC:
Somali pirates say they have thwarted an apparent revolt by the crew of a hijacked Ukrainian cargo ship, according to reports. An unnamed pirate told the AFP news agency that sailors of the MV Faina tried to “harm” two of their captors.
The ship is carrying 33 tanks and other weaponry and was seized by pirates two and half months ago.
“Some crew members on the Ukrainian ship are misbehaving,” the pirate said. “They tried to harm two of our gunmen late Monday. This is unacceptable, they risk serious punitive measures.”
“Somalis know how to live and how to die at the same time, but the Ukrainians’ attempt to take violent action is misguided.”
He claimed that two of the pirates were taken by surprise when a group of crew members attacked them. “Maybe some of the crew are frustrated and we are feeling the same but our boys never opted for violence, this was a provocation,” he told AFP by telephone.
Another report of the incident, by Russian Ren TV, quoted one of the pirates as saying that the crew responsible would be “seriously punished”.