by David Steven | Aug 4, 2008 | Conflict and security, North America, South Asia
So…The US is hassling Pakistan to crack down on its border regions. But it wants the Pakistanis to use the same tactics that it failed with in Afghanistan (and Iraq, of course). Yes, it’s another episode of the dysfunctional US-Pakistan relationship.
All this comes, according to the LA Times, after the new, and beleaguered, Prime Minister of Pakistan, Yusaf Raza Gillani, “got an earful from both the White House and Congress about the need to act far more aggressively in the tribal areas.” Their response? Send in the Special Forces. A US-trained and equipped commando division is being sent to the tribal region, we are told. Its mission – to put the insurgency to the sword.
I am sure this is a heady stimulant for the armchair warriors in the White House, but it flies in the face of the US counterinsurgency doctrine, which states flatly that “the military forces that successfully defeat insurgencies are usually those able to overcome their institutional inclination to wage conventional war against insurgents.”
But conventional war has long been the strategy of choice for Pakistan to deal with its internal problems (problems that could eventually lead to total state failure). Look at what happened back in 2004, when the US bullied General Musharraf into a disastrous attack on the tribal areas:
The tribesmen considered the military action as an attack on their autonomy and an attempt to subjugate them. Attempts to persuade them into handling over foreign militants failed and, with apparent mishandling, the military offensive against suspected al-Qaeda militants turned into an undeclared war between the Pakistani military and rebel tribesmen. Anger grew as government forces demolished the houses of members of the defiant tribes as collective punishment and seized their properties, even in other parts of the province.
The result was humiliation. One Colonel took shelter in a mosque and emerged with the Koran on his head, begging for mercy. Tribesmen stripped him of his uniform, and sent him on his way. In the end, the army signed a truce with the militants – a move that was widely (and rightly) interpreted as surrender.
In 2004, there was some excuse for this. The US, after all, was still learning some very hard lessons in Iraq, lessons that led David Petraeus to come back to the US believing that:
Success in a counterinsurgency requires more than just military operations. Counterinsurgency strategies must also include, above all, efforts to establish a political environment that helps reduce support for the insurgents and undermines the attraction of whatever ideology they may espouse.
Five years on, however, and the US’s Pakistan policy remains stuck in the dark ages. One of the most fragile countries on earth continues to be used as a political football in Washington (with Obama a willing participant, sadly).
The US’s field manual on counter-insurgency is selling well on Amazon (who would have predicted that a few years ago?). It described counterinsurgencies as ‘learning competitions’. At the moment, that’s one game we’re clearly losing.
Can I suggest that someone in Washington RTFM and reads it soon?
(Via Juan Cole.)
by Charlie Edwards | Aug 3, 2008 | UK
I can’t be the only one scratching my head at the Conservative Party’s summer holiday reading list. It’s week 2 of silly season, I grant you, and journalists will take pretty much anything on offer, but this just smacks of column filling (that said perhaps some of the larger tomes will act as wind breakers and/or sun shades on the beach).
According to the Sunday Times the reading list was chosen by Keith Simpson, a shadow foreign affairs spokesman and a former lecturer at Cranfield and Sandhurst. This is clearly reflected in his choice of reading material as 24 of the 38 books are on military history, geography, and terrorism. Nudge, the book currently feted by all three political parties looks like a definite afterthought.
What I find so puzzling is the choice of books on offer. I really can’t believe Cameron will be leafing through Empires of the Sea or Five Days in London on his hols.
There are no decent books on China (the more recent by Will Hutton, Charles Grant and Mark Leonard). What about Clay Shirky’s Here Comes Everybody; Diplomacy by Henry Kissenger, or Thomas Rick’s Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2003 to 2005? The list of good books is endless – this list is meaningless.
MPs have approximately 11 weeks off, so here’s how they might spend their summer holiday (according to Keith Simpson):
(more…)
by Richard Gowan | Aug 3, 2008 | East Asia and Pacific, Economics and development, Global system, Off topic
A story from Australia.
A charity program sending bras to women in developing nations has provoked debate about what’s appropriate assistance. The Uplift Fiji project has sent out more than 40,000 second-hand bras from Australia to countries such as Fiji, Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea. But a women’s development organisation in East Timor says Operation Uplift is a classic example of a donor driven project that shows little understanding of the needs of developing communities. Nance Haxton reports from Adelaide.
HAXTON: Uplift Fiji organisers say the program gives women in developing countries dignity, and prevents fungal infections and abscesses on the chest wall that can result from living in tropical climates without wearing a bra. Rotary International ships the second-hand bras overseas to a number of countries, with a thousand bras going to Papua New Guinea this week. However not all organisations are supportive of the project. The Alola Foundation in East Timor was established by Kirsty Sword Gusmão to increase the status of women in that country through community development grants, humanitarian relief and advocacy. The community programs adviser for the foundation based in Dili is Meredith Budge. She says projects such as Uplift Fiji can do more harm than good.
BUDGE: These kinds of projects really are, only, I think designed to focus on the donor, the person who feels good because they can give something that they would otherwise throw in the rubbish. But what happens is that you then create this dependency relationship.
HAXTON: She says her main concern is that programs such as Uplift Fiji are essentially misdirected, and can undermine local economies.
BUDGE: Dumping a whole lot of second-hand and possibly new bras in a charity fashion actually would undermine the ability of anybody to actually start up a decent and cheap supply business in that country.
HAXTON: She says the Alola Foundation is now discouraging donations of second hand goods, because often they are in poor working order, can be bought more cheaply locally, and then only add to rubbish collection problems.
BUDGE: We can buy things far more cheaply here because we’re part of the Asian environment, and can get cheap things from Indonesia, than can possibly be bought in Australia and then shipped over here.
HAXTON: Uplift Fiji national coordinator Liz Baker says they sort the bras in Australia and only send them in biodegradable packaging. She says the project was created to address a critical need.
BAKER: The women we are shipping to have asked for bras. The project started because women were asking a particular aid worker for bras and she was giving hers away on a regular basis in isolated communities. In Fiji in particular, while there’s second-hand clothing available, there’s not second-hand bras in sizes to suit the Fijian women who are substantial women; and they tend to be D to E cups. So while other things they can get their hands on; they really can’t obtain bras unless they’ve got the price of a week’s wages, which is what a new bra costs at the moment.
HAXTON: Liz Baker says ultimately there is room for many different approaches to community development and international aid.
by Richard Gowan | Aug 2, 2008 | Conflict and security, UK
We are all for joined-up, cross-sectoral security. And we can talk the talk. Track back through Global Dashboard, and you’ll soon be au fait with the language of community resilience, breaking down institutional silos, scanning the strategic horizon, etc. It’s a source of satisfaction that this blog is gaining semi-oracular status among those who care (nay, think outside the box) about this stuff.
But please don’t use this language when confiscating matches, kerosene, bits of wood or other bonfire materials. A lesson learned the hard way in Belfast:
Sinn Fein Assembly member Daithi McKay claimed he was assaulted yesterday following a row over a republican bonfire in Co Antrim. Mr McKay and a party colleague took several punches to the head outside a house in Dunclug Park, Ballymena. This was the latest incident in the fall-out over the decision by the local community association to cancel a bonfire marking the anniversary of the 1971 internment of republicans.
A police spokesman confirmed: “At around 13:50 we received a call to Dunclug Park about an assault on two members of Sinn Fein. “We are investigating the allegations. Police believe the incident was a reaction by a small number of people in the area to a multi-agency approach to the removal of bonfire material.”
So, nothing to do with the historical legacy of internment then. Phew. (Thanks to Gordon Peake for this – I’ve noted his acute commentary on our art before).
by Richard Gowan | Aug 1, 2008 | Conflict and security, Cooperation and coherence, South Asia
My recent extended growl about the parlous state of peacekeeping has been cited as evidence in a fascinating online debate among Indian security analysts on whether their army should stay committed to UN operations. This debate is significant because (i) India is consistently among the top three contributors to UN forces, along with Pakistan and Bangladesh; (ii) it is even more important in terms of hard-to-find assets like helicopters; (iii) it is suffering a run of negative publicity about how badly some of its troops behave (the fact that a lot of this snark comes from the BBC irks some in the debate, who detect post-colonial prurience).
With India’s economy growing fast, the payments it receives from the UN in return for its troops are increasingly irrelevant. So might there come a moment when India decides that blue helmet deployments no longer befit its status and interests as a great power? Yes, and the sooner the better, according to two hawkish strategists in the Indian Express in early July. Edited highlights:
More Indian troops have died in the line of their UN duties than from any other country. According to the Indian Embassy in the US, “India has risked the lives of its soldiers in peacekeeping efforts of the United Nations, not for any strategic gain, but in the service of an ideal. India’s ideal was, and remains, strengthening the world body, and international peace and security.” That the Indian government should take pride in risking the lives of Indian soldiers in the “service of an ideal” is appalling. It now serves little more than bureaucratic interests.
In order to give the issue the attention it demands, India should immediately suspend all further UN deployments. This should be followed by a graduated withdrawal of all Indian troops operating under the UN flag. There might be a case for a small, token presence, in carefully chosen theatres. It is time for India to stop seeing foreign troop deployments as “risking lives in the service of an ideal.” Rather, they should be seen as being tightly coupled with vital foreign policy objectives, like for instance, securing India’s construction crews in Afghanistan. As India’s economic interests expand globally, it is likely that the need for such deployments will increase.
You can follow the debate sparked by these comments over at Pragmatic Euphony, a blog devoted to India’s national interest. Fears of new violence ahead in the eastern Congo suggest that Indian peacekeepers may be in the headlines again this summer, as this is one of the theatres in which they are squarely on the frontline. A rapid drawdown of Indian forces isn’t imminent – New Delhi has good reasons to look responsible after (i) it took flak for helping kill off Doha (whatever the merits!) and (ii) the IAEA signed off on the US-India nuclear deal this week.
But these online stirrings may be the start of something bigger. India could well lose faith in the relevance of peacekeeping – recent violence in Kashmir and reports that Pakistan was implicated in July’s attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul are reminders that it has urgent problems on its doorstep to tend to. New Delhi is also deeply skeptical about all the current talk about the Responsibility to Protect (as it demonstrated during the Burmese cyclone crisis) and is liable to demand an ever-greater say in UN strategy-making if it is to stay involved. That raises the tricky question of when if ever India will get a permanent Security Council seat…
If India cut back on its peacekeepers it would be incredibly difficult to sustain big peace operations in places like the Congo. This is often obscured by (i) a lazy assumption that the South Asians will be peacekeepers forever out of habit; (ii) a focus on the views of African troop suppliers, especially in Darfur; and (iii) possibly excessive excitement about the prospect of other countries getting involved, like China. China’s peacekeeping commitments are still less than a quarter of India’s.
I’ve got yet another academic analysis of the dynamics of UN ops out, in a book on “Strategies for Peace” (don’t be put off by the lime-green cover). I wrote it ages ago, but it highlights the South Asian contribution and how UN missions rely on a global compact between three categories of state: “those in which large-scale peace operations are deployed (mainly in Africa); those which supply the bulk of peacekeeping forces (most notably in South Asia and Africa); and those that provide most of the funding for peace operations (the United States, EU members and Japan).” Lose the Indians, and that compact starts to unravel.
Unfortunately (or thankfully, depending on your perspective) this new article isn’t online. But it concludes along the lines of a shorter think-piece I published last year about developing a new strategic consensus that all those involved in UN ops can buy into if they are to keep on keeping on… a consensus, I infer from the Indian online debate, that should be couched in interests not ideals.
UPDATE: check out Pragmatic Euphony’s interesting riposte to this post here.
