Supply or demand? Which way to fight drugs?

by | Aug 1, 2008 | Conflict and security, Global system, South Asia

That cheeky discusser Alex seems to be both praising me and taking me to tasks for believing that a supply-side approach to the Afghan drugs trade will make a difference to drug use in Britain.

Why I have never. . .in fact, I have never. I have never been a supply-sider, at least as CN is concerned. I think we need to help the Afghan government deal with the ballooning opium economy because its existence is deeply corrosive of the Afghan state. If we do not, it will never be able to establish itself, deliver basic services (like order) and deal with threats to its power and the lives of its citizens.

That’s not the same thing as saying that a supply-side strategy will combat drug use worldwide. As David Mansfield, Britain’s leading drugs researchers, notes: “The overall success of supply side interventions will be contingent on reductions in demand both internationally and increasingly in source countries.”

A prime example of the failure of supply-side policies is the U.S crackdown on drugs in Colombia, which Alex highlights. Despite the progress that has been made within Colombia’s borders, little effect has been had on the overall drug war — due to the persistence of American demand, Peru and Bolivia have moved to fill the supply vacuum. But not only did regional production not decline, there were unforeseen political consequences in the countries where coca growth was resurgent – for example the rise of Evo Morales, a former coca grower who rallied the support of Bolivia’s coca growers to won the presidential elections.

But that does not mean all supply-side is useless. It means that you need both supply-side and demand-reduction. For me, CN in Afghanistan was part of the state-building project. I realise that Tony Blair, when he agreed that Britain should be the G8 lead for counter-narcotic, was focused on the flow of heroin into Britain – and probably hoped to keep the British public supportive of the Afghan mission if they could see a direct connection to their daily lives. But few people I worked with on the issue while I was in the Civil Service thought that way.

In addition, we worked hard to highlight the need for demand-reduction inside Afghanistan where demand-reduction facilities are low and the risk of Hep C and other diseases attacking a vulnerable and at-risk population were considerable.

When the UN’s 2005 survey of drug usein Afghanistan was published – estimating that there were 920,000 drug users in the country – I went around the Ministry of Counter-narcotics making bets with the Minsters and senior officials to see if they could guess the number of users. The then-Deputy Minister – now Minister – General Khodeidad guesses a high 10.000, and refused to believe me when I gave him the right figure. In other words, the Afghans themselves are quick to talk about our demand reduction, but struggle to deal with their own demand.

Live to fight another day

by | Aug 1, 2008 | Influence and networks, UK

I think Jules gets it wrong in his analysis of the options facing David Miliband. Jules writes:

If he doesn’t make an outright challenge for the leadership now, he will look like he has bottled it, twice, and will begin to look like the Michael Portillo of the Labour Party. If he does challenge Brown and lose, he will look like a loser. If he wins, he will most probably lose the election against Cameron, and will look like a loser. And, least likely scenario of all, if he wins the election against Cameron, he will still have to rule the country with a screwed up economy and a disgruntled electorate grown tired of Labour.

He should have let Brown lose, let the Tories win, let the Tories wallow in recession, let Labour re-group and himself assert his authority over the party in opposition, before coming back to beat the PR toff PM, who will very likely underperform when in power.

As I argued in my post on disruptive politics, the problem is in Jules’s seductively simple prescription that, after an election defeat, Miliband should “let Labour re-group and himself assert his authority over the party in opposition.”

That’s very unlikely to happen – even with a failing economy as the albatross around David Cameron’s neck. In opposition, demoralised by electoral humiliation, and with many of its most talented figures without seats, the Labour Party is almost certain to tear itself apart (with the media fuelling the frenzy).

That’s why Miliband’s best hope (from a self-interested point of view) is to take over now, head quickly for an election, and use his honeymoon bounce to try and turn a disastrous loss into the kind of battling one that the British love.

Momentum is everything in politics. If Miliband’s Labour were to lose the election on the up, then Cameron would take over as PM already looking rattled. In opposition, Miliband could focus his troops on a counter-attack – encouraging the media to sniff Tory not Labour blood.

Take over after a monumental landslide, in contrast, and the psychological damage would already have been done. Labour will spend years portrayed as hapless losers – remember how long it took the Conservatives to escape from this trap.

Miliband would not longer be a prospective Prime Minister. He’d be William Hague, starting a painful period of rebuilding that will benefit the next leader, or the next but one. Then his best hope would be ending up as Foreign Secretary again – in nine or ten years’ time.