Crisis is nothing new to the European Union. In fact, crises have made the EU’s foreign policy what it is, filling most of Javier Solana’s office hours. But the bloc is about to face a particularly serious crisis over the likely ouster of Turkey’s democratic government by the Turkish military.
Turkey’s military views itself as the guardian of the secular principles of the Turkish state, and has carried out three coups since 1960. In 1997 it led a campaign to force from power Turkey’s first Islamist-led government. It is now gearing up to conduct another one, this time using judicial processes rather than tanks and troops.
In July, Turkey’s top court is likely to outlaw the country’s ruling party and bar its president and prime minister from politics. The AK Party is accused of trying to undermine Turkey’s secular constitution and establish an Iran-style Islamic state. The leaked diary of Turkey’s navy chief has detailed how the military have pressurized the country’s court so as to get the results they want.
This would be disastrous for Turkey. Since capturing an outright majority in the Turkish Grand National Assembly in late 2002, and after wining again in 2004, AK has undertaken an impressive array of reforms. After ramming reform packages through the legislature, the European Commission determined in October 2004 that Turkey had met all the legal requirements to begin accession talks.
Sure there have been bumps on the road. On a number of occasions the European Commission has had to warn the government. But a military coup would not only halt reforms; it would encourage a radical response from the AK Party’s supporters, who, for the second time, will be denied their democratic right. What comes after the AK may be the very thing that military says it fears: a radicalized Islamic movement that shuns compromise and democratic politics in favor of the violent destruction of Turkey’s secular state.
This can be in nobody’s interest. Turkey is not only an important strategic partner, able to assist Iraq’s reconstruction and key for stability in the Black Sea and Caspian littoral. Under Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the government has shown a willingness help solve the long-standing dispute over Cyprus, support reconstruction in the Balkans and assist peace-making in the Arab-Israeli conflict. By being on the (admittedly slow) path towards European integration, Turkey also puts paid to the idea of clash of civilizations.
The EU needs to join forces with the outgoing Bush administration and communicate in clear terms that a military coup, however dressed-up, would be unacceptable and damage Turkey’s European integration. More, the White House needs to work with Congress to send a signal that a new administration – whether run by John McCain or Barack Obama – would be equally unhappy with a military take-over.
If a coup does happen, the EU should suspend – although not entirely stop – Turkey’s European integration and present a new government with a clear set of conditions for the resumption of EU-Turkey relations. NATO also needs to consider how to deal with a military-run Turkey. Having forced new members to adhere to democratic standards it cannot just accept the overthrow of Turkey’s democratic government.
Longer-term, civilian oversight over the military must be front and centre of the EU’s demands. Of the democratic reforms that Turkey has undertaken, none is more important and controversial than those related to the Turkish military’s power. For example, in December 2003, the legislature terminated the military’s exclusive control over a discretionary pool of funds that was generally used for weapons procurement. But this has clearly not been enough. A specially-created audit board should investigate all the military’s expenditures and report to parliament.
In exchange for such demands, the EU needs to re-examine what it can offer Turkey. President Nicolas Sarkozy’s call for a special relationship between the EU and Turkey will have played no small part in the military’s calculations. Though Prime Minister Erdogan has pursued pro-EU policies, he has become increasingly disillusioned with the entry negotiations. The military – while weary of EU integration, which can curtail their power in ways NATO membership cannot – will seek to play on Turkish disillusionment with the EU. Countering such propaganda will require tangible promises to a new civilian government.
