by Alex Evans | Mar 7, 2008 | Conflict and security, Europe and Central Asia
As regular readers will be aware, my fellow Global Dashboard columnist Richard Gowan is never happier than when Europe is burnishing its peacebuilding credentials, whether on Iraq, Chad or elsewhere. So we can all share in Richard’s joy when he learns that the Council of Europe has appointed former UK Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott to lead a mission to rescue Armenia from its current instability. Prescott, it will be recalled, has in the past proved his mettle on conflict management in Kovosa and the Balklands, so we’re expecting great things.
Gowan replies: Alex is correct to guess at my excitement at this new twist. I don’t know a huge amount about Armenia, but it seems to be a land of medieval vendettas, casual violence and incomprehensible oaths. So sending Mr Prescott is an act of genius.
by Alex Evans | Mar 7, 2008 | Influence and networks, UK
The Spectator’s Fraser Nelson has an excellent comparison of the effectiveness of Brown’s and Cameron’s inner circles (hit-tip: Red Box). As Nelson reports, the new Leo McGarry double act in Number 10 – Stephen Carter running the special advisers, Jeremy Heywood the officials – seems to be delivering:
The PM no longer takes part in the No. 10 early morning conference call — where Whitehall’s commanders are given their marching orders. Instead, he has ceded the floor to Mr Carter who ensures everything is in order then reports back. If an issue arose with another department, Mr Brown’s instinct was to engage in some light telephone terrorism by ringing the Cabinet member involved. Now, say those inside No10, he will leave it to Carter and Heywood to talk to their counterparts and resolve the issue. In the early days, Brown was once notorious for refusing to release any document or plan he had not signed off – making No 10 a bottleneck. Now, he is content to hear Carter or Heywood has given the all clear.
The tone of conversations inside No10 has already changed. Those who overhear Mr Carter and Mr Heywood in their meetings with Mr Brown say that phrases like ‘It’s OK, we’ll fix it’ or “it’s all right, we’ll deal with it” are common. The Prime Minister’s supporters say he’s always devolved to people he trusted – it’s just that he could count the people he trusted on two hands. Now, in Carter and Heywood, he has come the closest to replacing Ed Balls and Ed Miliband – whom he lost to the Commons in 2005 and now serve in his Cabinet. “Gordon is normally very, very slow to trust new people,” one Brownite tells me. “But he trusts Carter.” It may sound incredible, but Gordon is slowly letting go.
by Richard Gowan | Mar 7, 2008 | Conflict and security, Europe and Central Asia
Now that it looks likely that Kosovo is heading for some sort of de facto partition, there’s a sense of weary inevitability abroad. Of course this was coming, the argument goes, and it won’t be long before some other Balkan backwater is trying redraw its border – Tim Judah has a typically excellent summary of the possible hot-spots here. I suspect that one of the medium-term results of events in Kosovo will be that anyone who talks about minority rights and reconciliation is going encounter a frosty reception in foreign ministries for quite a while. “We spent a decade promoting ruddy ‘education for all’ in Kosovo,” will come the answer, “and what did we get? Bunch of beardies yelling obscenities at our troops, that’s what!”
I’m pretty skeptical about the vast majority of youth reconciliation initiatives, community-based peacebuilding and the like, and my skepticism is based on (admittedly limited) experience of minority rights work in the Balkans. But I have just come across evidence that suggests that, until the middle of last year, Kosovo was making genuine progress towards being a tolerant, multi-ethnic society. That has fallen apart in the last six months in the run-up secession – but leaves some hope that, once the current kerfuffle is over, a pluralistic Kosovo might function.
This evidence comes from one of the very few international projects in Kosovo that has always worked pretty well: the “Early Warning Report” series of quarterly opinion polls run by UNDP and USAID across the province. These correctly showed a massive loss of public faith in the UN administration prior to the (otherwise largely unforeseen) March 2004 riots that threw the internationals into confusion.
By contrast, the polling data from mid-2006 to mid-2007 – essentially the period that the West was pushing for a UN-mandated deal on Kosovo’s independence – suggested that both Kosovo Serbs and Albanians were starting to accept pluralism:
- By the second quarter of 2007, half of Kosovo Serbs surveyed said they’d be happy to work with Albanians – two thirds would be happy to live on the same street, and 80% would be happy to live in the same town.
- Kosovo Albanians were less keen on cohabitation, but only a fifth of them said that inter-ethnic relations could “never” be normal. Roughly half said that they’d be normal in the near or distant future – the same was true on the Serb side, although there was a tendency to say it’d be “distant”.
- So even if it wasn’t exactly an inter-ethnic love-in (quite literally as the one thing virtually no respondents of either background would contemplate was inter-marriage) at least there was a vague sense of moving in the right direction. And, crucially, most people didn’t think it was heading the wrong way. In the first half of 2005, still shaken by the previous year’s riots, up to 96% of Kosovo Serbs said they thought relations were “tense and not improving”. That fell to 10% by mid-2007 (the Albanian community seemed more relaxed on this score throughout, but then they had less to lose from things going haywire, or so it seemed at the time).
Alongside these trends there was evidence that both Serbs and Albanians were growing more trusting of NATO and the UN. Had Serbia and the Kosovo Albanians come to some sort of compromise on independence, it might have all gone rather smoothly. Even if the Security Council had ruled that Kosovo was independent in mid-2007 over Belgrade’s objections, these figures suggest there was a viable base for a tolerant (or at least tolerable) settlement inside Kosovo.
There would still have been trouble in the Serb-majority north – the figures were far less promising there than among those Serbs living in enclaves in the rest of the province. Perhaps partition was inevitable. That’s what a lot of UN officials were predicting. But they also noted that, among the enclave Serbs, pragmatic entrepreneurs were getting bored of their dogmatically anti-Albanian politicians.
But the final tumble towards independence through the latter half of last year reversed the positive trends. By the third quarter of 2007 (the last period we have results for) fewer than 30% of Kosovo Serbs said they’d work or even live near Albanian. Nearly two-thirds said relations would never be normal. A similar number said relations were tense and worsening – faith in NATO/UN collapsed.
Albanian opinion shifted less dramatically, although the trends were generally mildly negative. Unsurprisingly, the realisation that Kosovo was headed for a unilateral declaration of independence was a real shock to inter-ethnic relations. But, before one returns to cliches about ancient ethnic hatreds, it’s worth underlining this basic fact: an inter-ethnic modus vivendi was emerging in Kosovo before independence got messy. If the Albanians are clever, and Belgrade isn’t too stupid in the months ahead, it may be possible to salvage parts of that.
by Richard Gowan | Mar 5, 2008 | Africa, Conflict and security, Europe and Central Asia
Just after making light of incidents on Kosovo’s periphery below, I’ve been alerted to much nastier events on the Chad/Darfur border. An French EU soldier has been killed and another wounded, having strayed into Sudan (I’m sure there are already conspiracy theories out there about how this happened, but let’s not pursue them). As if this wasn’t bad enough, the EU Force in Chad has apologized for entering Sudanese territory – that may have been necessary to defuse tensions and get the body back, but it leaves a sour taste. I don’t recall Sudan grovelling after its forces apparently backed the rebellion in Chad at the start of February, or after any number of other recent cross-border clashes.
This is not the first time an EU mission has lost personnel to a hostile act (that happened in the Balkans in the 1990s) but none of it previous military missions to Africa had suffered a fatality. I’ve addressed the potential impact of something like this on EU security policy before: there are obviously far worse scenarios involving greater losses, but it feels like a grim turning-point all the same. By unhappy chance, I have a new article* out on the meaning of last month’s fighting in Chad, calling it a “predictable crisis”. Here’s the core of the argument:
Three things are already clear. One is that, for the first time, an EU military deployment is not only encountering significant violence (that has happened elsewhere, as in earlier operations in the Congo) but is fuelling violence in its own right. The second is that the consensus underpinning EU security cooperation is being severely strained by the experience. The third is that this combination of events was all too predictable.
This doesn’t just mean there were concrete warnings that Chad could turn ugly, although doubts were raised about the mission from very early on. The UN Secretariat – now responsible for over 55,000 peacekeepers in Africa, many of them in highly volatile situations – had resisted getting involved in Chad as there was “no peace to keep”. In private, European officials complained the mission’s proposed deployment (one year) was too short and its personnel far too few (analysts called for 10,000 troops or more).
But, whatever the specifics of this crisis, the generic threat that an operation in Africa turning bad could harm European security cooperation has been present for far longer. That is because there has never been a real consensus on the need for such operations.
Today’s events probably won’t show up this lack of consensus too badly, as the dead man is French – had he been from one of the other contributors to the mission (Ireland, say, or Austria) there would probably have been an uproar. But this is a sad day for the EU.
* Eagle-eyed Europhile readers may note an error in the article: I claim that the 2003 European Security Strategy doesn’t refer to Africa. It does, and I knew that – sorry!
by Richard Gowan | Mar 5, 2008 | Conflict and security, Europe and Central Asia
Exciting news from Kosovo. As I reported on Monday, Serbia tried to strengthen its claim to to the province by “reclaiming” a railway there – i.e. it sent two trains down the line. Well, information just in proves that you can burn border posts and/or the U.S. embassy, but nobody messes with UNMIK Railways:
The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) today reasserted control of a rail line in northern Kosovo, a day after Serbian Railways had challenged its authority over the stretch. Joachim Rücker, the head of UNMIK and the Secretary-General’s Special Representative, said that the intervention of UNMIK Border Police “reverses the challenge to UNMIK’s authority that occurred yesterday when Serbian Railways illegally sent two of its trains south of Leshak/Lešak.”
In a statement issued in Pristina, Mr. Rücker noted that about 9.35 a.m. today UNMIK Border Police at the Leshak/Lešak train station informed a representative of Serbian Railways that their train would not be allowed to travel south, and Serbian Railways complied. The envoy stressed that “any movement south of Leshak/Lešak by Serbian Railways is a clear challenge to UNMIK’s authority . . . and will not be tolerated.”
I know this is important really, but I’m left wondering what would happen if Scotland were to declare UDI and Gordon Brown attempted to assert his authority by sending a Virgin Express north of the border. It would doubtless be stuck in Manchester due to leaves and Britain would fragment accordingly…
