Last week Gordon Brown announced the publication of the UK’s first national security strategy in a statement to the House of Commons. Most analysts and commentators in the media welcomed the strategy like an ungracious three year old receiving a complicated birthday present; instead of playing with the new toy opts for the relative simplicity of the box it came in. And so it was with Brown’s statement.
The debate on the Strategy was muted because Brown and his advisers had packed the PM’s statement full of ideas and initiatives (some of which had already been announced before – allowing opposition parties to suggest, quite legitimately, that this was more than spin than substance). However this was clearly what No.10 and the media wanted, No.10 because they could point to what the government was planning to do and the media because they could report how the Government was protecting the public.
What was so disappointing was that we missed a valuable opportunity to debate the contents of the Strategy and instead had to make do with stories about Private Pike, Dad’s Army and civil defence networks mixed with musings from pundits about what a national risk assessment might actually include. But before delving into the strategy and highlighting some of the more obtuse media commentary its worth highlighting a recent post by John Robb on the future of national security:
Imagination: A deficit in imagination will soon be the critical determinant on whether the national security bureaucracy remains relevant in a rapidly changing global security environment.
National security architecture and black swan events: When another unanticipated situation occurs again (and it will, likely in a increasingly rapid succession as small group warfare climbs an exponential ramp of productivity improvements), the public will not be as generous as they were the first time to a legacy organization that can’t/won’t do the job we pay it for. In fact, the public’s displeasure will likely be expressed in a series of major defunding events for the national security bureaucracy.
Funding will already be very scarce: The combination of demographically driven entitlement spending (the first baby boomers retire this year), ballooning deficits (funded by harder to get and more expensive debt), and an inability to raise new federal revenue (money under pressure moves global) means that money will be very tight. As a result, the Federal government’s discretionary budget will suffer significant and prolonged shrinkage.
A need to show results: Given insufficient funding over a prolonged period, much more attention will be paid to the returns of investment from government programs (a result of too many programs chasing an ever tighter budget in an increasingly transparent society). Those programs that don’t perform well, will fall under the axe. Further, citizens, who increasingly view themselves as customers of government security services rather than passive recipients, will be increasingly critical of failures from programs that cost plenty but deliver little.
Competition from below: New, grass roots efforts at the state and local levels will compete favorably against national programs. As in: if the federal bureaucracy can’t protect us, we will do the job ourselves locally (New York City has already paved that pathway with its own counter-terrorism center). Expect a fight between local and federal, a fight where the local wins.
Robb concludes: The smart money is on a failure to change, irrelevance, and organizational dissolution – here’s why…
The Strategy is, broadly speaking, pretty good. Some of the detail (such as the blue box on national security reform which charts this Government’s approach to national security since 2002) is of questionable relevance, but given the timetable for publication, the bruising encounters between officials in the Cabinet Office and latterly between officials and special advisers the result is an excellent first step. For the first time the UK has a national security strategy. This is no mean feat.
It is also good news to see a set of guiding principles for the British Government when managing the UK’s national security.
Principles
1. Our approach to national security is clearly grounded in a set of core values;
2. We will be hard-headed about the risks, our aims, and our capabilities;
3. Whenever possible, we will tackle security challenges early;
4. Overseas, we will favour a multilateral approach;
5. At home, we will favour a partnership approach;
6. Inside government, we will develop a more integrated approach;
7. We will retain strong, balanced and flexible capabilities; and
8. We will continue to invest, learn and improve to strengthen our security.
And to have such a clear aim.
The aim of the strategy is to set out how we will address and manage this diverse though interconnected set of security challenges and underlying drivers, both immediately and in the longer term, to safeguard the nation, its citizens, our prosperity and our way of life.
The Strategy articulates the Government’s approach (though not in detail) and explains the Government will work more with ‘partners’. This section clearly needs to be unpacked further (given the current attempts at a Collaborative State) but at least the Strategy raises the spectre of a Government that is keen to engage with the public and private sector. Finally the Government articulates how it wants to manage risks in this complex, interconnected and interdependent world and identifies areas for further work.
We will consider: how to strengthen the Government’s capacity for horizon scanning, forward-planning and early warning to identify, measure, and monitor risks and threats; and our capacity for strategic thinking and prioritisation, spanning traditional boundaries between domestic and foreign policy, defence and security, and intelligence and diplomacy.
That said the Strategy got a peculiarly rough ride in the media. I can only assume this is more of a reflection of how Gordon Brown and his Government is perceived rather than the question marks over the strategy. But it is instructive to note just how poor many think the Strategy is. I also think one must take into account the biases of certain commentators and Whitehall insiders, oh and the how ignorant people can be… Take the following post from Iain Dale:
My contact in the Ministry of Defence was a relieved man this afternoon after having heard Gordon Brown’ statement on a National Security Strategy. In fact, he chortling at a job well done by the MoD. He reckons they saw off the PM’s attempt to seize powers from them, and instead what he has set up is a series of talking shops. “Instead of a National Security Strategy, what they’ve come up with is the New Labour equivalent of a National Neighbourhood Watch Strategy – makes everyone feel good but achieves bugger all.”
And while Peter Hennessy did welcome the report and seemed generally in favour of it he suggested that:
Last week’s document, subtitled “Security in an interdependent world”, is very Gordon – a mixture of Lord Curzon (we Brits still have a chunk of high-quality armed forces at out disposal so Johnny Foreigner had better watch out) and Blue Peter (we Brits can lead the world to relieving poverty in Africa, and then, next week, to alleviating climate change).
The Telegraph on the other hand didn’t even bother to conceal its anger or come to think of it the author’s ignorance.
Hundreds of thousands of starving people walking into Europe is intelligibly to be regarded as a threat to national security, so it is at least arguable that, if global warming will have that consequence, it ought to be considered in the National Security Strategy. But what is flu doing on the list? Or flooding?
Oh dear.
Meanwhile David Cameron welcomed the Strategy but suggested that the Prime Minister’s plan looked “rather more like a list than a strategy”. He also questioned why Mr Brown had not set up a US-style National Security Council with executive powers intead of “a talking shop and confusion”.
Finally there was some really good news that no one picked up on. According to Lord West Britons are less at risk from the threat of terrorism than they were one year ago. Surely that is cause for a small celebration?
