The morning sessions were quite good, but the problem the old school (sitting behind and to the left of me) had was that most of the presentations were just scene setters. Paul Cornish, on the other hand, said they were more like undergraduate lectures on international security.
We aren’t able, it seems, to move beyond talking about the big trends, poles of power and the possible or probable impacts of global risks on societies (now or in the future). Instead, we get stuck discussing how difficult it is to reform the institutions that make up the international architecture – while revelling in conversations about food security and resource scarcity because they’re relatively new and fashionable issues and there is no baggage (or at least not quite so much baggage) attached to them.
Next month I’m talking at a Chatham House conference on security and defence futures. I’m meant to be critiquing the British government’s new national security strategy – but given that it apparently won’t be published for another few weeks, I’m going to opt for setting out some potential routes forward instead.
Back to the Hague and the afternoon sessions were ok. I chose the workshop on risk management processes and made three mediocre points:
– We can be more imaginative in the risk management process
– We need to pay more attention to the possible risks rather than focusing solely on the probable ones
– We should build and develop more comprehensive scenarios as part of the risk management process. At the moment, the majority focus on specific events or issues.
Final thoughts:
– Black swan event: Being offered milk at lunch
– Conference fact: The Dutch have one word for safety and security: Veiligheid (neat)
– Realpolitik: I learnt that the European Commission created a Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network (CIWIN) in 2003 to facilitate exchange of information on shared threats and vulnerabilities and appropriate counter-measures and strategies. Not only did it get a poor reception from member states, but some even refuse to use it. The Commission also wants more information on ‘near misses’ which can inform their work and share them with member states. Get this: Officially the Commission can’t ask a member state for that information (they have to go through various back doors). Mad, isn’t it? No incentive to share information means that member states don’t: what’s in it for them?
Back to Blighty…
