Game Theory

Adolescents who spend more time playing online strategy games than concentrating on their studies may be making better choices for the future than their parents believe.

Historian Niall Ferguson has been running scenarios about what might have been through Muzzy Lane’s Making History game with the help of his 13 year old son. And according to Clive Thompson, writing in Wired, the experience has forced him to rethink some of his favourite theories completely.

Now Ferguson, best known for Virtual History, a 1997 book based on asking ‘what if’ about historical events ranging from World War 2 to the English Civil War, is working with Muzzy Lane to design a new game. Due out in 2008 it will model modern, real-world conflicts, and allow players to tweak strategies and approaches to these problems.

According to Thompson:

“Ferguson discovered something that fans of war-strategy and civilization-building “god” games have realized for years: Games are a superb vehicle for thinking deeply about complex systems. After you’ve spent months pondering the intricacies of the weapons markets in Eve Online, or the mysteries of troop placement in Company of Heroes, you develop a Mandlebrotian appreciation of chaos dynamics — how a single change can take a stable situation and sent it spiraling all to hell, or vice versa”.

The EU’s clueless central Asia policy

Last week, the Kremlin signed a deal with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan that apparently stymies the mooted Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline, which the EU was hoping would free up some Turkmen gas from the bear hug of the Kremlin. Instead, it looks like for the time being, all Turkmen gas will be exported via Gazprom.

There was a brief window of opportunity for the EU to try and woo the new president of Turkmenistan, Gurbanguly Berdimuhammedov, after president Turkmenbashi died suddenly earlier this year.

But did the EU ever really have any hope of winning over the new president? The Kremlin would have had top politicians on the plane immediately to Ashgabat, with promises of major new investments and major personal financial incentives for all concerned. The EU would have sent some minor bureaucrat several months later, to discuss the possibility of a wide-ranging partnership including strengthening the country’s judiciary and possibly supporting some sort of theatrical festival.

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Phone economics

A neat study reveals the economic benefits of mobile phones in developing countries:

“As phone coverage [in Kerala] spread between 1997 and 2000, fishermen started to buy phones and use them to call coastal markets while still at sea. (The area of coverage reaches 20-25km off the coast.) Instead of selling their fish at beach auctions, the fishermen would call around to find the best price… [As a result], no fish were wasted and the variation in prices fell dramatically. By the end of the study coverage was available in all three regions. Waste had been eliminated and the “law of one price”—the idea that in an efficient market identical goods should cost the same—had come into effect, in the form of a single rate for sardines along the coast.

This more efficient market benefited everyone. Fishermen’s profits rose by 8% on average and consumer prices fell by 4% on average. Higher profits meant the phones typically paid for themselves within two months.”

Why not an auction?

All week, season ticket holders at Liverpool Football Club have been up in arms at a denial of their “right” to a ticket for next week’s European Champions’ League Final. Yesterday, meanwhile, Prince sold out tickets for seven London gigs in twenty minutes (and crashed his booking system to boot).

For most events, ticket prices are fixed (at least until touts/scalpers get hold of them) and supply limited. Demand has to be restrained by rationing – ballots (skewed by points for loyalty) for football; chance (and the willingness to hammer away at F5) for music.

But all this begs questions that should (and probably do) bother economists. Why are ticket prices kept so far below what people are prepared to pay? Why do event promoters (irrationally) allow so much revenue to leak away to touts? Why aren’t auctions, or other market mechanisms, used to equalise supply and demand? (more…)