by David Steven | Apr 18, 2007 | Conflict and security, Cooperation and coherence, Influence and networks
For Lind et al (writing in their draft field manual), 4th generation warfare is about fighting an idea rather than fighting for territory (in Afghanistan, the Soviets failed because they ‘could not operationalize a conflict where the enemy’s strategic center of gravity was God’).
Fight an idea with conventional weapons and you often fail. ‘Every physical victory,’ Lind says, ‘may move you closer to moral defeat.’ So how do you win when strength itself can be an Achilles heal?
Lind draws the idea of a ‘moral defeat’ comes from John Boyd, the fighter pilot and godfather of contemporary military theory. For Boyd, third generation or manoeuvre warfare (think WW2 blitzkrieg) is all about using speed, ambiguity and innovation to confuse, disorient and then break the enemy. (more…)
by Jules Evans | Apr 17, 2007 | Europe and Central Asia
I’m in Kiev on a business trip. Kiev is great, actually. It’s sunny, it’s green, it’s full of beautiful women. It may actually have more beautiful women here than Moscow, and Moscow has a lot of beautiful women.Yesterday I went to a conference by Concorde Capital, a local brokerage. In the day-time, fund managers ran around from meeting to meeting with local managers who want their capital.
Then in the night-time we were all taken to a club called Tsar, where we were greeted by ten women wearing only body-paint and a few feathers. They winked and gave us shots of evil-smelling liquor. Then we went into the main room, where more scantily-clad women were dancing on podiums. (more…)
by David Steven | Apr 16, 2007 | Conflict and security, Influence and networks
The winner of the US Army Information Operations Proponent (USIOP) essay-writing competition, Elizabeth Robbins, explores [pdf] the rise of the Milblogger and asks:
(1) “Who speaks for the Army?” (2) “If everyone may speak, what is the impact?” and (3) “What controls, if any, should the Army impose on soldiers?”
Her conclusion?
Military blogs written by those in muddy boots… are a combat multiplier in the information domain… Commanders at every level must boldly accept risk in order to support the rewards and warfighting advantage sthat soldier-authors bring to the information battlespace.
by David Steven | Apr 16, 2007 | Economics and development
For those of you following Wolfowitz’s woes, World Bank President has full coverage, including this response, from a World Bank retiree, to the President’s latest attempt to save his job…
“In his email of April 14, Wolfowitz draws our attention to his ‘significant facts.’ The ‘significant facts’ he omits are:
1) The Board was willing to accept his recusal but had to back down because apparently after subsequent advice from his attorney he had a change of heart and refused to recuse himself on “professional relationship” with his girlfriend. So his offer of recusal was a farce (and the Board saw it as such).
2) Contrary to his assertion that he was only looking after the interests of the Bank, the documents make it abundantly clear that he was only interested in safeguarding Riza’s interests. It was he who devised the package (with Ms. Riza’s help?) rather than HR.
3) Contrary to what he says, he was actively involved in devising the package for Riza, overruling the considerably less generous (and more reasonable) package proposed by HR. He cleverly directs Coll to give Riza an option between the two packages. One has to be stupid to elect to choose the vastly inferior package.
4) He was clearly both negotiating for Riza and turning around and acting like the ‘decider’.
If this is not corruption, I don’t know what is.”
Background here.
by Alex Evans | Apr 15, 2007 | Conflict and security, Cooperation and coherence, Influence and networks
This weekend’s light reading: Principles of Emergency Planning and Management, by one David Alexander of the University of Massachussetts. Amid chapters covering such recondite matters as emergency cartography, how many people can be carried lying down by a range of transport helicopters and what a triage tag looks like (this), there’s an intriguing section about myths and misassumptions about disasters, often perpetuated by the news media. For example:
Myth – When disaster strikes, panic is a common reaction.
Reality – Most people behave rationally in disaster. Although panic is not to be ruled out entirely, it is of such limited importance that some leading disaster sociologists regard is as insignificant or unlikely.
Myth – Looting is a common and serious problem after disasters.
Reality – The phenomenon of looting is rare and limited in scope. It mainly occurs when there are strong preconditions (i.e. a disaster is hardly necessary to start it off), as when a community is already deeply divided.
Myth – Disasters usually give rise to spontaneous manifestations of antisocial behaviour.
Reality – Generally, they are characterized by great social solidarity, generosity and self-sacrifice, perhaps even heroism.
(more…)
